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Summary 
Previous research has examined a variety of behavioural effects, thought to stem 
from mental exhaustion, following the prior use of inhibitory control.  Here we attempt 
to examine whether such effects are apparent in unconscious behaviours.  Chapter 1 
demonstrates no effect of prior use of inhibitory control on subsequent susceptibility to 
subliminal priming of neutral (Experiment 1) and reward (Experiment 2) terms.  
Chapter 2 explores whether the prior use of inhibitory control influences the degree of 
susceptibility to an alternative source of influence, hypnotic induction, and provides the 
novel finding that inhibitory impairment does not affect hypnotic response.  Chapter 3 
utilises behavioural and fMRI imaging data to examine changes in a conscious facet of 
human experience often moderated by unconscious influences: emotion regulation.  The 
results support a period of increased mood lability following a challenging inhibitory 
control task.  However, we were unable to provide evidence of any underlying change 
in cortical activation and connectivity.  Finally, Chapter 4 investigates whether this 
heightened mood lability following prior inhibitory control would also be mirrored in 
ratings of emotion attributed to positive and negatively valenced images (Experiment 1) 
and additionally, whether a mindfulness induction, previously documented to improve 
emotion regulation, would reduce individuals’ perception of the degree of valence 
attributed to the same images (Experiment 2).  Contrary to predictions, we report 
substantial evidence for no effect of prior inhibitory control or a brief mindfulness 
manipulation on subsequent ratings of emotionally valenced stimuli. 
Taken together the research indicates that mental exhaustion arising from the use of 
self-control appears to have no effect on susceptibility to unconscious priming, hypnotic 
suggestions, and no effect on the perception of emotionally valenced images.  However, 
prior use of inhibitory control does appear to affect the degree of emotional lability 
experienced following music. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Literature Overview 
Self-control is a defining feature of the human race and refers to the ability to 
regulate urges and resist temptation in the pursuit of competing goals.  It is one aspect 
of executive inhibitory control and is often referred to colloquially as willpower.  
Effective self-control presents many opportunities for personal growth and goal 
attainment.  As such, its practical importance is of great significance with the failure to 
exert self-control held to contribute to many of society’s challenges such as obesity, 
debt, drug and alcohol abuse, criminality, and racial discrimination (Inzlicht & 
Schmeichel, 2012).  In fact, studies have shown that self-control is a more powerful 
predictor of academic success than IQ itself (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005).  Even 
when controlling for socioeconomic status and intelligence, those with higher levels of 
self-control as children, grow into adults with better physical and mental health with 
fewer criminal convictions, less incidence of substance abuse and better financial 
security (Moffitt et al., 2011).   
Self-control has been a hot topic of research for several decades and has 
predominantly been experimentally explored using a dual task paradigm, which requires 
participants to complete two consecutive tasks requiring some form of inhibitory 
control, in order to examine the extent to which exerting control on one task affects the 
degree of control which individuals apply to subsequent tasks.  For the first task, 
participants are typically split into two conditions requiring them to complete either an 
easy or difficult version of a task requiring inhibitory control.  Participants in both 
conditions subsequently complete a further inhibitory control task on which their 
performance is compared.  The literature consists of over 300 studies which report a 
limited capacity for further attempts at self-control following the difficult inhibitory task 
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(contrast Dang, 2017; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010, with Carter & 
McCullough, 2014), demonstrated via worse performance on the second task in 
comparison to their control counterparts who completed the easy task.  The research 
shows that the reduced capacity for self-control on the second task results in heightened 
aggression (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007), risk-taking (Fischer, 
Kastenmüller, & Asal, 2012), impulsivity (Vohs & Faber, 2007), over-eating (Hofmann, 
Rauch, & Gawronski, 2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), underachievement 
(Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003) and greater levels of stereotypical responses 
on tests of implicit racial bias (Govorun & Payne, 2006). 
Despite the importance of self-control in shaping human experience, attempts to 
model self-control (explored further below) have thus far proven inconclusive and 
consequently our current understanding of the mechanisms involved is fundamentally 
limited.  More research is necessary to determine how our cognition and behaviour is 
affected by the prior use of inhibitory control.  Whilst much research has demonstrated 
the effect of prior self-control on subsequent conscious behaviours, it is interesting to 
consider how it might similarly affect how we respond to unconscious influences.  Over 
the course of this thesis I therefore aim to investigate how mental exhaustion, arising 
from the prior use of inhibitory control, affects how we process, respond, or attend to 
unconscious influences. 
Models of Self-Control 
The Resource (or Strength) model of self-control has dominated for some time 
and portrays self-control as a capacity which relies upon an internal and limited 
resource which once used, takes time to replenish (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998).  The model proposes that exerting willpower consumes this 
resource, resulting in ‘ego-depletion’; a state in which further attempts to exert self-
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control are increasingly difficult (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010).  Whilst 
the self-control literature outlined above appears to support this account to a degree, the 
extent to which the findings can be seen as evidence for the Resource model has been 
widely disputed (see Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012) and attempts to characterize the 
nature of the ‘resource’ suffering depletion have thus far been without success. Early 
proposals that the resource may be blood glucose levels (Gailliot, Plant, Butz, & 
Baumeister, 2007; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008) have since been robustly 
challenged (Beedie & Lane, 2012; Dang, 2017; Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010; Kurzban, 
2010; Martijn, Tenbult, Merckelbach, Dreezens, & de Vries, 2002; Schmeichel & Vohs, 
2009; Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007) and without a means to pinpoint 
the resource in question, the model is fundamentally limited.  
An alternate explanation comes from the Process model of self-control, a model 
which proposes a shift in motivational orientation and attentional focus following acts 
of self-control at time 1 (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012).  That is, after the initial act of 
self-control, individuals become less motivated to exert control and more motivated to 
indulge as attention is shifted away from cognitive and affective cues signalling the 
need for self-control, and toward cues signalling rewards.  One proposed account for 
this shift in motivation is ‘self-licensing’; the idea that after exerting self-control once, 
individuals feel that they can then justify indulgences (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012).  
Support for the process model comes from studies demonstrating that offering rewards 
for self-control at time 2 or boosting motivation to exhibit control appears to counteract 
Baumeister et al.'s (1998) ego-depletion effect (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003).  
Other more recent models of self-control continue this trend toward a 
mechanistic revision of self-control.  For example, the Opportunity Cost Model 
(Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013) depicts self-control as reliant on 
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computational mechanisms which weigh up the costs and benefits of a given task in 
order to assess to which task executive functions are most usefully deployed.  It is 
believed that mental fatigue, experienced as effort, is an adaptive and necessary signal 
to cue goal switching and the reallocation of processes to a more beneficial task 
(Kurzban et al., 2013). 
A neurological account of self-control comes from Heatherton and Wagner's 
(2011) balance model which depicts self-control as a precise balancing act between 
brain regions such as the lateral and medial areas of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
responsible for inhibiting impulses, and those regions responsible for monitoring the 
reward and salience of stimuli such as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and Striatum.  
Self-control fails when the impulse is stronger than the processes needed to inhibit it or 
when frontal executive processes are disrupted, such as in the case of the ‘ego-
depletion’ effect.   
Opprobrium and Reappraisal of the Depletion Literature 
The self-control literature, and the Resource model in particular, has recently 
become the subject of much debate.  Carter and McCullough (2014) reported an 
incidence of high rates of publication bias in Hagger et al.'s (2010) meta-analysis which 
had led to an overinflated medium to large effect size (d = 0.62, 95% CI = 0.57, 0.67).  
In response Carter, Kofler, Forster, and McCullough (2015) published their own meta-
analysis including a number of unpublished papers and found little evidence of the ego 
depletion effect (adjusted g = 0.24, 95% CI = 0.13, 0.34).  Furthermore, a registered 
replication report, involving 23 laboratories (N = 2141) similarly found little to no 
evidence of ego-depletion (Hagger et al., 2016).  Taken together, these studies sparked 
high levels of interest regarding the reliability and replicability of the self-control 
literature.  
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A key issue within the literature is ensuring that the task employed as the 
manipulation is inherently exhausting enough to reliably produce ‘depletion’ effects.  
Recently, a meta-analysis by Dang (2017), has addressed this by systematically 
investigating the effectiveness of different tasks used as the inhibitory control 
manipulation.  Employing much stricter procedures and addressing issues regarding the 
inclusion criteria in Carter et al. (2015), Dang demonstrated that so long as the task 
utilised as the inhibitory control manipulation is experienced as being more mentally 
exhausting, then it does appear to illicit the subsequently depleting effects observed on 
behavioural outcomes.   
Various inhibitory control tasks have been employed in the literature ranging 
from highly cognitive tasks such as the colour naming Stroop (e.g. Bray, Martin Ginis, 
Hicks, & Woodgate, 2008; Dahm et al., 2011; Govorun & Payne, 2006; Hagger et al., 
2010; Vohs, Glass, Maddox, & Markman, 2011; Webb & Sheeran, 2003, exp. 1), to 
those requiring participants to suppress emotions (e.g. Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 
2007; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003, exp. 2; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000, exp. 
3) and thoughts (e.g. Fischer, Kastenmüller, & Asal, 2012; Vohs & Faber, 2007, exp. 2), 
or resist the temptation to eat highly desirable foods (e.g. DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, 
& Gailliot, 2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000, exp. 1 & 2).  These tasks most often 
comprise of a difficult condition requiring high levels of inhibitory control and an easy 
condition requiring minimal inhibitory control.  Some such examples include the 
emotion video, e-crossing task, attention essay and attention video.  During the emotion 
video (e.g. a video of an animal being harmed) those in the easy (control) condition are 
told to freely watch the video whilst those in the difficult (experimental) condition are 
asked to regulate their emotions by supressing or exaggerating their responses.  For the 
e-crossing task, participants are provided with sheets of text and are asked to cross out 
7 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
every letter ‘e’ in accordance with particular rules; In the easy condition participants are 
asked to cross out every letter ‘e’ whilst those in the difficult condition are asked to 
cross out every letter ‘e’ unless it is one letter away from or next to another vowel.  
During the attention essay manipulation, participants are required to write about a 
particular topic whilst either avoiding the use of common letters such as ‘a’ and ‘n’ in 
the difficult condition or avoiding the use of uncommon letters such as ‘q’ and ‘z’ in the 
easy condition.  The attention video involves participants watching a video during 
which stimuli appear on screen; those in the easy condition are simply asked to watch 
the video whilst those in the difficult condition are told to pay attention to the video, 
ignoring any stimuli appearing on screen.  Dang (2017) reported that the strongest and 
most reliable of the inhibitory control tasks are the emotion video, attention essay and 
the Stroop task.  In addition, in the case of the e-crossing task (Baumeister et al., 1998), 
while it was not always experienced as exhausting or effortful, those who did find it so 
exhibited the expected ‘depletion’ effect on subsequent behaviour.  The overriding 
message in Dang (2017) therefore, is arguably more promising for the self-control 
literature than that of Carter et al. (2015).  Instead of suggesting that the literature is of 
limited theoretical value, Dang instead highlights the importance of the inherent 
effectiveness of each inhibitory control task in creating more inhibitory demand and 
mental exhaustion in order to determine whether or not the resulting findings are 
meaningful.   
One way to determine the effectiveness of the inhibitory task employed in 
research studies is to include a manipulation check which asks participants to rate how 
mentally exhausting they felt the task was.  These ratings of exhaustion can then be 
compared between groups in order to ascertain that those undertaking the difficult 
(experimental) task find it significantly more exhausting than those in the easy (control) 
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condition.  This method is common place within the literature (e.g. Bray et al., 2008; 
Fischer et al., 2012; Friese, Binder, Luechinger, Boesiger, & Rasch, 2013; Friese, 
Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008; Friese, Messner, & Schaffner, 2012; Govorun & Payne, 
2006; Grillon, Quispe-Escudero, Mathur, & Ernst, 2015; Webb & Sheeran, 2003) and is 
adopted in the four papers presented in this thesis.  Here we define mental exhaustion as 
a psycho-physiological state stemming from sustained mental performance (see van der 
Linden, Frese, & Meijman, 2003) which is associated with a heightened perception of 
mental load, feelings of fatigue, inattentiveness and impulsivity (see Kuo & Sullivan, 
2001).  Mental exhaustion is also thought to contribute to changes in mood, specifically 
inducing irritability and aggression (see Kuo & Sullivan, 2001).  As such in Papers 3 
and 4, where emotional lability and variability of valence ratings were crucial dependent 
variables, it was important to control for any between group differences in emotion 
which may have stemmed solely from the mentally exhausting nature of the inhibitory 
task.  In order to control for this, participants rated their mood in terms of 5 emotions 
(happy, sad, angry, aroused, anxious) before and after the inhibitory task.  The 
following section considers how exhaustion arising from inhibitory tasks influences the 
executive processes responsible for inhibitory control.  
The Role of Executive Function in Inhibitory Control 
Executive functioning refers to the top-down cognitive processes necessary for 
working memory, attention, emotion regulation, problem solving and inhibitory control 
(Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Patrick, Blair, & Maggs, 2008), which 
enable individuals to function in a socially-desirable, organised, and goal-orientated 
manner (McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010; Miyake et al., 
2000).  Previous research has extensively documented brain regions which appear to be 
recruited for executive functioning and inhibitory control (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; 
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De Pisapia, Turatto, Lin, Jovicich, & Caramazza, 2012; Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; 
Lenartowicz & McIntosh, 2005); these regions include areas of the PFC and the anterior 
cingulate gyrus which form the executive attention network and function to monitor and 
resolve conflicts among cognitive processes by promoting and suppressing the 
activation of other networks (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001).  These 
areas have been consistently implicated by inhibitory control tasks such as the Stroop 
(see Fan, Flombaum, McCandliss, Thomas, & Posner, 2003; Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, 
Flombaum, & Posner, 2005) reinforcing the notion of their important role in effective 
inhibitory control and regulation.  
Whilst the mechanisms underlying the ‘depleting’ effect of prior inhibitory 
control are not yet fully understood, it would appear to result from a switch from 
carefully controlled processing to a reliance on unconscious cognitive processes.  More 
specifically, it appears that when the top-down cognitive capacity necessary to regulate 
responses, such as the executive attention network, has been implicated (i.e. by the prior 
use of inhibitory control) there is a switch instead to a reliance on bottom-up processing 
resulting in behaviour being driven by impulses, desires, and implicit response 
tendencies (see Bertrams, Baumeister, Englert, & Furley, 2015; Hofmann et al., 2007).  
Evidence for such an effect is demonstrated in self-control studies which compare 
performance on Implicit Association Tests following either an easy or difficult 
inhibitory control task.  Such studies have reported higher levels of stereotype 
consistent responses, as if individuals are relying on automatic implicit attitudes in the 
absence of adequate cognitive resources needed to inhibit such responses (e.g. Govorun 
& Payne, 2006).  Taken together, these results appear to show that the depletion effect 
stems from compromised functioning of prefrontal executive control processes.  It is 
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interesting to consider those individual differences which might result in a greater 
susceptibility of inhibitory control processes from prior tasks.  
Individual Differences 
There are many individual differences which contribute to the successful ability 
to exert control over automatic implicit responses.  Whilst some have documented a 
positive relationship between individuals’ trait levels of self-control and their ability to 
overcome the ‘depleting’ effects of prior inhibitory control (Gillebaart & de Ridder, 
2015; Muraven, Collins, Shiffman, & Paty, 2005) others have documented the opposite 
effect (Imhoff, Schmidt, & Gerstenberg, 2014) or failed to find a relationship at all 
(Stillman, Tice, Fincham, & Lambert, 2009).  The Self-Control Scale (SCS; Tangney, 
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004) is included in the four papers presented in this thesis, in 
order to further explore evidence either for or against a relationship between trait self-
control and the ability to consistently apply control processes to subsequent tasks.   
Effective inhibitory control is of upmost importance to healthy cognition.  Those 
with lower levels of self-control are found to engage in more health risk behaviours 
(Wills, Isasi, Mendoza, & Ainette, 2007) and report higher rates of psychopathological 
symptoms associated with depression, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, phobias 
and paranoia (Tangney et al., 2004), see de Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, 
& Baumeister (2011) for a meta-analysis.  One factor which affects the incidence of 
such symptoms is emotion regulation.  
Emotion Regulation and Inhibitory Control 
Emotion regulation is a facet of inhibitory control which enables individuals to 
manipulate the original trajectory of their emotional response as a means to respond in a 
more socially desirable, adaptive, or beneficial manner.  Whilst emotion regulation 
often happens on an unconscious, automatic basis, changes to the emotional response 
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can also happen through the conscious recruitment of strategies such as, biting one’s 
tongue or breathing deeply (see Gross, 2015).  Emotional stability and inhibitory control 
are highly correlated (Tangney et al., 2004) with those individuals exhibiting high levels 
of control, experiencing less intense moods with fewer fluctuations (Layton & Muraven, 
2014).  As previously discussed, the emotion video which requires high levels of 
emotion regulation, is one of the most effective ‘depleting’ inhibitory control tasks (see 
Dang, 2017) and is often employed in the literature (e.g. Hofmann et al., 2007; 
Schmeichel et al., 2003, exp. 2; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000, exp. 3).  
For most individuals, emotion regulation happens automatically (Volokhov & 
Demaree, 2010) however in the absence of the means needed to successfully regulate 
responses, emotions can maladaptively bias cognition.  Individuals with low levels of 
control show poorer inhibition of negative emotions (Kieras, Tobin, Graziano, & 
Rothbart, 2005).  Interestingly, but perhaps not unsurprisingly, many disorders 
characterised by a lack of inhibitory control are linked with failures in emotion 
regulation (Eftekhari, Zoellner, & Vigil, 2009) such as anxiety (Cisler & Koster, 2010; 
Cisler & Olatunji, 2012), Bulimia Nervosa (Anestis et al., 2009), and Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD; Skirrow et al., 2014; Walcott & Landau, 2004). 
Therefore, the importance of examining the influence of states of inhibitory control 
(whether depleted or not) on processing in both clinical and non-clinical populations 
remains an important endeavour in order to better understand processing in those 
suffering from disorders characterised by persistently low levels of self-control.   
Another facet of research directly related to the inhibitory control literature and 
thought to similarly effect emotion regulation, and cognition and behaviour in general is 
cognitive load theory which is discussed further below.  
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Cognitive Load versus Inhibitory Control Depletion 
Cognitive load theory, developed by Sweller (1988), is built on Atkinson and 
Shiffrin's (1968) model of information processing comprising of working, long-term, 
and sensory memory stores.  Cognitive load specifically concerns working memory, 
also known as short-term memory, which refers to the cognitive ability to process and 
consciously manipulate information (Maranges, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2017).  
Working memory is used for language comprehension and problem solving among 
other executive processes (Cowan, 2010) and is thought to predict cognitive 
performance on a variety of tasks such as the Stroop, antisaccade, and dichotic-listening 
task (Engle, 2002).  Miller (1956) claimed that working memory can only hold up to 
around seven pieces of information (e.g. numbers, letters, or words) at one given time.  
Whilst the exact limit and nature of the capacity is still under enquiry, researchers are in 
agreement that working memory has a limited capacity which can only hold up to 
around 3-5 chunks of information at a time (Farrington, 2011; Halford & Andrews, 
2009), see Cowan (2010) for a review.  Due to its limited capacity, tasks relying on 
working memory impose what it is termed ‘cognitive load’ which can impede 
performance on other tasks requiring executive function (Ariely, 2000) resulting in for 
example, increased antisaccade task reaction times and errors (Berggren, Hutton, & 
Derakshan, 2011; Engle, 2002) and greater distractor interference (Dalton, Santangelo, 
& Spence, 2009).  As a result of cognitive load, individuals exhibit a tendency to rely 
instead on implicit modes of thought and long-term schematic information (Ariely, 
2000; Drolet & Luce, 2004; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). 
There are many parallels between the effect of inhibitory control induced ‘ego-
depletion’ and cognitive load, not least the fact that both states appear to reduce the 
resources available to successfully perform a secondary task requiring carefully 
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controlled cognitive processes.  Interestingly, Diamond (2013) stresses that working 
memory and inhibitory control processes actually support each other.  For instance, 
individuals must be able to use working memory to keep goals in mind to exert 
inhibitory control and act in a goal-directed manner; likewise, individuals must be able 
to recruit inhibitory control to supress irrelevant information in order to free up working 
memory for the task at hand (Diamond, 2013).  Despite this Maranges et al. (2017) 
directly compares the two and highlights differences pertaining to the onset, recovery-
time, and task specificity of, the state of reduced cognitive control.  Crucially, cognitive 
load effects performance on concurrent tasks, while depletion influences performance 
on a secondary task after the prior exertion of inhibitory control.  Furthermore, 
cognitive load can affect performance on any task requiring the use of working memory 
(Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert, & Viding, 2004) whilst depletion appears to only effect tasks 
requiring some vestige of inhibitory control and does not affect working memory (see 
Maranges et al., 2017 for a full comparison).  
When comparing the effects of cognitive load and prior inhibitory control on 
emotion regulation, research is less conclusive.  The prior exertion of inhibitory control 
impairs effective emotion regulation resulting in increased amygdala activation 
(Wagner & Heatherton, 2013).  Whilst some researchers suggest cognitive load appears 
to prevent the full processing of emotional stimuli which results in decreased amygdala 
activation and less influence on subsequent behaviour (Drolet & Luce, 2004; Maranges 
et al., 2017; Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2009), others have reported a greater 
reliance on emotion as a source of information under periods of high cognitive load 
(Schwarz, Strack, Kommer, & Wagner, 1987; Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998), this is 
referred to as the mood-as-input hypothesis and is explained further below.  
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Mood-as-Input  
The mood-as-input hypothesis explains individuals’ decisions to stop or 
continue at a task in terms of an interaction between their stop rules (e.g. ‘as many as 
can’ or ‘feel like continuing’) and information about whether they have met their goals, 
for which their current mood is used as a source of information (see Meeten & Davey, 
2011, for a review).  The hypothesis has been used to successfully explain perseverative 
behaviours such as depressive rumination (Hawksley & Davey, 2010; Watkins & 
Mason, 2002), catastrophic worrying (Startup & Davey, 2001, 2003) and perseverative 
checking (Benie MacDonald & Davey, 2005).  Mood is more likely to be used as 
information when the individual does not have access to other sources of information 
such as expertise (Forgas & Tehani, 2005), and less likely to be used where the source 
of their mood is salient and believed to be irrelevant to the task at hand (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983).  Cognitive load theory is known to influence this effect; as cognitive load 
increases, individuals are more likely to attend to their mood and use it as a source of 
information (Schwarz et al., 1987; Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998).  This intensifies during 
a state of negativity where individuals have a greater desire to understand and repair 
their mood (see Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  Whilst it is less clear whether inhibitory 
control depletion has the same effect, it is feasible that mental exhaustion arising from 
the prior use of inhibitory control might result in a higher tendency to rely on mood as a 
source of information.  Thus, individuals might be more sensitive to mood 
manipulations following a prior inhibitory task which is cognitively demanding, 
especially if the task itself has induced some degree of negative state such as those 
associated with exhaustion (e.g. anger or irritability).   
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Unconscious Processing 
An important question which underlies each of the papers presented in this 
thesis is whether mental exhaustion arising from the prior use of inhibitory control 
leaves us more susceptible to unconscious influences.  Unconscious influences have 
been of enduring interest in psychological research relating to emotion, attention, 
decision making, motivation and attitudes.  However, one of the greatest complications 
in the study of cognition and behaviour in terms of consciousness lies in the ability to 
empirically distinguish when an individual has, or does not have, conscious awareness 
(Schooler, Mrazek, Baird, & Winkielman, 2015).  
Consciousness can be referred to as the “subjective status” of mental content 
such as thoughts, feelings or perception (Schooler et al., 2015).  One school of thought 
adopts an ‘all-or-none’ view of conscious perception suggesting that the distinction 
between the unconscious and conscious is a clear dichotomy (Sergent & Dehaene, 
2004).  However, such an account fails to determine the characteristics of conscious 
content.  Just because one is consciously able to report seeing a flash of some kind of 
stimulus does not mean that they are consciously aware of the content of that stimulus.  
For example, in a word priming paradigm, where words are presented subliminally 
before a judgment must be made regarding the nature of the word, one might be aware 
of seeing a masked stimulus but not be able to correctly categorise it as either a word or 
a non-word.  In this case, according to a dichotomous account, an individual would be 
thought to have conscious awareness despite them having no conscious recollection or 
awareness of the content of the stimulus itself.  Due to numerous states of awareness 
which are difficult to classify as either purely unconscious or conscious, consciousness 
can also be viewed as a gradient (see Norman, 2010).   
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Further Schooler et al. (2015), suggest that levels of consciousness can be 
determined in relation to at least three characteristics: (1) a genuine unawareness, (2) 
awareness without meta-awareness, and (3) genuine meta-awareness.  Here meta-
awareness refers to an individual’s knowledge about their own awareness.  For example, 
being able to self-reflect on their awareness of a particular stimulus or the effect that it 
is having on them.  The authors stress that these three categories are not exhaustive and 
that other distinctions are highly possible.  In support of these characteristics, Dienes 
and Scott (2005) define unconscious knowledge as knowledge an individual has despite 
not being conscious of having it (i.e., an awareness in the absence of meta-awareness).  
Much research now endorses the use of confidence ratings, where participants report 
whether they are guessing or have a degree of confidence in their judgement, to 
establish levels of unconscious knowledge (see Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 
1995; Dienes & Scott, 2005).  Here, the absence of conscious knowledge of 
subliminally presented stimuli is indicated by a lack of confidence despite being able to 
correctly discriminate between stimuli (see Scott, Samaha, Chrisley, & Dienes, 2018).  
Such research suggests that consciousness can be defined by a series of dichotomies that 
distinguish between the conscious content of the experience.  That is, each trial can be 
followed by a series of dichotomous judgements which enable researchers to distinguish 
between conscious and unconscious knowledge.  For example, ‘Did you see anything? 
(yes or no)’, ‘Did you see a word or non-word? (word or non-word)’, ‘Do you have any 
confidence in your judgment? (some confidence or guessing)’.  If an individual is able 
to classify strings as either a word or non-word with above chance accuracy but report 
that they are guessing it is thought to be unconscious in the sense that they appear to 
have awareness without meta-awareness.  
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There is a wealth of research documenting the effects of a variety of 
unconscious influences on behaviour and cognition.  Research postulates that mental 
content can be consciously experienced without any mindful reflection about the effect 
of that content on an individual’s own cognition, emotion, perception, or behaviours 
(i.e. such as failing to recognise your emotional state until someone asks you to reflect 
upon it) or lacking in any conscious awareness of the cause of the emotional reaction 
(Damasio, 1995).  Interestingly, research shows that an individual who gains meta-
awareness of a pleasant feeling or emotion, is less likely to enjoy it or feel positively 
about it than an individual who has no explicit meta-awareness of their mood state 
(Schooler, Ariely, & Loewestein, 2003).  Emotionally valenced subliminal primes (such 
as positive or negative words) have been shown to unconsciously influence subsequent 
evaluations of stimuli in the absence of any conscious awareness.  For example, Custers 
and Aarts (2005), used an evaluative conditioning paradigm to demonstrate that 
subliminally presenting an activity (e.g. “reading”) alongside a positive word, increased 
the rated appeal of that activity in comparison to those that were paired with a neutral 
word.  Similarly, Strahan, Spencer, and Zanna (2002), reported an unconscious 
influence on an indirect measure of mood, namely that a subliminally presented sad or 
neutral face altered individuals’ ratings of a subsequently presented piece of music such 
that those who had been unconsciously presented with the sad face rated the music as 
more sad than neutral controls.  Research has repeatedly reported that subliminal 
priming can activate and facilitate goal pursuit (cf. Bargh, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, 
Gollwitzer, & Trötschel, 2001; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010, with Pashler, Coburn, & 
Harris, 2012) and can influence attention in the absence of conscious awareness (see 
Jiang, Costello, Fang, Huang, & He, 2006).  In terms of implicit learning, research 
shows that individuals are able, with above chance accuracy, to apply implicitly learnt 
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rules in the absence of a conscious ability to verbalise knowledge of the structure of 
these rules (Dienes & Scott, 2005).  Such findings further reiterate the existence of 
intermediate levels of awareness which cannot be easily categorised as either purely 
unconscious or conscious (see Dienes & Scott, 2005; Norman, Price, Duff, & Mentzoni, 
2007).  
For the purpose of this thesis we take the unconscious to be an absence of meta-
awareness; for example, where there is a dissociation between subjective reports and 
influence on behavioural measures.  Whilst Paper 1 is arguably the most direct test of 
unconscious processing, the subsequently presented papers examine influences which 
are either experienced as subjectively non-volitional (e.g. hypnosis, Paper 2), or have an 
impact on emotion regulation, a process which is thought to often be elicited in the 
absence of subjective awareness or meta-awareness of a particular mood state (see 
Koole & Rothermund, 2011).  Further, whilst individuals might be aware of their mood 
state, they could remain unaware of the cause of that change in emotion (Paper 3) or the 
effect it has on subsequent responses (Paper 4). 
Summary and Rationale  
Previous research has documented the effect of challenging inhibitory tasks on 
subsequent self-regulatory behaviour that would typically be considered under 
conscious control; the effect of such influences has been shown to result in a variety of 
negative behavioural outcomes (see Fischer et al., 2012; Vohs & Faber, 2007; Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2000).  The four papers presented in this thesis explore whether the effects 
of prior inhibitory challenge extend beyond conscious outcomes to include unconscious 
influences on cognition and behaviour.  This research will help to determine the extent 
to which impeded self-control, observed to occur after an inhibitory task, arises not 
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simply from conscious disinhibition but from a greater susceptibility to unconscious 
influences.    
Paper 1 examines the effect of a difficult prior inhibitory control task in 
comparison to an easy task on subsequent susceptibility to unconscious priming of 
neutral (Experiment 1) and reward (Experiment 2) words in a stem completion 
paradigm.  Whilst the inhibitory control manipulation proved effective, with the 
difficult task being rated as significantly more exhausting, neither the degree of 
inhibitory challenge nor trait self-control influenced subsequent susceptibility to 
unconscious priming for either neutral or reward salient stimuli.  Bayesian analysis 
provided strong evidence that this was a sensitive null effect and thus that the 
experienced mental exhaustion did not increase susceptibility to unconscious priming.   
Considering these findings, Paper 2 explores whether the prior use of inhibitory 
control might have an effect on subsequent susceptibility to an alternative source of 
unconscious influence, namely hypnosis.  Here, participants completed either an easy or 
difficult task before their responsiveness to four hypnotic suggestions was evaluated.  
Again, the inhibitory control task was experienced as more mentally exhausting.  
However, the results provide substantial evidence that the prior exertion of inhibitory 
control does not influence subsequent susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion.  
Paper 3 investigates emotion regulation, a facet of human behaviour which 
although conscious, is moderated by unconscious influences, following prior inhibitory 
control.  Specifically, this paper compares mood lability in response to a mood 
induction (via music) following either an easy or difficult inhibitory task in a 
behavioural (Experiment 1) and fMRI imaging (Experiment 2) design.  Experiment 1 
demonstrated that participants found the difficult inhibitory challenge more exhausting 
and provides strong evidence that the prior use of inhibitory control results in a period 
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of increased emotional reactivity.  Due to data insensitivity the behavioural results from 
experiment 2 were unable to provide evidence for or against any effect of the inhibitory 
control manipulation on subsequent mental exhaustion and mood lability.  Whilst the 
fMRI results showed significant clusters of activation in the hypothesised networks 
(default mode and executive control networks), after the inhibitory task, this was only 
observed when the results were collapsed across task condition.  Thus, the results were 
unable to provide evidence relevant to an effect of prior inhibitory control on cortical 
activity and resting-state network connectivity.  
Paper 4 examines, in Experiment 1, whether the period of heightened mood 
lability following prior inhibitory control (observed in Paper 3), would be reflected in 
individuals’ emotion ratings of positively and negatively valenced stimuli.  Conversely, 
Experiment 2 investigates whether a brief mindfulness manipulation, reported to 
increase capacity for emotion regulation, would reduce the severity of emotional 
response reflected in individuals’ ratings of the same set of positively and negatively 
valenced stimuli.  Whilst the inhibitory control task in Experiment 1 was again 
experienced as significantly more exhausting, the manipulation of inhibitory challenge 
had no effect on subsequent extremes of emotion attributed to images.  Similarly, in 
Experiment 2, whilst the mindfulness manipulation and mind-wandering control 
condition elicited equivalent engagement, there was no effect on subsequent extremes of 
emotion ratings.  
Taken together, the research presented in this thesis provides the novel 
contribution that despite the mental exhaustion arising from prior inhibitory control, 
such tasks appear to have no effect on subsequent susceptibility to unconscious 
influences arising from unconscious priming or hypnosis, and no effect on the emotion 
attributed to valenced stimuli.  Whilst mental exhaustion arising from the prior use of 
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inhibitory control does appear to result in a period of increased mood lability, 
limitations in the inhibitory control manipulation when applied in an fMRI context 
means that we are unable to draw conclusions relating to whether these effects are 
supported by changes in neural activation or resting-state connectivity. 
 
22 
Running Head: INHIBITORY CONTROL & UNCONSCIOUS PRIMING 
 
 
 
Paper 1: 
Susceptibility to Unconscious Influences is Unaffected by a Challenging Inhibitory 
Task or Mental Exhaustion 
 
Angela Gurney, Anna-Nepheli L. Lagos, Abigail Manning, Ryan B. Scott 
 
University of Sussex 
 
Author Note: 
A version of this paper is published in the journal Consciousness and Cognition as: 
Gurney, A., Lagos, A. L., Manning, A., Scott, R. B. (2018). Susceptibility to 
unconscious influences is unaffected by a challenging inhibitory task or mental 
exhaustion. Consciousness and Cognition, 58, 111-123. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.10.016 
 
AG designed the experiments with RS’s oversight.  AG ran the studies with assistance 
in data collection from two undergraduate students (ANL and AM).  The analysis and 
write up were completed by AG with comments and advice on the manuscript provided 
by RS.
23 
INHIBITORY CONTROL & UNCONSCIOUS PRIMING 
Abstract 
Unconscious influences have been demonstrated in a variety of behavioural contexts, 
however, a key question remains – to what extent do such influences vary with our 
changing mental states?  We examine whether a prior inhibitory challenge increases 
susceptibility to subliminal priming in a stem completion task employing neutral 
(Experiment 1) and reward salient terms (Experiment 2).  Results show stem 
completions to be significantly influenced by unconscious priming, and the challenging 
inhibitory task (the Stroop) to be significantly more mentally exhausting than the 
control task.  However, neither the degree of inhibitory challenge, trait self-control, nor 
task-related mental exhaustion significantly influenced unconscious priming.  Bayesian 
analysis provides strong evidence that prior inhibitory challenge does not affect 
susceptibility to unconscious priming.  The study supports the conclusion that 
unconscious processing can be independent of consciously experienced mental states 
and provides reassurance that inhibitory impairment, common to mood disorders, 
should not increase susceptibility to unconscious influences. 
 
Keywords: Inhibitory control; self-control; unconscious; subliminal priming
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Human susceptibility to unconscious influences has been of enduring interest in both 
lay and research contexts since the earliest psychological endeavours.  An extensive 
literature exists demonstrating the effects of unconscious priming in various forms on a 
variety of behavioural outcomes (e.g. Kiefer, 2002; Klauer, Eder, Greenwald, & 
Abrams, 2007).  An important question that is largely unexplored in this context 
however, is the extent to which such influences vary with our changing mental state – 
are we more susceptible to unconscious influences when tired or exhausted from prior 
mental exertion?  Gauging the extent of such variations could be especially important to 
understanding how unconscious influences contribute in a variety of clinical conditions 
characterised by chronic mental fatigue and impaired inhibitory control.  Those with 
low levels of self-control suffer from poorer inhibition of negative emotional responses 
(Kieras et al., 2005), engage in more health risk behaviours (Wills et al., 2007) and 
report higher levels of psychopathological symptoms including those linked to 
depression, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, phobias and paranoia (Tangney et 
al., 2004), see de Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, and Baumeister (2011) 
for a meta-analysis.  Thus, with control being paramount to a healthy human psyche, it 
is important to better understand how those suffering from mental fatigue might be 
differentially affected by unconscious influences.   
Hypnotism and evolutionary theory are often credited as being the first allusions 
to the unconscious, but it was Pierce and Jastrow (1884) who were the first to 
empirically study subliminal perception and to report the ability to distinguish between 
different stimuli, even in the absence of conscious awareness.  Another early account of 
subliminal priming comes from Sidis (1898), who presented participants with small 
cards printed with a single number or letter, at a distance from which they reported 
being unable to decipher the stimuli.  Despite reporting being unable to consciously 
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perceive the stimuli, Sidis discovered that when tested using a forced choice paradigm, 
the participants guessed the cards’ contents correctly at above chance, suggesting some 
level of unconscious perception.  Although it became a popular topic of research (see 
Adams, 1957, for a review), subliminal priming received much criticism from claims 
that there was a need for a higher level of certainty about participants’ awareness of 
primes or the implementation of a confidence criterion (Eriksen, 1960). 
Cheesman and Merikle (1984, 1986) distinguished between objective and 
subjective thresholds of conscious awareness.  The objective threshold is defined by the 
level at which performance in some discrimination is objectively at chance.  In contrast, 
the subjective threshold more directly taps the phenomenal experience and is defined by 
that level at which participants believe they are unable to discriminate the stimuli 
regardless of whether they actually show above chance accuracy (Jack & Shallice, 
2001; Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001).  The subjective threshold demonstrates a 
lack of meta knowledge in the sense that participants either truly believe they are 
guessing or show no correlation between their confidence and accuracy, referred to 
respectively as the ‘guessing criterion’ and ‘zero correlation criterion’, (Dienes, 
Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995).  There has been considerable evidence for priming 
below the objective threshold, however for the most part effects have been smaller, hard 
to attain and short lived (e.g. Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Klauer et al., 2007, though cf. 
Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009,  for a meta-analysis of 
subliminal priming effects who report no significant effect of using objective versus 
subjective thresholds).  In the present study, where the central purpose is to assess 
whether different mental states might affect our susceptibility to unconscious 
influences, it is important that we attempt to adopt the most sensitive of measures; for 
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this reason, we adopt a subjective threshold in identifying participants unconscious 
thresholds. 
One of the enduring paradigms for the study of unconscious influences, is the 
stem completion task (see Graf & Mandler, 1984).  This task involves presenting a word 
prime for a duration too brief to be consciously discerned and then requiring the 
participant to complete three letters (a word stem) to form the first word that comes to 
mind.  Typically, the word stem could be completed to form the subliminally presented 
word as well as multiple alternatives.  For example, for the prime ‘reliable’, the stem 
would be ‘rel’ and possible completions would include ‘reliable’, ‘relevant’, ‘relax’ etc.  
Valid inferences from a stem completion task clearly depend on each stem having an 
appropriate minimum number of alternate completions (Soler, Dasí, & Ruiz, 2015).  
Studies have consistently demonstrated that when participants report being unable to 
read the prime (i.e. it is below their subjective threshold), it nonetheless influences their 
subsequent choice of word completion (Perrig & Eckstein, 2005; Tiggemann, 
Hargreaves, Polivy, & McFarlane, 2004).  The stem completion paradigm has been 
employed extensively to study implicit learning (Fleischman et al., 2005), lexical 
memory (Nelson, Keelean, & Negrao, 1989) and memory related individual differences 
(Lorenzi, Giunta, & Di Stefano, 2006).  The present study exploits the stem completion 
task to index how the degree of subliminal priming differs across task conditions. 
 When exploring the potential effect of mental states on susceptibility to 
unconscious influences, a relevant literature is that which has sought to examine the 
effect of mental exertion on conscious behaviours.  This has predominantly been 
explored in the context of research seeking to manipulate self-control.  Such research 
has employed a dual-task paradigm to evaluate the extent to which exerting inhibitory 
control on an initial task affects the degree of control applied to subsequent tasks.  Prior 
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inhibitory tasks have been reported to influence subsequent behaviour in a variety of 
different ways, for example resulting in overeating (Hofmann et al., 2007; Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2000), increased risk-taking (Fischer, Kastenmüller, & Asal, 2012), 
aggression (DeWall et al., 2007), impulse buying (Vohs & Faber, 2007), and more 
frequent stereotypical judgments (Govorun & Payne, 2006), see Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & 
Chatzisarantis, 2010, for a meta-analysis. 
 Some accounts of the effects of mental exhaustion on subsequent behaviour 
have proven to be controversial, with the resource model (Baumeister et al., 1998) 
having been especially subject to challenge.  This model proposes a reliance on a 
limited pool of resources which is depletable with use and, once used, takes time to 
replenish (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007).  When in this depleted state subsequent attempts 
at self-control are thought to be impaired (Baumeister et al., 1998).  However, attempts 
to characterise the resource as blood glucose (Gailliot et al., 2007; Masicampo & 
Baumeister, 2008) have been vigorously challenged (Beedie & Lane, 2012; Job et al., 
2010; Kurzban, 2010; Martijn et al., 2002; Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Tice et al., 2007) 
and without an identifiable resource the model is of limited theoretical value (Kurzban 
et al., 2013).  A recent meta-analysis (Carter et al., 2015) and a registered replication 
report (Hagger et al., 2016) also further challenge this conceptualisation.  Nevertheless, 
new research has demonstrated that as long as inhibitory control tasks, such as those 
employed in the self-control literature (e.g. the colour naming Stroop), are experienced 
as being more mentally exhausting, they do appear to impact upon further attempts at 
self-control (Dang, 2017).  The Stroop task was identified by Dang as amongst the 
strongest and most reliable of the self-control tasks used to induce a state of mental 
exhaustion and is therefore adopted in the present study as our inhibitory control 
manipulation.  
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Despite the enduring belief that trait levels of self-control protect, and are 
positively correlated with, an individual’s ability to overcome the depleting effects of 
prior exertion of self-control (Gillebaart & de Ridder, 2015; Muraven et al., 2005), 
some studies have reported a negative correlation between the two (Imhoff et al., 2014) 
or have failed to find any effect at all (Stillman et al., 2009).  Therefore, in order to 
further explore and control for any relationship between trait levels of self-control, and 
the use of inhibitory control processes during periods of mental fatigue, we include the 
Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004) in the present study.  In spite of the challenges 
encountered by attempts to model self-control, interesting questions remain regarding 
the effect of mental exhaustion on subsequent unconscious processing.  
 A large body of research indicates that when adequate cognitive capacity is 
available, behaviour will be predominantly driven by explicit and controlled processes.  
However, in situations where this capacity is unavailable, behaviour will be driven by 
impulses, attitudes, and implicit response tendencies (Hofmann et al., 2007), as the lack 
of cognitive capacity leads to an inability to inhibit such responses and a reliance on 
automatic bottom-up processing (Bertrams, Baumeister, Englert, & Furley, 2015).  
Indeed, whilst perceiving, storing, and retrieving information appears to happen 
automatically (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003), inhibiting responses appears to 
decrease mental efficiency on subsequent executive functions such as reading 
comprehension, working memory and response inhibition (Stucke & Baumeister, 2006).  
This switch to automatic implicit response tendencies is notably demonstrated in studies 
employing Implicit Association Tests which have shown that after completing a 
demanding inhibitory control task, participants are more likely to be guided by their 
automatic attitudes and make more stereotype consistent errors on racial discrimination 
tasks (e.g. Govorun & Payne, 2006).  Furthermore, in a colour priming study, Bertrams 
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et al. (2015) demonstrated that those who had previously completed a task high, versus 
low, in the need for self-control were more susceptible to the negative effect of being 
primed with the colour red.  Specifically, participants completed one of two versions of 
a writing task that involved either directly copying some text or reproducing it with 
specific changes such as omitting the letter e and including deliberate misspellings.  
They were then primed with the word ‘test’ on either a red or grey background prior to 
completing a mental arithmetic evaluation.  The red colour priming effect of decreased 
arithmetic performance was only seen for those who had previously exerted high levels 
of inhibitory control.  However, the approach adopted by Bertrams et al., utilised 
consciously presented colour blocks as their priming methodology.  As such, findings 
from the study cannot be conclusively attributed to unconscious influences.   
Understanding whether mental fatigue increases our susceptibility to 
unconscious influences is important from a theoretical standpoint and has potentially 
important practical implications.  In the present study, we specifically examine 
unconscious priming achieved through subliminal word presentation.  Here we examine 
whether the effects observed in conscious contexts extend to unconscious influences.  
Specifically, we test for the first time whether a prior inhibitory challenge increases 
susceptibility to unconscious priming and whether this varies with the emotional 
salience of primes.  The degree of prior inhibitory challenge is manipulated by the 
completion of either an easy or difficult version of a colour classification task, the 
Stroop task.  The effect of this manipulation is then examined on the extent to which 
unconscious priming influences responses in a stem completion task.  Experiment 1 
examines how a prior inhibitory challenge effects the priming for neutral terms.  We 
predict that participants in the difficult condition will be more susceptible to 
unconscious priming and thus will complete more stems with the primed words. 
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Experiment 2 then contrasts the effect for neutral and reward salient terms i.e. those 
relating to food and drink.  We predict that a challenging inhibitory task increases 
subsequent susceptibility to unconscious influences. Thus, those in the challenging task 
condition will complete more stems with the primed target word especially those of a 
reward relevant nature. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 60 volunteers (33 female, 27 male) aged 18-29 years (M = 
20.75, SE = 1.79) recruited from the University of Sussex and participating in exchange 
for entry into a £25 prize draw.  Participants were naïve to the experimental hypothesis 
and were randomly assigned in equal proportions to one of two inhibitory task 
conditions: inhibitory challenge vs. control.  All participants were native English 
speakers.  The experiment was considered low risk and received ethical approval from 
the University of Sussex School of Psychology ethics committee.  All participants read 
an information sheet and signed a consent form before the experiment began.  At the 
end of the experiment participants were fully debriefed as to the nature of the 
experimental aims. 
Materials 
The controlling program was implemented in Matlab, run on a Pavilion DM4 
computer with a 15” 60Hz monitor.  Participants were seated with a viewing distance of 
600mm.  The complete set of materials for both experiments and the corresponding data 
has been made publicly available on the Open Science Framework (OSF) and can be 
retrieved from https://osf.io/gphkq/.   
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The threshold finding task and stem completion task used distinct sets of words.  
The threshold finding task used ten colour names and the numbers one to twenty.  These 
highly familiar words were used on the basis that the threshold for their detection would 
be lower than that for the less familiar terms used in the stem-completion task.  The 
stem completion task utilised a list of 100 target words compiled from the British 
National Corpus online service.  No two words began with the same three letters and 
these three letter stems (e.g. ‘bis’ for ‘biscuit’) had at least two possible alternative real 
word completions (e.g. bishop or bisect).  Non-words for both the threshold finding task 
and stem completion task consisted of random sequences of consonants, matched in 
length to the target words.  See Appendix A for a full list of the word stimuli used in the 
experiment.  Words and non-words were displayed in ‘Courier New’ font size 30 and 
were light grey (0.8 on a scale of 0-1 where 0 = black and 1 = white), with a luminance 
of 63.78 cd/m2 and contrast of -0.36, presented on a white background with a luminance 
of 99.68 cd/m2.  The mask was 40 by 180 mm (large enough to obscure the largest word 
used) and comprised randomized patterns of black and white 3-pixel by 3-pixel blocks.  
Masks had a maximum luminance of 99.68 cd/m2, a minimum luminance of 0.09 cd/m2 
and a contrast of -0.99.  
The full 36 item Self-Control Scale (SCS; Tangney et al., 2004) was included as 
a self-report measure of trait self-control. 
Design 
The experiment utilised a mixed design with two independent variables: 
inhibitory task (between subject: challenge vs. control) and priming (within subject: 
target word vs. non-word).  The primary dependent variable was the number of stems 
completed with the target word.  The measure of trait self-control provided by the SCS 
was included as a covariate.  
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Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room with the experimenter present at 
all times.  All instructions were given on screen and clarification was provided by the 
experimenter when required.  Participants provided demographic information (age and 
gender) before beginning the experimental tasks.  Each of the experimental tasks, in the 
order they were completed, are outlined below. 
Visual threshold task.  This established individual visual thresholds in order to 
ascertain that primes in the stem completion task were presented below the subjective 
threshold of conscious awareness.  Each trial involved the presentation of a word or 
non-word with every four trials including two of each in random order.  Trials began 
with a fixation cross presented in the centre of the screen for 1000ms.  The black and 
white mask then appeared in the centre of the screen for 600ms.  The target was then 
presented for the same duration before the mask was again presented for a further 
600ms.  Participants were then presented the question ‘Do you think there was a real 
word or a non-word?’ and their response captured using the arrow keys.  A second 
question, ‘Do you have any confidence in your judgement?’ alongside the options 
‘some confidence’ and ‘guess’, was then displayed.  They were instructed to indicate 
having ‘some confidence’ even if they had only the tiniest amount.  
Initially, every trial correctly classified and made with ‘some confidence’ 
resulted in a 50ms reduction in the duration that the target was presented on subsequent 
trials (the mask duration of 600ms remained unchanged throughout).  These reductions 
continued until the participant reported ‘guessing’, after which the duration of exposure 
was increased to that of the previous trial and the subsequent reductions after correct 
confident trials reduced to 16.67ms (a single screen refresh).  Hence, the subjective 
unconscious threshold was always approached in steps of a single screen refresh.  When 
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participants reported that they were guessing for 6 consecutive trials at the same 
exposure duration that duration was taken to be their subjective unconscious threshold 
and the task ended.   
Inhibitory control manipulation.  Participants completed one of two versions 
of a colour naming task (inhibitory challenge vs. control).  Those in the inhibitory 
challenge condition completed a four-colour Stroop task requiring them to classify the 
colour in which one of the words red, blue, green or yellow were written while 
suppressing the tendency to respond based on the word itself.  For example, ‘red’ 
written in blue was to be classified as blue and not red (the four text colours used were 
also red, green, blue and yellow).  Participants were instructed to be as accurate as 
possible and keep errors to an absolute minimum.  Each trial began with a fixation cross 
for 300ms before the colour word was presented for 1000ms.  Words were displayed in 
‘Arial’ font size 50.  Classifications were made using the number keys 1-4 with their 
corresponding colours shown onscreen in monochrome.  If participants failed to 
respond within one second or a wrong classification was made, then an error tone 
(middle C pitch) sounded.  Every eight trials contained two trials of each colour word in 
a randomized order, with a total of 240 trials.  For six out of every eight trials the colour 
word and the text in which it was written were the same (concordant trials), for the 
remainder the colour words were written in one of the other three colours chosen at 
random (discordant trials). 
Those in the control group completed a simplified colour classification task that 
did not require any inhibition.  Specifically, only two colour words were presented (red 
and green) and the text colour was always congruent with the word.  No time limit was 
imposed however the error tone still sounded if a mistake was made.  The duration of 
the control condition was fixed to match that of the inhibitory challenge condition, 
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irrespective of the number of trials completed.  The colour classification task was 
followed by a 1-minute break during which a countdown timer was presented on-screen.  
Stem completion task.  For each participant, the primes consisted of a 
randomly selected 50 of the 100 target words together with the length-matched non-
words for the other 50 target words.  The order of word and non-word trials was 
randomised over participants.  Each trial consisted of the following: a fixation cross 
presented in the centre of the screen for 1000ms, followed by a forward mask for 
600ms, followed by the word or non-word prime for the individual’s threshold duration, 
followed by a backward mask for 600ms.  A question mark then appeared in the centre 
of the screen to which participants had to respond either ‘Y’ for yes if they thought they 
had seen the prime or ‘N’ for no if they did not.  Where the participant responded with 
‘Y’ they were presented with a screen prompting them to type in what they believed 
they saw and to press enter to move to the next trial; note no stem completion was 
conducted where they believed they had seen a prime.  Where the participant responded 
with ‘Y’ and correctly identified the prime, then the prime exposure duration was 
reduced by 16.67ms for subsequent trials.  If the participant chose ‘N’ they were given 
the 3-letter stem corresponding to the target word with the instruction to complete it 
with the first word that came to mind.  Participants were given 10 seconds to respond 
before a warning tone was played and a message to please hurry presented on-screen.  
Participants were encouraged to report any targets they thought they saw and 
incentivised to do so by the provision of a bonus for any correctly identified.  
Thresholds ranged from 85 to 187ms (M = 131.33ms, SE = 3.19ms).  A complete list of 
individual thresholds can be found in the data file provided on the OSF.   
Rating of mental exhaustion.  A single screen was displayed with the question 
‘Thinking back to the earlier colour classification task, how mentally exhausting did 
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you find it?’  Responses were recorded on a VAS scale ranging from ‘Not at all’ (1) to 
‘Extremely’ (600).  
Self-control questionnaire.  Finally, participants completed the Self-control 
Scale using keys 1 to 5 on the keyboard to correspond to the five-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (‘not at all’) to 5 (‘very much’).  
  Results 
Inhibitory Control Induced Mental Exhaustion  
An independent t-test revealed that participants in the inhibitory challenge 
condition rated the inhibitory task as significantly more mentally exhausting (M = 
369.20, SE = 23.53) than those in the control condition (M = 198.03, SE = 31.94), 
t(51.89) = -4.31, p < .001, d = 1.13.  
The Effect of a Prior Inhibitory Control Challenge on Unconscious Priming 
A 2 (inhibitory task: challenge vs. control) x 2 (priming: word vs. non-word) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted on the percentage of stem completions that matched the 
target word (target matches), see Figure 1.  The analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of priming, F(1, 58) = 6.43, p = .014, ηp2 = 0.10, no significant main effect of 
inhibitory task, F < 1, and no significant interaction, F < 1.  The effect of priming 
reflected a significantly greater number of target matches for the word versus the non-
word priming condition. 
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Figure 1.  Mean percentage of stem completions that matched the target word by 
priming and inhibitory task condition (+/- 1 SEM) 
A Bayes analysis on the effect of the inhibitory task was conducted to establish 
the extent to which this data provides evidence for the null hypothesis, namely that a 
prior inhibitory challenge has no effect on susceptibility to unconscious priming.  
Adopting the procedure advocated by  Dienes (2014), we specified the prior as a 
uniform distribution from zero to twice the effect observed in the control condition.  
The resulting Bayes factor of 0.25 is less than one third and thus represents strong 
evidence for the null hypothesis. 
The Effect of Trait Self-Control and Mental Exhaustion on Unconscious Priming 
To evaluate the potential effects of trait self-control and mental exhaustion on 
unconscious priming the above ANOVA was repeated with SCS and reported task-
related mental exhaustion included as covariates.  Neither covariate achieved 
significance, all F < 1. 
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Discussion 
Experiment 1 aimed to investigate the effect of a prior inhibitory task on 
subsequent susceptibility to unconscious priming using a stem completion paradigm.  
Consistent with the established literature (Perrig & Eckstein, 2005; Tiggemann et al., 
2004) the stem completion task revealed a significant sensitivity to unconscious 
priming.  The inhibitory task was also rated by participants to be significantly more 
mentally exhausting than the control task, suggesting that it was successful in creating 
greater inhibitory demand.  However, the prior inhibitory challenge was not found to 
influence the degree of susceptibility to unconscious priming, with a Bayes analysis 
indicating that this was a sensitive null result.  Similarly, neither trait self-control nor 
task-related mental exhaustion were found to significantly influence unconscious 
priming. 
Our findings contrast with those of previous studies examining the effects of 
prior inhibitory challenge on responsiveness to consciously perceived environmental 
cues (Govorun & Payne, 2006).  However, aside from the fact that the cues were 
presented consciously, these studies predominantly examined the response to emotional 
or reward salient items, such as food and drink (e.g. Papies & Hamstra, 2010; Papies, 
Stroebe, & Aarts, 2008).  This highlights the possibility that our failure to observe an 
effect of the prior inhibitory challenge on unconscious priming may have been limited 
by our use of neutral terms.  In Experiment 2 we sought to address this question directly 
by introducing a systematic difference in word type such that there were both reward 
salient and neutral terms.  All other aspects of the study remain the same as Experiment 
1, while the additional manipulation of word type permitted us to contrast the effect of a 
prior inhibitory task on unconscious priming for reward salient and neutral terms. 
38 
INHIBITORY CONTROL & UNCONSCIOUS PRIMING 
Experiment 2  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 120 volunteers (74 female, 46 male) aged 18 to 41 (M = 22.01, 
SE = 0.38) recruited from the University of Sussex and participating in exchange for 
entry into a £25 prize draw or 2 course credits.  Participants were naïve to the 
experimental hypothesis and were randomly assigned in equal proportions to one of 
four between subject conditions created by a 2 (inhibitory task: challenge vs. control) x 
2 (priming: target word vs. non-word) design.  The experiment was considered low risk 
and received ethical approval from the University of Sussex School of Psychology 
ethics committee. All participants read an information sheet and signed a consent form 
before the experiment began.  At the end of the experiment participants were fully 
debriefed as to the nature of the experimental aims. 
Materials 
All materials were identical to those of Experiment 1 except for the words used 
in the stem completion task, described here.  Two word lists were generated from the 
British National Corpus online service; 50 reward salient words relating to food and 
drink, and 50 neutral words, see Appendix A.  Reward salient and neutral words were 
matched for length and frequency of use in written English.  As in Experiment 1, no two 
words began with the same three letters and these three letter stems all had at least two 
possible alternative completions in the English language.  
Design 
The experiment exploited a mixed design with three independent variables: 
Inhibitory task (between subject: challenge vs. control), priming (between subject: word 
vs. non-word) and word type (within subject: reward salient vs. neutral).  The primary 
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dependent variable was the number of stems correctly completed to match the target 
word.  The measure of trait self-control provided by the SCS was included as a 
covariate. 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 with the exception 
that priming was a between-subject condition rather than within-subject, and the primes 
included two categories of word (reward salient and neutral).  This change was made in 
order to avoid increasing the total number for participants which could otherwise be a 
confounding factor.  As such, participants were either primed with the target words on 
all 100 trials (word condition) or primed with paired random sequences of consonants 
(non-words) matched for target word length on all 100 trials (non-word condition).  
Thresholds for word and non-word stimuli ranged from 35 to 203ms (M = 103.69ms, SE 
= 2.79ms), with the complete list of individual thresholds available in the data file 
provided on the OSF.   
Results 
Exclusions 
Normality checks revealed two extreme outliers; while their removal did not 
alter the observed pattern of significant effects they were excluded for the analyses 
reported below. 
Inhibitory Control Induced Mental Exhaustion  
An independent t-test revealed that participants in the inhibitory challenge 
condition rated the inhibitory task as significantly more mentally exhausting (M = 
410.64, SE = 15.75) than those in the control condition (M = 271.64, SE = 21.54), 
t(106.21) = 5.21, p < .001, d = 0.96.  
40 
INHIBITORY CONTROL & UNCONSCIOUS PRIMING 
The Effect of a Prior Inhibitory Challenge on Unconscious Priming 
A 2 (inhibitory task: challenge vs. control) x 2 (priming: word vs. non-word) x 2 
(word type: reward salient vs. neutral) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the percentage 
of stem completions that matched the target word (target matches), see Figure 2.  The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of priming, F(1, 114) = 5.33, p = .023, ηp2 = 
.05, a significant main effect of word type, F(1, 114) = 348.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .75, no 
significant main effect of inhibitory task, F < 1, and no significant interactions, all F < 
1.   
 
Figure 2.  Mean percentage of stem completions that matched the target word by 
inhibitory task, priming, and word type conditions (+/-1 SEM). 
Consistent with Experiment 1, the significant main effect of priming reflected a 
larger number of target matches for word primes versus non-word primes.  The 
significant main effect of word type indicates that participants were more likely to 
complete the word stems with reward salient terms than neutral terms.  Crucially, again 
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consistent with Experiment 1, the absence of a significant main effect or interaction 
involving the inhibitory task condition indicates that the inhibitory challenge failed to 
influence the degree of unconscious priming irrespective of the reward salience of the 
words.  To establish the extent to which the totality of our data provides support for the 
null hypothesis, namely that a prior inhibitory challenge has no effect on susceptibility 
to unconscious priming, we combined the two studies in a Bayesian analysis.  
Specifically, we combined the raw effect sizes of Experiment 1 and 2 weighted by the 
square of the SE of each estimate and computed a Bayes factor for the combined effect 
specifying the prior as a uniform distribution from zero to twice the weighted mean of 
the two control conditions (Weighted M = 2.28).  This analysis gave a Bayes Factor of 
0.23, providing strong evidence for the null hypothesis, that a highly demanding 
inhibitory task did not increase susceptibility to unconscious priming.  
The Effect of Trait Self-Control and Mental Exhaustion on Unconscious Priming 
To evaluate the potential effects of trait self-control and mental exhaustion on 
unconscious priming the above ANOVA was repeated with SCS and reported task-
related mental exhaustion included as covariates.  This identified a significant main 
effect of task-related mental exhaustion, F(1, 112) = 5.06, p = .026, ηp2 = .04, and a 
significant interaction between task-related mental exhaustion and word type, F (1, 112) 
= 10.55, p = .002, ηp2 = .09.  No significant main effect of SCS was observed, F (1, 112) 
= 1.17, p = .282, ηp2 = .01, and no significant interaction involving SCS, F < 1.  
Bivariate correlations were used to explore the relationship between task-related mental 
exhaustion and word type.  These revealed a significant positive relationship between 
task-related mental exhaustion and the percentage of target matches for reward salient 
words, r (118) = .26, p = .004, and a non-significant negative relationship between task-
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related mental exhaustion and the percentage of target matches for neutral words, r 
(118) = -.06, p = .550, see Figure 3.  Note, this effect is independent of priming. 
 
Figure 3.  The relationship between reported task-related mental exhaustion and the 
percentage of stem completions matching reward salient and neutral targets. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 sought to establish whether the failure of a prior inhibitory task to 
influence susceptibility to unconscious priming, as observed in Experiment 1, would 
hold true where the primes were reward salient rather than neutral.  The stem 
completion task was again found to be sensitive to unconscious priming.  The inhibitory 
task was also again found to be experienced as significantly more mentally exhausting 
than the control task.  Crucially, consistent with Experiment 1, the prior inhibitory 
challenge was again found not to influence the degree of susceptibility to unconscious 
priming, regardless of whether the primes were reward salient or neutral terms.  
Combining the results of Experiment 1 and 2 in a Bayesian analysis provided strong 
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support for the null hypothesis, namely that the prior inhibitory challenge did not 
influence unconscious priming.  Similarly, and again consistent with Experiment 1, 
neither trait self-control nor task-related mental exhaustion were found to significantly 
influence unconscious priming. 
Interestingly, the results revealed a significant positive correlation between how 
mentally exhausting participants rated the inhibitory task and the number of stems 
completed with reward salient targets.  While this effect could be considered partially 
consistent with previous research revealing increased approach behaviour and 
consumption after highly demanding tasks (Hofmann et al., 2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 
2000), it was independent of both the inhibitory task and priming conditions and as such 
is tangential to the objectives of this study. 
General Discussion 
Previous research has examined the effect of challenging inhibitory tasks on a 
range of conscious behavioural outcomes (e.g. Fischer et al., 2012; Vohs & Faber, 
2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), but to date none have directly examined the effects on 
susceptibility to influences elicited unconsciously.  Here, we sought to address this by 
establishing whether the effects observed in conscious contexts extend to unconscious 
influences.  The present study therefore examined the effect of a prior inhibitory task on 
subsequent susceptibility to unconscious priming.  We manipulated the degree to which 
an inhibitory task was challenging using two versions of a colour classification task, 
specifically designed to place differing demands on inhibitory processes and examined 
subsequent susceptibility to subliminal priming using a stem completion paradigm.  
Experiment 1 examined the effect of a challenging inhibitory task on subsequent 
susceptibility to subliminal priming with neutral words in the stem completion task.  
Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1 by introducing a systematic difference in word 
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type permitting the priming effects to be contrasted between reward salient and neutral 
terms.  The stem completion task proved sensitive to unconscious priming in both 
experiments, with more primes being used as stem completions.  The manipulation of 
inhibitory demands also proved to be effective in both experiments, with the 
challenging version of the colour classification task being rated as significantly more 
mentally exhausting.  Crucially however, neither experiment revealed a significant 
interaction between the degree to which the prior task was taxing and subsequent 
susceptibility to unconscious priming.  Combining the two experiments using Bayesian 
analysis, provided strong evidence for the null hypothesis that the degree of inhibitory 
control required by the prior task had no effect on subsequent susceptibility to 
unconscious influences.  The results presented here therefore indicate that completing a 
task requiring high levels of inhibitory control does not influence an individual’s 
subsequent degree of susceptibility to subliminal priming.  Additionally, neither how 
mentally exhausting individuals rated the colour classification task, nor the measure of 
trait self-control (SCS) were found to correlate with levels of unconscious priming. 
Findings from supraliminal priming research (Bertrams et al., 2015) and the self-
control literature in general (see Hagger et al., 2010) appear to demonstrate a reliance on 
automatic bottom-up processing following a taxing inhibitory task.  Had the effects 
from such research extended to unconscious influences, we would have expected to 
observe greater levels of subliminal priming for those whose inhibitory processes had 
previously been burdened by the challenging colour classification task.  However, our 
results suggest that this is not the case and instead that the inhibitory nature of the task 
does not affect subliminal priming.  Unconscious influences appear to be independent of 
fatigue arising from frontal executive processes. 
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While our central finding differs to the effects commonly observed in the self-
control literature, some interesting parallels can otherwise be drawn.  Firstly, in the 
present study, a significant difference is reported between task conditions, with much 
higher levels of perceived mental exhaustion being attributed to the challenging versus 
easy version of the inhibitory task.  This is consistent with such inhibitory tasks being 
used to create a temporary state of mental exhaustion, as has been widely applied in the 
self-control literature (e.g. Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008).  Secondly, in Experiment 
2 those individuals’ who rated the colour classification task as more mentally 
exhausting were found to be significantly more likely to produce reward relevant terms 
as stem completions.  While this correlation does not permit causal conclusions, the 
observed relationship is consistent with previous research suggesting that where self-
control is seemingly reduced individuals exhibit a preference for, and consume more, 
unhealthy food items (Hofmann et al., 2007; Papies & Hamstra, 2010; Papies et al., 
2008; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). 
Given the prevalence of chronically impaired inhibitory control in mood 
disorders such as anxiety and depression, some reassurance might be taken from our 
results.  The inhibitory challenge common to suffers of such disorders should not, in its 
own right, result in a greater susceptibility to unconscious influences.  However, this 
can only be concluded within the constraints of the current study which examined only 
neutral and reward salient primes.  Given the established attentional bias towards mood-
congruent information in those suffering from depression (Leung, Lee, Yip, Li, & 
Wong, 2007), stronger conclusions would require our findings to be extended to include 
stimuli of direct relevance to those mood conditions.  
The Bayesian analysis provides certainty that the results represent a sensitive 
null result rather than reflecting insensitivity.  However, future replications might 
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benefit from implementing alternative priming measures with potentially stronger 
priming effects.  Furthermore, while this study rigorously identified participants’ 
subjective threshold of awareness aiming to ensure that the primes were genuinely 
subliminal, a powerful alternative would be to apply the process dissociation procedure 
(see Jacoby, 1998).  Such a procedure would have the advantage of permitting the direct 
comparison of controlled (conscious) and automatic (unconscious) influences over the 
stem completions and would be independent of the absolute threshold achieved. 
The current study provides strong evidence that neither an extended period of 
inhibitory control, nor individuals’ level of trait self-control, influences subsequent 
susceptibility to unconscious influences.  This provides further evidence of a difference 
between unconscious cognitive processes and consciously experienced mental demands.  
Considering the importance of self-control in shaping human behaviour it is reassuring 
that prior use of inhibitory processes appears not to leave us open to unconscious 
influences. 
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Abstract 
Executive functioning is paramount to the successful exertion of inhibitory control over 
automatic impulses and desires.  Despite disagreements in determining the exact 
mechanisms responsible for hypnosis, many theories involve the use of, or alterations 
in, frontal processing and top-down executive functioning.  The present study sought to 
explore this relationship by examining whether a transient state of reduced inhibitory 
control influences susceptibility to hypnosis.  Specifically, participants completed a 
colour naming task designed to place differing demands on inhibitory control processes 
before experiencing a hypnotic induction and four suggestions.  Bayesian analysis 
indicated substantial evidence that the prior exertion of inhibitory control processes 
does not influence subsequent susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion.  The study provides 
evidence that inhibitory impairment, often experienced by those with a range of 
disorders (such as anxiety and depression), should not affect receptiveness to hypnotic 
procedures.  
 
Keywords: Self-control; hypnosis; inhibitory control; suggestibility; depletion 
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Hypnosis refers to two related concepts: A putative altered state of consciousness in 
which an individual is receptive and attentive to suggestions  (Elkins, Barabasz, 
Council, & Spiegel, 2015); and a way of responding to suggestions involving distortions 
in the sense of voluntariness and of reality (Kihlstrom, 2008; APA, 2003).  Hypnotic 
response may be facilitated by a hypnotic state, but it need not be: the two concepts are 
in principle empirically distinguishable (Kirsch, 2011).  Hypnosis has been linked to 
changes in frontal executive functioning (e.g. Egner & Raz, 2007), processes which 
have previously been reported to be implicated following the application of inhibitory 
control (see Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010, for a meta-analysis).  
Furthermore, hypo-frontality has been linked to altered states in general (Dietrich, 
2003).  This paper will explore whether a transient state of reduced inhibitory 
functioning influences hypnotic responding.  
Hypnotic suggestibility is measured via responses to standard scales of hypnotic 
susceptibility, such as the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGSHS; 
Shor & Orne, 1962) and the Waterloo Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility 
(WSGC; Bowers, 1993), usually involving a hypnotic induction procedure followed by 
a series of suggestions.  Susceptibility varies greatly with around 70-80% of the 
population being moderately susceptible to suggestion (referred to as ‘medium’ 
responders), 10-15% responding to few or no suggestions (‘lows’) and the remaining 
10-15% responding to most or all suggestions (‘highs’), (Woody, Barnier, & 
McConkey, 2005).  Whilst hypnotic suggestibility is thought to be influenced by 
modifiable factors such as expectancy (Kirsch & Lynn, 1997), test-retest reliability of 
an individual’s hypnotic suggestibility has been reported to remain stable over twenty-
five to thirty years (Piccione, Hilgard, & Zimbardo, 1989). 
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Theories of Hypnosis 
The best theoretical account of hypnosis remains unresolved.  Whilst some 
suggest that hypnosis stems from an altered state of consciousness (e.g. Bowers, 1992; 
Hilgard, 1977; Woody & Bowers, 1994), often referred to as ‘state-theories’, others 
maintain that hypnosis requires no special state (e.g. Spanos & Coe, 1992; Spanos, 
1986). 
State theories.  Dissociation state models of hypnosis, such as the Neo-
dissociation (Hilgard, 1977) and dissociated control (Bowers, 1992; Woody & Bowers, 
1994) theories, regard hypnotic responding as based on a state of separation of normal 
cognitive control systems.  The Neo-dissociation theory holds that hypnotic 
phenomenon come about through a dissociation of high level executive control systems, 
resulting in distorted motor control, perception, and memory (Hilgard, 1977).  
Specifically, it is proposed that hypnotic inductions split the central executive 
functioning into different streams.  One stream continues to function normally but due 
to an amnesic barrier is not consciously accessible, meaning that the hypnotised 
individual is aware of the resulting action but not of the process eliciting it.   
The dissociated control theory (Bowers, 1992; Woody & Bowers, 1994) 
explains hypnotic responding as a state of dissociation between the supervisory 
attentional system and the contention scheduling (habit) system.  As these systems cease 
to work together efficiently it results in diminished frontal supervisory attentional 
control.  This dissociation between high level control systems results in a reliance on 
automatic, low-level, control system processing and thus the feeling of involuntariness 
which accompanies hypnosis.  If hypnosis is due to dissociation, then levels of hypnotic 
responding should plausibly, positively correlate with dissociative experiences.  
Research to date has been inconclusive with evidence both of (Kirsch & Council, 1992; 
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Nadon, Hoyt, Register, & Kihlstrom, 1991) and a lack of (Butler & Bryant, 1997; 
Dienes et al., 2009) a relationship between everyday dissociative experiences and 
hypnotic responding. 
Non-state theories.  Alternative non-state models of hypnosis include Spanos' 
(1986) socio-cognitive theory which takes the social-psychological perspective that 
participants’ views of hypnosis will affect the degree to which they respond.  That is, 
rather than holding dissociative processes at the forefront of hypnosis, the socio-
cognitive approach explains responding in terms of misattributions of experience, and 
as stemming from strategically responding to demand characteristics and schematic 
knowledge of what is expected to happen during the hypnotic experience (Spanos & 
Coe, 1992).  For example, a positive hallucination (perceiving something that is not 
there) could be produced by imagining the stimulus and misattributing the act to 
hypnosis rather than oneself; a negative hallucination (not perceiving something that is 
there) could be produced by deliberately ignoring the stimulus without realising one is 
doing so.  Support for the socio-cognitive approach comes from studies reporting that 
individuals’ motivation, expectancy, and beliefs predict their hypnotic suggestibility 
(Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Spanos, Brett, Menary, & Cross, 1987).  According to Kirsch's 
(1985) response expectancy version of this theory, the single mediating variable is 
expectancy, which directly causes the hypnotic response (just as expectancy can directly 
cause pain relief in the placebo response). 
Cold-control theory.  The cold control theory (Dienes & Perner, 2007) draws 
on both the socio-cognitive and dissociation approaches to explain hypnotic responding.  
According to cold control theory, the distinctive nature of hypnotic responding is 
entirely metacognitive: A strategic failure to develop a higher order thought (HOT) that 
one is intending.  That is, there is a lack of awareness of the intention to act and 
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consequently, the act is experienced as involuntary.  See Norman, Scott, Price, and 
Dienes (2016), for a demonstration of similar strategic control in the absence of 
conscious awareness.  From this perspective, both Spanos' (1986) non-state and 
Hilgard's (1977) state theories can be regarded as variants of cold control, because in 
each case there is an intention to act the subject is not aware of.  Conversely, the state 
dissociated control theory of Woody and Bowers (1994) is not a cold control theory, 
because hypnotic response is regarded as occurring without executive intentions; and 
similarly, for Kirsch’s (1985) non-state response expectancy theory: Expectancies, not 
intentions, cause responses. 
The Role of Frontal Function in Hypnosis 
Despite disagreements surrounding the mechanisms underlying hypnotic 
responding, many theories involve the use of, or alterations in, frontal processing and 
top-down cognitive control.  Hilgard’s (1977) and Spanos’ (1986) theories require 
hypnotic suggestions be carried out by executive functions; thus, disruptions to 
executive processes should impair hypnotic response.  Conversely, the dissociated 
control theory of Woody and Bowers (1994) likens the hypnotic state to a “functional 
prefrontal lobotomy” whereby disruptions to executive function should enhance 
hypnotic response.  As Kirsch’s (1985) response expectancy theory holds expectancy as 
the sole factor underlying hypnotic responding, it would not predict any change in 
hypnotic response by disruption in frontal function (cf. Buhle, Stevens, Friedman, & 
Wager, 2012, for independence of placebo effects from distraction).  According to the 
cold control theory of Dienes and Perner (2007), if disruptions to frontal function impair 
the ability for accurate metacognition, hypnotic response should be facilitated.  That is, 
if it is harder to form accurate higher order thoughts of intending, it will be easier to 
have inaccurate higher order thoughts when required for hypnosis.  However, if frontal 
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function is disrupted without affecting metacognition, then hypnotic response will be 
unaffected (or impaired, if there is impairment of the capacity to carry out the 
behavioral or cognitive act required, e.g. imagining, or ignoring a stimulus in the case of 
positive or negative hallucinations). 
There are clinical reasons for postulating a relation between executive function 
and hypnotic response.  Executive functioning is paramount to successful self-
regulation, and in exhibiting inhibitory control over automatic impulses and desires.  
Hypnosis is applied as a valuable tool used to control undesirable behaviours such as in 
the cessation of smoking (Elkins, Marcus, Bates, Rajab, & Cook, 2006; Green & Lynn, 
2000, 2017).  Neuroimaging research has provided support for postulating a relation of 
hypnotic response to frontal function by pinpointing structures involved in top-down 
regulation (Gazzaley & D’esposito, 2007; Miller & Cohen, 2001) which are consistently 
implicated in hypnotic responding, such as the frontal and parietal cortices and the 
anterior cingulate (Cojan et al., 2009; Dienes & Hutton, 2013; Huber, Lui, Duzzi, 
Pagnoni, & Porro, 2014; McGeown, Mazzoni, Venneri, & Kirsch, 2009).  Dienes and 
Hutton (2013) applied repetitive TMS to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 
many functions of which such as, logic, willed action, and memory are particularly 
affected by hypnosis (Dietrich, 2003), and reported that disrupting the DLPFC increased 
hypnotic responding.  Similarly, Semmens-wheeler, Dienes, and Duka (2013) found 
that alcohol intoxication facilitated hypnotic response.  
On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that cognitive demands created 
by a secondary task can hamper hypnotic responding (Kirsch, Burgess, & Braffman, 
1999).   Kirsch et al. (1999) report that cognitive load from an additional task 
compromised the subjective experience of suggestions such as feelings of rigidity 
during the rigid arm suggestion.  Non-hypnotic tasks appear to interfere with responses 
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to posthypnotic suggestions even when the necessary responses do not conflict (e.g. 
Tobis & Kihlstrom, 2010).  Thus, secondary tasks largely impair hypnotic responding 
(consistent with Hilgard, 1977, and Spanos, 1986).  This may be because hypnotic 
responding requires executive performance of the required actions, such as control of 
attention.  Nonetheless, the results contrast with the interventions above that facilitate 
hypnotic response. 
In terms of the effect of hypnotic induction on executive function tasks, studies 
have shown impaired performance (exhibited by longer reaction times) on a colour-
naming Stroop task following hypnotic induction, in comparison to non-hypnotised 
controls (Jamieson & Sheehan, 2004; Sheehan, Donovan, & MacLeod, 1988).  
Jamieson and Sheehan (2004) suggest that this difference in reaction times demonstrates 
that it is not the response selection process itself which is altered under hypnotic 
induction, but rather the efficiency of such processes; thus, there is some evidence that 
inductions impair executive ability.  One explanation for this might be the requirement 
of executive control processes in order to maintain the altered state itself.  However, 
Jamieson and Sheehan explain such impairments by proposing a modification to 
dissociative control theory centered around the lDLPFC (left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex).  It is suggested that impaired stroop performance during hypnosis is due to a 
dissociation between the executive control functioning of the lDLPFC and the feedback 
monitoring processes of the ACC (anterior cingulate cortex) in response to which the 
lDLPFC would normally implement control. 
In terms the relationship between hypnotic response and executive ability, 
Dienes et al. (2009) found little correlation between hypnotic suggestibility and 
performance on inhibitory attention tasks; and despite initial promising findings 
reviewed by Crawford, Brown, and Moon (1993), later Varga, Németh, and Szekely 
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(2011), and Jamieson and Sheehan (2002), failed to find correlations between various 
attentional tasks and hypnotisability.  Further, Martin, Sackur, and Dienes (2017) 
showed that one task (perspective switching), previously argued to show differences in 
attentional abilities between high and low hypnotizable subjects, is sensitive to demand 
characteristics and motivation differences between high and low hypnotizable subjects.  
In sum, despite the effects of interventions influencing hypnotic response, individual 
differences in executive ability seems unrelated to hypnotisability (see Parris, 2017). 
One way to reconcile these findings is to postulate that executive resources are 
needed for the normal behavioural and cognitive acts involved in hypnotic response: 
Imagination, attentional control, or appropriate action control.  These acts do not lose 
the resources needed for their completion just because they are hypnotic (Dienes & 
Perner, 2007).  Thus, major attention demanding secondary tasks interfere with 
hypnotic response.  Yet special attentional abilities are not needed to perform these 
everyday acts:  hence the lack of correlation of attentional tasks with hypnotisability.  
On the other hand, if sufficient resources are available to perform the motor or cognitive 
act, impairing metacognition will enhance hypnotic response (Dienes, 2012).  Thus, 
rTMS to areas shown to be relevant to metacognition, such as the DLPFC (Dienes & 
Hutton, 2013) and alcohol which prominently affects the DLPFC (Semmens-wheeler et 
al., 2013) may be especially likely to facilitate hypnotic response.  Testing this 
theoretical resolution requires interventions that impair executive function without 
harming metacognition.   
One potential intervention which meets both of these requirements involves 
inhibitory tasks commonly employed in the self-control literature.  An extensive body 
of research has previously claimed that applying control on an initial task has a negative 
impact on an individuals’ subsequent ability to control impulses, urges and behaviours 
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(cf. Dang, 2017; Hagger et al., 2010, with Carter & McCullough, 2014).  Such research 
has reported increased risk taking (Fischer et al., 2012), over-eating (Hofmann et al., 
2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), and heightened aggression (DeWall et al., 2007) 
following a prior task requiring high levels of self-control, such as the colour naming 
Stroop task.  Similarly, Wheeler, Briñol, and Hermann (2007), found that the prior use 
of inhibitory control decreased subsequent resistance to persuasion.  Popular models 
designed to explain such findings hold that the inability to control behaviours following 
previous attempts at control stem from either diminishing resources needed to exert 
self-control (the resource model; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), a 
change in motivation shifting attention away from the need for control and toward 
rewards (the process model; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003), or from the reallocation of 
computational mechanisms to a more beneficial task (the opportunity cost model; 
Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013).  The overarching principle of self-control 
research is that providing the task is mentally exhausting, then subsequent exertion of 
self-control will be implicated.  When the cognitive capacity for control is unavailable, 
behaviour is instead driven by bottom up processing, impulses, and implicit response 
tendencies (Bertrams et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2007).  An issue is ensuring a given 
task is demanding enough: While one task designed to tax self-control failed to impair 
subsequent self-control in a large-scale replication (Hagger et al., 2016), a pre-registered 
study using the Stroop task found subsequent self-control impairments (Dang et al., 
2017).  The latter study used rated fatigue as an outcome-neutral check on the 
effectiveness of the Stroop task.  
Present Research  
The question arises as to what effect taxing inhibitory control would have in 
hypnotic response; and although it is not the primary focus of the present research to 
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provide support for the various theories of hypnosis it is interesting to consider what 
these theories would predict.  The state dissociated control theory of Woody and 
Bowers (1994), which compares hypnotic responding to a prefrontal lobotomy, would 
predict an increase in hypnotic response following a taxing inhibitory task as this 
disruption to executive function will facilitate hypnosis.  Conversely, Hilgard's (1977) 
and Spanos' (1986) theories require executive functioning to perform hypnotic 
suggestions.  Thus, if inhibitory control tasks temporarily impair executive ability, then 
Hilgard’s and Spanos’ theories would predict a decrease in subsequent susceptibility 
following a taxing inhibitory task.   Kirsch's (1985) theory views expectancy as the sole 
predictor of hypnotic response and thus would predict no effect of inhibitory control 
tasks on subsequent susceptibility.  The predictions of cold control theory (Dienes, 
2012; Dienes & Perner, 2007) depend on the effect of inhibitory challenge on 
metacognition.  Gurney, Lagos, Manning, and Scott (2017), showed that the inhibitory 
challenge used here did not affect subjective thresholds in a subliminal perception task1; 
thus, the formation of accurate higher-order thoughts was not affected.  As such, cold 
control theory predicts that inhibitory challenge would have no effect on hypnotic 
response unless there is an impairment in the capacity to carry out the cognitive or 
behavioural act required for the suggestions, in which case responding would be 
impaired.  
Here we tested whether a prior inhibitory challenge would change suggestibility 
to a set of standard hypnotic suggestions.  Specifically, we manipulated inhibitory 
control processes via the completion of either an easy or difficult version of the colour 
                                                          
1 Whilst this is not reported in Gurney et al. (2017), the results show substantial evidence of no difference 
in subjective thresholds between the difficult and easy inhibitory task conditions, (Mdiff = 6.96, SEdiff = 
5.56), t(116) = -1.25, p = .213, dz = 0.23, BN(0, 50.10)  = 0.24 RR[39.37,100], Note. here the Bayes was 
modelled as a normal distribution from 0 to halfway between the control mean and the bottom of the 
scale. 
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classification Stroop task (cf. Dang et al., 2017).  Our outcome neutral test was rated 
mental exhaustion (cf. Dang et al., 2017).  We then examined participants’ 
responsiveness to a hypnotic induction procedure and four standard suggestions 
including ‘magnetic hands’, ‘rigid arm’, and a taste and negative colour illusion.  
Adopting the stance of the cold control theory, we predicted that hypnotic response 
would be impaired or remain unaffected for those in the difficult inhibitory control 
condition.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
60 participants (45 female, 15 male) aged 18 to 44 years (M = 20.70, SD = 3.57) 
were recruited from the University of Sussex Hypnosis Database and paid £5 for 
participation.  Participants had previously been screened using the Waterloo Stanford 
Group Scale of Hypnotic suggestibility (Form C, Bowers, 1993) and had been rated as 
'medium responders' (between 5 to 8 out of 12) for hypnotic suggestibility.  Participants 
were randomly assigned in equal proportions to one of two experimental task type 
conditions: difficult versus easy inhibitory challenge.  All participants were naive to the 
experimental hypothesis.  The experiment was considered low risk and received ethical 
approval from the University of Sussex School of Psychology ethics committee.  All 
participants read an information sheet and signed a consent form before the experiment 
began.  At the end of the experiment participants were fully debriefed as to the nature of 
the experimental aims. 
Materials 
The experiment was implemented in Matlab and run Pavilion DM4 computer 
with a 15” 60Hz monitor.  
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A standardised hypnotic induction and four hypnotic suggestions were presented 
to participants via headphones.  The four suggestions included "magnetic hands", "rigid 
arm", a taste hallucination and a negative colour hallucination.  The complete set of 
materials for both experiments, including the scripts for the hypnotic induction and four 
suggestions, and the corresponding data has been made publicly available on the Open 
Science Framework (OSF) and can be retrieved from http://osf.io/xa9p8. 
Mood ratings were captured using a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) for the 
emotions: happy, sad, anxious, mentally exhausted, aroused and angry, e.g. “At this 
precise moment how HAPPY do you feel?” with ratings provided on a scale from ‘not 
at all’ (1) to ‘extremely’ (10).  These mood ratings were included in order to check that 
the experimental procedure did not unduly alter any of these five emotions between the 
experimental conditions prior to the hypnotic induction and thus did not confound the 
results.  Additional VAS were also employed as a measure of self-reported hypnotic 
experience following each suggestion.  Questions for these VAS included "To what 
extent did your hands move together?", "To what extent did you find it difficult to bend 
your arm?", and "To what extent did you experience a taste in your mouth?" rated from 
"Not at all" to "Very much" and lastly, "What proportion of the block pattern did you 
perceive as being grey?" rated from "None at all" to "The entire pattern". 
Two versions of the colour-naming Stroop task, previously shown to be among 
the stronger manipulations in ego-depletion studies (Hagger et al., 2010), were used as 
the self-control manipulation, see Procedure section.  
The Self-Control Scale (SCS; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), was 
included as a measure of self-reported trait self-control.  The Dissociative Experiences 
Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), was included as a self-report measure of 
dissociative experiences.  The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer, 
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Smith, Hopkins, & Toney, 2006), was used as a self-report measure of five facets of 
mindfulness including, observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-judging, and 
non-reactivity.  This was included to examine any relationship between mindfulness and 
hypnotic response.  Whilst Lush, Naish, and Dienes (2016) found a negative correlation 
between mindfulness and hypnotic response; we obtained largely insensitive results, 
which will be presented, but not discussed further. 
Three further questions were included as a debrief in order to ensure that 
participants were naïve to the experimental hypothesis.  These included “What do you 
think the experiment was trying to test?”, “What do you think was the purpose of the 
colour classification task?”, and “How do you think being mentally exhausted would 
affect your hypnotic suggestibility?”.  
Design 
The experiment adopted a between subjects design with one independent 
variable: Inhibitory control manipulation (easy vs. difficult).  The primary dependent 
variable was the hypnotic experience ratings taken after each hypnotic suggestion.  VAS 
ratings of mood and mental exhaustion were used as outcome neutral manipulation 
checks (with changes in mental exhaustion but not mood desired); expectation, and 
personality measures (SCS, FFMQ, DES) were also captured for correlational analyses.  
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room with the experimenter available 
throughout.  Instructions were presented on screen and clarification was provided by the 
experimenter if required.  The experiment began with a sound check allowing 
participants to set a comfortable volume for the audio instructions.  Participants then 
provided demographic information (e.g. age and gender) before instructions for the 
inhibitory control manipulation were provided.  
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Inhibitory control manipulation.  Participants completed one of two versions 
of the colour naming Stroop task (easy vs. difficult).  Those in the difficult inhibitory 
challenge condition completed a four-colour version requiring high levels of inhibition 
of responses to suppress the automatic tendency to read the word in order to report the 
colour of the text that it is written in (either Red, Green, Blue or Yellow).  For example, 
‘red’ written in blue must be classified as blue and not red. Participants were asked to be 
as accurate as possible.  Trials began with a 300ms fixation cross before the colour 
word was presented for 1000ms in ‘Arial’ font size 50.  Participants classified the text 
colour using keys 1-4.  Failure to respond within 1 second or to correctly classify the 
colour resulted in a middle C pitch error tone.  There were 240 trials in total with every 
8 trials containing 2 trials of each colour word in a randomised order.  Each set of 8 
trials also contained 6 congruent trials (colour name and text colour match) and 2 
incongruent trials (colour name and text colour did not match).  
Those in the easy condition completed a two-colour version of the colour 
classification task, requiring lower levels of inhibitory responses, in which the colour of 
the text and the word presented were always congruent (i.e. ‘red’ written in red) and 
were only either red or green.  Participants were again asked to keep errors to a 
minimum.  Responses were made using keys 1-2.  Each trial began the same way as the 
four-colour Stroop task but they were asked to classify the text colour as either Red or 
Green using keys ‘1’ or ‘2’ respectively.  The duration of the task was fixed to match 
the duration of the inhibitory condition, irrespective of the number of trials completed.   
Mood ratings.  Following the inhibitory manipulation, a set of mood ratings 
were captured using the on-screen VAS for the emotions: happy, sad, anxious, aroused, 
angry, and exhausted e.g. “At this precise moment how happy do you feel?”  with 
ratings provided on a scale from ‘not at all’ (0) to ‘extremely’ (10).  An additional VAS 
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was used to capture a measure of expectation of participants’ level of hypnotic 
responding.  
Hypnotic responding.  All participants were instructed to put on their 
headphones and were asked to listen to the standardised hypnotic induction procedure.  
This induction was followed by the four separate suggestions in the following order: 
hands together, rigid arm, taste hallucination, and negative colour hallucination.  After 
each suggestion participants were prompted to give a measure of self-reported hypnotic 
responding.  Responses for the hands together, rigid arm, and taste hallucination 
suggestions were made using on-screen VAS for the questions; “To what extent did 
your hands move together?”, “To what extent did you find it difficult to bend your 
arm?” and “To what extent did you experience a taste in your mouth?” respectively, 
with the scale ranging from “not at all” (0) to “very much” (10).  Responses to the 
negative colour hallucination was measured using a VAS for the question “What 
proportion of the block pattern did you perceive as being grey?” from “none at all” (0) 
to “the entire pattern” (10).   
Questionnaires.  Participants then completed three on-screen questionnaires; 
the SCS, DES and FFMQ.  
Lastly, participants were asked to answer the three on-screen debrief questions 
before being fully debriefed as to the true nature of the study and thanked for their 
participation.  
Results 
All raw data are available at http://osf.io/xa9p8.  
Bayes factors (B) were used to assess the strength of evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis, H1, over the null, H0 (Wagenmakers, Verhagen, Ly, Matzke, et al., 2017).  
A B of above 3 indicates substantial evidence for H1 over H0 and below 1/3 substantial 
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evidence for the H0 over Hl.  All Bayes factors, B, reported here represent the evidence 
for H1 relative to H0; to find the evidence for H0 relative to H1, take 1/B.  Bs between 3 
and 1/3 indicate data insensitivity (see Dienes, 2014; cf. Jeffreys, 1939).  Here, BH(0, x) 
refers to a Bayes factor in which the predictions of H1 were modeled as a half-normal 
distribution with an SD of x (see Dienes & McLatchie, 2017); the half-normal can be 
used when a theory makes a directional prediction where x scales the size of effect that 
could be expected.  As correlations with hypnotic response, if they exist, tend to be in 
the region of r = 0.2 (e.g. Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & Du Chéné, 2008), for 
correlations the SD was set to be x = 0.2.  For the mood ratings, in the absence of 
similar previous studies we followed a strategy recommended by Dienes (2017) for this 
situation.  As we predicted that the control group would be happier and more aroused, 
we estimated a difference between the mean of the experimental condition and the 
maximum shift possible, thus the SD for mood valence and arousal were set as half the 
difference between the mean of the difficult condition and the top of the scale (10) (i.e. 
3.45/2 = 1.73).  For the manipulation check, using the same strategy would result in 
modeling H1 with a half-normal with SD = 2.65.  A previous study (Gurney et al., 
2018) using the same difficult and easy tasks and the same measure of mental 
exhaustion estimated a change of 2.85, virtually the same as the estimate just calculated 
using the Dienes (2017) strategy.  As conclusions do not depend on which SD is used; 
we chose the more informed value (2.85).  Finally, for the change in hypnotic response, 
theoretically the effect could go in either direction, thus we used a normal distribution to 
model H1.  BN(0, x) refers to a Bayes factor in which the predictions of H1 were modelled 
as a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and an SD of x (this can be used for non-
directional predictions in general).  The maximum difference between the groups is the 
largest difference between the control mean and the end of the scale.  We then set the 
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SD to be half this maximum.  The effect observed in the control condition of 
Experiment 1 was 4.51 on a 10-point scale, thus, the SD was set to 2.75.  With these 
assumptions for modeling H1, as it happened, where an effect yielded a p value of 
about .05, the Bayes factor was about 3, though there is no guarantee of such a 
correspondence between B and p values (Lindley, 1957).  We will interpret all effects 
with respect to the Bayes factors. 
To indicate the robustness of Bayesian conclusions, for each B, a robustness 
region is reported, giving the range of scales that qualitatively support the same 
conclusion (i.e. evidence as insensitive, or as supporting H0, or as supporting H1), 
notated as: RR [x1, x2] where x1 is the smallest SD that gives the same conclusion and 
x2 is the largest2. 
Participant Awareness 
 Responses to the question “What do you think the experiment was trying to 
test?” which included references to the influence of exhaustion, depletion, will-power 
(or similar) affecting hypnotic suggestibility were coded as ‘aware’.  Responses to the 
question “What do you think the purpose of the colour classification task was?”, which 
mentioned depletion or exhaustion were coded as ‘aware’.  Finally, any responses to the 
question “How do you think being mentally exhausted would affect your hypnotic 
suggestibility?”, which stated that it would increase suggestibility were coded as 
‘increase’, those which stated suggestibility would decrease were coded as ‘decrease’ 
and ‘other’ for ambiguous answers.  All responses were coded by two independent 
coders, and codes were found to correspond 100%.  
                                                          
2 Thanks to Balazs Aczel for suggesting the use of robustness regions 
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No participants correctly identified the purpose of the experiment.  Out of the 
five participants who correctly identified the purpose of the stroop task, all thought that 
mental exhaustion would increase suggestibility. 
Correlational Analysis  
Expectancy.  Pearson’s correlation revealed a positive relationship between 
participants’ expectancy ratings and their mean hypnotic response, r = .28, p = .028, 
BH(0, 0.20) = 6.08, RR[0.09,0.97]. 
Personality.  Correlational analyses were conducted for the relationship 
between each of the personality measures and mean hypnotic responding, see Table 1.  
Results show that responses to the DES showed a positive relationship with hypnotic 
responding. 
 
Table 1.  Relationship between mean hypnotic response and all personality measures. 
 
SCS FFMQ: 
Observe 
FFMQ: 
Describe 
FFMQ: 
Act 
FFMQ: 
Non-
Judge 
FFMQ: 
Non-
React 
DES 
r -.13 -.03 -.00 -.12 .00 -.20 .35 
p .310 .838 .995 .348 .981 .132 .006 
B 0.31* 0.47 0.55 0.32* 0.55 0.25* 18.63* 
Note. * Sensitive B at >3 or <1/3. 
Outcome Neutral Tests 
 Exhaustion.  There was no evidence one way or the other for there being a 
difference in mental exhaustion between those in the difficult (M = 5.49, SE = 0.42) and 
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easy (M = 4.69, SE = 0.45) conditions, t(58) = 1.31, p = .197, d = 0.34, BH(0, 2.85)  = 0.85 
RR[0.01, 8.11]. 
 Thus, we have not established, independent of the crucial test, that the tasks 
challenged the inhibitory system to a different extent.  As well as establishing a 
difference in test difficulty we would also establish that mood was not changed.  
Changes in mood may accompany different degrees of fatigue as a matter of course, 
thus establishing no change in mood is not crucial to the logic of the experiment in the 
same way that establishing differences in inhibitory challenge is. 
Mood (valence).  There was no evidence one way or the other for there being a 
difference in valence between those in the difficult (M = 3.09, SE = 0.61) and easy (M = 
3.69, SE = 0.61) conditions, t(58) = 1.31, p = .489, d = 0.18, BH(0, 3.45)  = 0.46 RR[0.01, 
4.99]. 
Mood (arousal).  There was no evidence one way or the other for there being a 
difference in arousal between those in the difficult (M = 4.30, SE = 0.37) and easy (M = 
4.67, SE = 0.38) conditions, t(58) = 0.71, p = .478, d = 0.18, BH(0, 2.85) = 0.46 RR[0.01, 
3.15]. 
Main Analysis  
 The effect of a prior inhibitory challenge on hypnotic suggestibility.  Here 
we sought to examine how hypnotic suggestibility differed with inhibitory control 
condition.  A one-way ANOVA was conducted on mean hypnotic response and the 
inhibitory control manipulation condition (easy vs. difficult).  The results revealed 
evidence for a main effect of inhibitory control condition on subsequent hypnotic 
response, (Mdiff = 1.07, SEdiff = 0.43), F(1, 58) = 6.13, p = .016, ηp2 = .10, BN(0, 2.75)  = 
3.17 RR[0.39,2.94], with those in the easy rather than difficult condition showing a 
greater hypnotic response, see Figure 4. 
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Discussion 
Experiment 1 aimed to investigate the effect of a prior inhibitory task on 
subsequent susceptibility to hypnotic suggestions.  Consistent with Hilgard (1977) and 
Spanos (1986) our results suggest that a prior inhibitory task decreases subsequent 
susceptibility.  As such the findings contrast predictions from dissociated control 
theories of hypnosis which suggest that due to compromised functioning of the frontal 
cortices there would be an increase in suggestibility to hypnosis.  The positive, 
correlation between participant’s dissociative experiences as reported on the DES and 
their hypnotic responding provides some support for a relationship between dissociative 
processes and hypnosis.  However, one limitation of the inhibitory control literature is 
ensuring that the task used is mentally exhausting (see Dang, 2017).  Whilst the Stroop, 
as used here, has previously been shown to create necessary inhibitory demand (Dang, 
2017; Gurney et al., 2017) we were unable to provide evidence for or against a 
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Figure 4.  Change in mean hypnotic responding for each hypnotic suggestion as a 
product of inhibitory condition (+/- 1 SEM).  Note. * p < .05 
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difference in levels of mental exhaustion for the easy and difficult task conditions.  As 
we did not have clear evidence for this outcome neutral test, and Experiment 1 was run 
without a pre-defined analytic protocol, we sought to directly replicate the procedure 
with a larger sample, using the same analyses. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
96 participants (72 female, 24 male) aged 18 to 45 years (M = 20.95, SE = 0.41) 
were ‘medium responders’ recruited from the University of Sussex Hypnosis Database 
and paid £5 for participation.  Participants were randomly assigned in equal proportions 
to one of two experimental task type conditions created by the inhibitory control 
manipulation: easy versus difficult.  All participants were naive to the experimental 
hypothesis.  Participants were run until the Bayes factor for the manipulation check 
indicated substantial evidence for either H1 or H0.  The experiment was considered low 
risk and received ethical approval from the University of Sussex School of Psychology 
ethics committee.  All participants read an information sheet and signed a consent form 
before the experiment began.  At the end of the experiment participants were fully 
debriefed as to the nature of the experimental aims.  The experimental materials, design 
and procedure all remained the same as Experiment 1. 
Results 
Participant Awareness 
 Responses to the three debrief questions were coded as in Experiment 1.  No 
participants simultaneously identified the purpose of the study, the purpose of the stroop 
and identified that exhaustion would decrease susceptibility.  Therefore, all were 
included in the analysis. 
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Correlational Analysis 
 Expectancy.  Pearson’s correlation revealed a positive relationship between 
participants’ expectancy ratings and their mean hypnotic response, r = .38, p < .001, 
BH(0, 0.2)  = 538.22, RR[0.03, 1]. 
Personality.  Correlational analyses were conducted for the relationship 
between each of the personality measures and mean hypnotic responding, see Table 2.  
Results show evidence that responses to the SCS showed a negative relationship with 
hypnotic responding and the DES showed a positive relationship with hypnotic 
responding.   
 
Table 2.  Relationship between mean suggestibility and all personality measures. 
 
SCS FFMQ: 
Observe 
FFMQ: 
Describe 
FFMQ: 
Act 
FFMQ: 
Non-
Judge 
FFMQ: 
Non-
React 
DES 
r -.21 .01 -.11 -.09 -.14 .02 .33 
p .039 .903 .293 .395 .168 .851 .001 
B 5.06* 0.48 0.24* 0.26* 0.21* 0.52 91.04* 
Note. * Sensitive B at >3 or <1/3. 
Outcome Neutral Tests 
 Exhaustion.  There was substantial evidence for a difference in mental 
exhaustion between those in the difficult (M = 6.26, SE = 0.31) and easy (M = 5.07, SE 
= 0.38) conditions, t(91.74) = -2.45, p = .016, d = 0.50, BH(0, 2.85)  = 5.90, RR[0.27, 
6.06]. 
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 This is a key manipulation check to establish the integrity of the experiment.  
Establishing equivalence of mood would help narrow theoretical interpretation, but as 
mood may naturally vary with exhaustion (in that, for example, exhaustion is often 
unpleasant), presence or absence of mood differences do not threaten the integrity of the 
experiment as such. 
Mood (valence).  There was no evidence one way or the other for there being a 
difference in valence between those in the difficult (M = 1.26, SE = 0.57) and easy (M = 
2.42, SE = 0.47) conditions, t(94) = 1.56, p = .119, d = 0.32, BH(0, 4.37)  = 1.04 RR[0.01, 
14.53]. 
Mood (arousal).  There was evidence for the null hypothesis, namely that there 
was no difference in arousal between those in the difficult (M = 4.44, SE = 0.38) and 
easy (M = 4.65, SE = 0.31) conditions, t(94) = 0.43, p = .672, d = 0.09, BH(0, 2.78)  = 0.24 
RR[2.04, 10].  Thus, the differences in mental exhaustion were not accompanied by 
overall differences in arousal. 
Main Analysis  
 The effect of a prior inhibitory challenge on hypnotic suggestibility.  Here 
we sought to examine how hypnotic suggestibility differed with inhibitory control 
condition.  A one-way ANOVA was conducted on mean hypnotic response and the 
inhibitory control manipulation (easy vs. difficult).  The results revealed substantial 
evidence for the null hypothesis, namely that there was no main effect of inhibitory 
control condition on mean hypnotic response, (Mdiff = -0.17, SEdiff = 0.38), F (1, 94) = 
0.20, p = .675, ηp2 = .00, BN(0, 2.75)  = 0.15, RR[1.23, 10], see Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Change in mean hypnotic responding for each hypnotic suggestion as a 
product of inhibitory condition (+/- 1 SEM).  
Next, we tested whether the crucial effect in experiment 1 was different from 
that in Experiment 2.  The results showed substantial evidence for an interaction 
between condition and experiment, (Mdiff = 0.81, SEdiff = 0.29), F (1, 152) = 4.52, p = 
.035, ηp2 = .03, BN(0, 2.75)  = 4.63, RR[0.01, 4.38], suggesting that the crucial effect was 
different in the two experiments.  We also tested whether experiment 2 replicated the 
effect in experiment 1, in the specific sense of using the posterior distribution of the 
effect found from experiment 1 as the model of H1 for testing the effect in experiment 2 
(the strategy recommended by Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014).  The resulting Bayes 
provided evidence that Experiment 2 did not replicate the effect observed in Experiment 
1, BN(0.80,0.39)  = 0.16, RR[1.01, 10].  Finally, we meta-analytically combined the raw 
effect sizes of Experiment 1 and 2 weighting by the square of the SE of each estimate  
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and computed a Bayes Factor for the combined effect3.  The resulting Bayes factor 
provided substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, namely that exerting inhibitory 
control does not decrease susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion, BN(0, 2.75)  = 0.23 
RR[1.89,10]. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 sought to establish whether the effect reported in Experiment 1, 
namely that a prior inhibitory task decreases subsequent susceptibility, would be 
replicated over a larger sample size.  Those in the difficult inhibitory task condition 
gave higher ratings of mental exhaustion suggesting that the challenging task had the 
desired effect of increasing inhibitory demand.  We found evidence for no effect relative 
to a relatively uninformed model of H1, and evidence for no effect relative to the effect 
size found in Experiment 1.  Combining both studies in a Bayesian meta-analysis 
provided support for the null hypothesis that exerting inhibitory processes on a 
challenging task has no effect on subsequent susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion.  As 
the outcome neutral test was not satisfied in Experiment 1, and the analyses were not 
pre-defined, we treat Experiment 1 as exploratory (even though the analytic protocol 
was in fact simple); and Experiment 2 as more clearly testing the theoretical claim that 
an inhibitory challenge impairs hypnotic response, given the analytic protocol had been 
pre-defined by that used in Experiment 1. 
Consistent with Experiment 1 and previous research there was a positive 
correlation between scores on the DES in the hypnotic context (Kirsch & Council, 
1992; Nadon et al., 1991).  This correlation may especially arise when hypnotic 
                                                          
3 This is the same as a fixed effects meta-analysis.  While the difference between experiments is evidence 
(but not strong evidence, B < 10) that the effect is not fixed, on the null hypothesis we are testing the 
effect is fixed at zero. That is, if we assume H0, we assume a fixed effect. Note that the same program 
exactly was run in the same university drawing from the same subject pool (largely psychology 
undergraduates at the University of Sussex) with no obvious contextual differences that would be relevant 
according to the theories tested. Thus, it is relevant to test the model there is one fixed effect of zero. 
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response and DES are tested in the same context (e.g. contrast Dienes et al., 2009, 
where they were tested in a different context).  In addition to this we found a negative 
relationship between individuals’ scores on the SCS and their mean hypnotic 
responding suggesting that those scoring highest in self-control, reported lower levels of 
hypnotic responding.  Given this result, it is interesting that we did not observe lower 
levels of hypnotic responding for those who had completed the easy task.  This suggests 
a difference between trait levels of self-control and the level of regulatory capacity 
altered by inhibitory control tasks.  Interestingly, whilst some report a positive 
relationship between trait self-control and the ability to overcome the effects of 
‘depletion’ (Gillebaart & de Ridder, 2015; Muraven et al., 2005) others have reported 
the opposite effect (see Imhoff, Schmidt, & Gerstenberg, 2014). 
General Discussion 
 Despite disagreements surrounding the exact mechanisms underlying hypnosis, 
many theories involve the use of, or alterations in frontal processing and executive 
functioning (e.g. Dietrich, 2003; Egner & Raz, 2007).  As executive functions are vital 
to inhibitory control, the present study sought to examine whether a temporary 
reduction in inhibitory control might influence hypnotic suggestibility.  We sought to 
address this by manipulating the degree of demand required to complete a prior task, 
which consisted of either an easy or difficult colour naming task (see Dang, 2017), and 
comparing subsequent susceptibility to a set of four standard hypnotic suggestions.  
Experiment 1 aimed to investigate the effect of the degree of inhibitory 
challenge on subsequent hypnotic responding.  This constituted an initial exploration.  
There was not clear evidence for the difference in mental exhaustion produced by the 
inhibitory tasks in the intervention and control conditions; thus, the required outcome 
neutral task was not passed.  Nonetheless, the results for Experiment 1 provided 
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evidence for the hypothesis that a prior inhibitory task decreases subsequent hypnotic 
suggestibility.  Crucially, Experiment 2, did provide evidence for the outcome neutral 
task, that is a difference in mental exhaustion between the intervention and control 
groups, and had researchers’ degrees of freedom removed by following the exact 
protocol as Experiment 1.  Experiment 2 found evidence for no effect of prior inhibitory 
control on hypnotic response.  A Bayesian meta-analysis combining the two 
experiments provided evidence for the null hypothesis that exerting inhibitory processes 
on a challenging task has no effect on subsequent susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion.  
The results presented here therefore suggest that the level of demand we placed on 
inhibitory processes does not influence the degree to which an individual is responsive 
to subsequent hypnotic influences. 
It may be argued that although we had succeeded in placing different levels of 
inhibitory demand on participants, that difference was not large enough to interfere with 
hypnotic response.  However, the Stroop task used in the experiments in this paper has 
been pinpointed as one of the strongest and most reliable inhibitory control 
manipulations in a recent meta-analysis of the depletion literature (Dang, 2017) and has 
also been used to show subsequently increased stereotype consistent errors (Govorun & 
Payne, 2006), decreased persistence on puzzle-solving tasks (Webb & Sheeran, 2003, 
Experiment 1), and reduced performance on tests of handgrip endurance (Bray et al., 
2008).  Furthermore, it is coupled with a manipulation check in which participants were 
asked to rate how mentally exhausted they are, a method which is common place within 
the literature (e.g. Bray et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2012; Friese, Binder, Luechinger, 
Boesiger, & Rasch, 2013; Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008; Friese, Messner, & 
Schaffner, 2012; Govorun & Payne, 2006; Grillon, Quispe-Escudero, Mathur, & Ernst, 
2015; Webb & Sheeran, 2003). 
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The results presented here are consistent with the cold control theory (Dienes, 
2012; Dienes & Perner, 2007) in that previous work disrupting frontal function that 
improves hypnotic response has been interpreted by cold control as arising from a 
disruption in metacognition.  That is, as cold control predicts an improvement in 
hypnotic response only where metacognition is affected.  Previous research suggests 
that the inhibitory challenge utilised in the current study (the colour naming Stroop) 
does not affect the formation of accurate higher-order thoughts (Gurney et al., 2018), 
thus the cold control theory would predict no alteration - or an impairment in hypnotic 
responding if the disruption is sufficient to impair the strategies that must be performed 
to produce the hypnotic action.  What cold control theories, including those of Spanos 
(1986) and Hilgard (1977) rule out is an improvement in hypnotic response by 
disrupting frontal function. 
The results are in themselves consistent with Kirsch's (1985) response 
expectancy theory, a non-cold control theory, because it regards expectancy as the 
single direct cause of hypnotic response.  The absence of the relevance of disruption of 
the executive system on hypnotic response is predicted by this theory.  However, the 
results that frontal challenges which impair the formation of accurate higher order 
thoughts (e.g. Semmens-wheeler et al., 2013) do improve hypnotic response are not 
predicted by response expectancy theory. 
The results do not provide evidence for the original dissociated control theory of 
hypnosis (e.g. Bowers, 1992; Woody & Bowers, 1994) as such approaches would have 
predicted an increase in hypnotic suggestibility following a challenging inhibitory task 
due to an implication of the frontal processes resulting in less control over the further 
splitting of executive control systems.  However, second-order dissociated control 
models, which locate the dissociation in meta-cognitive monitoring, survive the 
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challenge (Woody & Sadler, 2008).  Further, the positive relationship observed between 
DES scores and mean hypnotic response mirrors findings previously documented 
(Kirsch & Council, 1992; Nadon et al., 1991) and provides some evidence of a link 
between dissociative experiences and hypnotic suggestibility, though the absence of this 
correlation when the measures are taken in different contexts suggests caution in using 
it to support dissociation theories (Dienes et al., 2009; Kirsch & Council, 1992). 
Previous research has shown that exerting control on one task reduces the degree 
of control which is readily applied to subsequent tasks (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1998; 
DeWall et al., 2007; Fischer et al., 2012; Hofmann et al., 2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 
2000).  Thus, if inhibitory control was necessary for hypnosis, the inhibitory control 
literature would predict impaired hypnotic responding following a task which placed 
high levels of demand on inhibitory processes.  This was not observed in the present 
study and instead the results show substantial evidence of no effect of prior inhibitory 
control on hypnotic response.  However, interestingly, we do report a negative 
correlation between individuals’ trait levels of self-control and their mean hypnotic 
responding.  This suggests a difference between trait self-control and temporary 
alterations in regulatory capacity induced by the inhibitory control manipulation.  
Further, the result suggests that those with low trait self-control should be more 
receptive to hypnosis.  This is important given the clinical applications of hypnosis as a 
supplementary therapy in populations associated with chronically impaired self-control.  
Hypnosis is thought to augment the effectiveness of cognitive behavioural 
therapies (Kirsch, Montgomery, & Sapirstein, 1995), decrease the symptoms of anxiety 
and depression (Heap, 2012), and facilitate treatment gains for a variety of 
psychological and medical conditions (see Green, Laurence, & Lynn, 2014, for a 
review).  Previous work has highlighted the role of chronically impaired inhibitory 
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control in disorders such as anxiety (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Cisler & Olatunji, 2012) 
and depression (Joormann & Stanton, 2016).  Thus, it is interesting and arguably 
reassuring to report that placing a high level of demand on inhibitory control processes 
had no effect on hypnotic suggestibility.  This encouragingly suggests that, at least 
within the constraints of study, those with low levels of inhibitory control should be no 
less receptive to the potentially beneficial effects of hypnosis as a treatment.  Further, 
the correlation between low levels of self-control and high hypnotic response suggests 
those individuals with disorders characterised by impaired self-control might in fact, be 
more responsive to the benefits of hypnosis.   
Cold control theory (Dienes & Perner, 2007) would predict a change in hypnotic 
response only where metacognition is impaired.  As previous research has shown 
substantial evidence of no effect of the inhibitory task on subjective thresholds and 
metacognition (Gurney et al., 2017), cold control theory would predict no change in 
hypnotic response between inhibitory task conditions as metacognition should remain 
unaffected.  As such, the results presented here provide support for the cold control 
theory and provide evidence that exerting inhibitory control processes does not 
influence subsequent susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion.  Considering the use of 
hypnosis in facilitating treatments, it is reassuring that prior inhibitory control demand 
does not unduly effect receptiveness to hypnotic procedures. 
78 
Running Head: INHIBITORY CONTROL & MOOD LABILITY  
 
 
 
Paper 3: 
Mood Lability, Neural Activation, and Resting State Connectivity Following a 
Demanding Inhibitory Control Task 
 
Angela Gurney, Cassandra Gould Van Praag, Jacob Gough, Amanda Lange, Charlotte 
Rae, Chris Bird & Ryan B. Scott 
 
University of Sussex 
 
Author Note: 
AG and RS designed the two studies.  Data collection for Experiment 1 was supported 
by two undergraduate students (JG and AL).  AG completed all data collection for 
Experiment 2 (fMRI).  AG completed analysis for Experiment 1 and completed all 
preprocessing and analyses for Experiment 2 with support from CGVP and CR.  AG 
completed the write up with comments on the manuscript provided by CGVP, CB and 
RS.
79 
INHIBITORY CONTROL & MOOD LABILITY 
 
Abstract 
Exerting inhibitory control is understood to result in a reduced capacity for control on 
subsequent tasks.  The present study employed a novel, experimental approach to 
examine whether performing a task imposing higher versus lower inhibitory control 
demands increases subsequent susceptibility to mood manipulations.  Consistent with 
predictions, Experiment 1 showed that participants who completed the demanding 
inhibitory task subsequently showed significantly greater differences in rated happiness 
and sadness after positive and negative mood manipulations.  Experiment 2 then 
extended this approach by introducing a neuroimaging component to investigate 
differences in resting state network activation and connectivity, specifically in the 
default mode and executive control networks, underlying any behavioural changes in 
mood lability following the prior use of inhibitory control.  To this end, participants 
completed either an easy or difficult inhibitory task flanked either side by a positive 
mood manipulation and resting-state fMRI scan.  The behavioural results revealed no 
evidence for or against an effect of inhibitory control demand on subsequent mood 
lability.  Significantly increased activation was observed in regions of the default mode 
network (DMN) and executive control network (ECN) during the second resting-state 
scan.  However, this effect was only observed when the results were collapsed across 
task conditions.  Thus, the results were unable to provide evidence relevant to an effect 
of prior inhibitory control on cortical activity and resting-state network connectivity.  
 
Keywords: Self-control; emotion; inhibitory control; resting-state
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Inhibitory control or self-control, often referred to as ‘willpower’, is a defining feature 
of the human race and refers to the ability to regulate urges and resist temptation in the 
pursuit of competing goals.  Failure to exert inhibitory control is held to contribute to 
many of society’s challenges such as the obesity epidemic, debt, drug and alcohol 
abuse, criminality, and racial discrimination (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012).  Despite the 
importance of inhibitory control in shaping human experience, our current 
understanding of the mechanisms involved is fundamentally limited and remains a topic 
of much debate and interest.  Thus, the current study aims to investigate the role that 
self-control plays in one key aspect of our everyday lives: emotion regulation.  Whilst 
much research has documented the link between inhibitory control and emotion 
regulation, few have experimentally examined the effect of state self-control on 
subsequent capacity for emotion regulation, and neural connectivity.  The present study 
therefore examines the effect of a demanding inhibitory control task on subsequent 
mood lability and resting state network connectivity in response to positive and negative 
mood induction.  
Inhibitory control has predominantly been examined using a dual task paradigm 
to demonstrate that exerting control on one task significantly reduces the amount of 
control applied to subsequent tasks.  In this manner, exerting control on an initial task 
can lead to subsequently greater levels of undesirable behaviours such as impulsivity 
(Vohs & Faber, 2007), overeating (Hofmann et al., 2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), 
aggression (DeWall et al., 2007), and racial stereotyping (Govorun & Payne, 2006), see 
Hagger, Wood, Stiff, and Chatzisarantis (2010) for a meta-analysis.  
One account of such effects, the Resource model (Baumeister et al., 1998), 
depicts self-control as a resource which once used, needs time to replenish and until 
such time, cannot be applied to further tasks.  However, the resource in question has 
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thus far proven unidentifiable with attempts to characterise it as blood glucose levels 
(Gailliot et al., 2007; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008), being subject to much criticism 
(Beedie & Lane, 2012; Job et al., 2010; Kurzban, 2010; Martijn et al., 2002; Schmeichel 
& Vohs, 2009; Tice et al., 2007).  Whilst further challenges to this model arose from a 
meta-analysis (Carter et al., 2015) and registered replication report (Hagger et al., 2016) 
both of which failed to find evidence of the depleting effects of prior inhibitory control, 
new research has since demonstrated that providing that the task used as the inhibitory 
control manipulation is experienced as more exhausting, then subsequent effects such as 
those reported in the self-control literature are apparent (Dang, 2017). 
A more recent account of such effects comes from a neural-systems based 
balance model, by Heatherton and Wagner (2011).  The model is built on the concept of 
a careful balancing act between regions responsible for inhibitory control such as the 
lateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) and regions involved in processing the 
valence, appeal, and reward value of stimuli such as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and 
striatum.  Impulse strength is constantly moderated by frontal control, with failures to 
regulate responses observed where the impulse is stronger than the capacity for 
regulation or where prior disruption to frontal processes, potentially from prior exertion 
of inhibitory control, leads to insufficient top-down control (see Wagner, Altman, 
Boswell, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2013).  
Despite the ongoing challenge to encapsulate the underlying foundations of such 
an effect, a considerable amount of research has collectively reported that exerting 
control on one task reduces the degree of control applied to subsequent tasks (DeWall et 
al., 2007; Fischer et al., 2012; Govorun & Payne, 2006; Hofmann et al., 2007; Papies & 
Hamstra, 2010; Papies, Stroebe, & Aarts, 2008; Park, Glaser, & Knowles, 2008; Vohs 
& Heatherton, 2000).  Although the exact mechanisms underlying the effect remain 
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unknown, it appears that when adequate cognitive capacity is limited, there is a shift 
from the use of executive top down control to bottom up processes resulting in 
behaviour being instead directed by impulses, desires and implicit response tendencies 
(Hofmann et al., 2007). 
One facet of cognition requiring inhibitory control is emotion regulation.  
Emotion regulation refers to the ability to alter the original trajectory of emotion by 
manipulating one or more of the behavioural, subjective or physiological components of 
emotional response (Gross & Levenson, 1993).  Individuals can change the intensity, 
duration and quality of emotion either automatically or via the conscious recruitment of 
strategies such as breathing deeply, biting one’s tongue or purposefully thinking happier 
thoughts (see Gross, 2015).  In the absence of successful regulation, emotions can 
maladaptively bias cognition and behaviour (Eftekhari et al., 2009; Gross & Jazaieri, 
2014).  Consequently, effective emotion regulation is imperative to healthy adaptation 
and mental health (Gross & Munoz, 1995).  
Emotion regulation and inhibitory control are inextricably entwined; both 
processes requiring intervention to alter automatic response tendencies.  Indeed, tasks 
involving the inhibition of emotional reactions have been extensively used to 
experimentally lower levels of self-control (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1998; Friese, 
Messner, & Schaffner, 2012; Gailliot et al., 2007).  While most individuals exhibit an 
automatic tendency to regulate their emotional responses to affective stimuli (Volokhov 
& Demaree, 2010), many psychopathologies and disorders characterised by impulsivity 
are also associated with the failure to regulate emotions (Eftekhari et al., 2009) such as 
anxiety (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Cisler & Olatunji, 2012), bulimia nervosa (Anestis et 
al., 2009) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD; Skirrow et al., 2014; 
Walcott & Landau, 2004).  Thus, better understanding the role of inhibitory control in 
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emotion regulation may help account for observed variations in regulatory capacity seen 
both in clinical and non-clinical populations (Layton & Muraven, 2014).  
Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone (2004), found a positive correlation between 
high levels of self-control and self-reported emotional stability, suggesting that the two 
go hand in hand.  The self-reports collected in this study however were participants’ 
predictions of how they might respond rather than a rating of their emotions directly 
after or during emotional experiences.  Similarly, Layton and Muraven (2014), looked 
at two aspects of emotional behaviour: emotional intensity (the degree of positive or 
negative affect) and emotional lability (fluctuations in positive and negative affect) in 
two studies.  Those high in inhibitory control had greater emotional stability, 
experiencing lower emotional intensity and fewer fluctuations in mood, suggesting that 
lower levels of emotional volatility may occur for those high in trait self-control.  
Consequently, it appears that those who are high in self-control may restrict their 
emotional experiences by limiting the range of emotion that they exhibit (Layton & 
Muraven, 2014).  Although these correlational designs appear to show a relationship 
between subjective self-reported mood and trait self-control, experimental designs are 
required to examine the extent of any causal relationship. 
  One such experimental investigation exploited neuro-imaging to examine how 
a demanding inhibitory control task altered subsequent cortical reactivity to emotionally 
valenced stimuli during an inside-outside judgement task (Wagner & Heatherton, 2013).  
The study revealed increased left amygdala reactivity to negative stimuli and reduced 
connectivity between the left amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC), when viewing emotional images in those who had previously completed a 
challenging task in comparison to controls.  Given that both the amygdala and PFC are 
known to play an important role in the processing of emotion (Hariri, Mattay, Tessitore, 
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Fera, & Weinberger, 2003) and the importance of the PFC in exerting control over 
automatic responses (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009), these results appear to suggest 
less PFC control over amygdala activation and a period of amplified neural response to 
negative stimuli following the prior use of inhibitory control. In support of this, a 
neuroimaging study by Paschke et al. (2016), demonstrated that during emotion 
regulation individuals high in control exhibited stronger connectivity between the 
amygdala and PFC, potentially allowing for more effective and better maintained 
emotion regulation.  Considering such findings, we therefore propose that prior exertion 
of inhibitory control might increase the subsequent intensity and lability of emotional 
experiences due to a decrease in regulatory capacity.  
Task-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigms (such as 
that employed by Wagner et al., 2013), which measure blood oxygen level dependant 
(BOLD) signal to determine brain regions activated in response to specific stimuli, have 
been critical to our understanding of how the brain functions (Lee, Smyser, & Shimony, 
2013).  More recently however, attention has been focused on connectivity in resting 
state networks (RSNs), as networks identified during resting are understood to be 
functionally coupled during task-positive states, and resting-state fMRI imaging offers 
the opportunity to examine multiple networks at one time rather than a single task-
associated network (Shen, 2015).  
At rest the brain is engaged in spontaneous activity observed as slow 
fluctuations in BOLD signal (<0.1 Hz) (see Lee et al., 2013).  This spontaneous activity 
shows correlations across brain regions (Fox & Raichle, 2007), which despite being 
spatially independent appear to be functionally connected (Rosazza & Minati, 2011).  
One technique used to identify RSNs is independent component analysis (ICA) whereby 
a number of independent components which show highly correlated patterns of similar 
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BOLD activity are extracted from the BOLD time series (Mckeown et al., 1998; 
Rosazza & Minati, 2011).  The extracted RSNs, and each of their specific networks of 
brain areas, show a great deal of consistency across multiple studies and populations 
and typically include the default mode, executive control, sensorimotor, medial visual, 
right and left lateralised fronto-parietal, auditory and temporo-parietal networks (see 
Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Rosazza & Minati, 2011).  The same brain regions which 
show correlated activity during resting-state also exhibit correlated activity during tasks 
(Shen, 2015); if there is a change within network connectivity it demonstrates that it is 
comprised of different regions, leading to changes in cognition and behaviour.  
Therefore, once these RSNs have been identified, alterations in the specific connectivity 
within the networks may be informative regarding differences observed in behaviour.  
The default mode network (DMN), arguably the most studied component, 
involves the precuneus/posterior cingulate, the lateral parietal cortex and medial 
prefrontal cortex (Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 2003; Raichle et al., 2001).  The 
DMN is engaged under ‘rest’ conditions and deactivated when the individual is 
performing active tasks, leading to it often being referred to as a ‘task-negative’ network 
(Lee et al., 2013).  The activity underlying the DMN is thought to reflect self-referential 
processing, theory of mind, mind-wandering and thinking about past and future events 
(Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 
2001; Mason et al., 2007) but can be influenced by the characteristics of tasks preceding 
data acquisition (Rosazza & Minati, 2011).  The executive control network (ECN) on 
the other hand, comprising areas such as the medial frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus 
and anterior cingulate cortex, is referred to as ‘task-positive’ as it is most intensely 
engaged during tasks reliant on executive control processes and working memory 
(Rosazza & Minati, 2011).  As such, DMN and ECN activation exhibit instantaneous 
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anti-correlation, such that as task demand increases there is an increase in activation of 
task-positive regions and a decrease in activation of task-negative regions (see Fox et 
al., 2005).  Both the DMN and ECN are implicated in emotional processing; Whilst 
regions involved in the ECN such as the anterior cingulate cortex are known to play an 
important role in monitoring cognitive influences on subsequent emotion (Stevens, 
Hurley, & Taber, 2011), the DMN has also been shown to play an important role in self-
related emotion with apparent differences in DMN connectivity in those with mood 
disorders such as depression (Greicius et al., 2007; cf. Bluhm et al., 2009).  Therefore, it 
is possible that prior inhibitory control might affect the balanced state between task-
positive ECN and task-negative DMN, or connectivity within the networks themselves 
leading to changes in their subsequent functioning whilst passively listening to highly 
emotionally valenced music. 
The present study employs an experimental approach to directly evaluate the 
relationship between state inhibitory control and mood lability.  Experiment 1 examines 
whether performing a task imposing high versus low inhibitory control demands 
increases subsequent susceptibility to a music-based mood manipulation.  As an 
extension of this, Experiment 2 employs a novel design to examine how resting state 
network connectivity, whilst passively listening to uplifting music, differs with the 
extent to which a preceding task is mentally demanding.  Inhibitory control is 
manipulated throughout using the e-crossing task which has previously been found to be 
among the more effective manipulations (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010).  
Emotional state is then evaluated before and after a positive or negative mood 
manipulation in the form of music.  It was predicted that in Experiment 1, participants 
experiencing the difficult versus easy inhibitory task would subsequently show 
increased mood lability observed in a greater increase in happiness after positive music 
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and a greater increase in sadness after negative music.  The same period of increased 
mood lability following prior inhibitory control was predicted for Experiment 2.  
Additionally, it was hypothesised that following increased ECN activity during the 
difficult inhibitory task, the switch to a restful state would decrease ECN and increase 
DMN activity during the subsequent mood manipulation; with this change being more 
pronounced than following the easy inhibitory task.  Alternatively, it was also 
hypothesised that increased ECN activity during the difficult inhibitory task would 
continue during the mood manipulation, as prior task positive brain states can influence 
subsequent resting states (Rosazza & Minati, 2011), thus reducing DMN activity.  
Additionally, changes in mood lability may be accompanied by changes in connectivity 
within networks, similar to those observed in disorders of emotion regulation such as 
borderline personality disorder (e.g. Doll, 2013; Wolf et al., 2011).  Thus, exploratory 
analyses are utilised to examine changes in network connectivity during mood 
manipulation before and after inhibitory control. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
120 participants (72 female, 48 male) aged 18 to 40 (M = 21, SD = 3.17) were 
recruited from the University of Sussex and participated in exchange for confectionery 
and entry into a £25 prize draw.  All participants were naïve to the experimental 
hypothesis and were randomly assigned in equal proportions to one of four 
experimental conditions created by the two by two design: inhibitory task condition 
(easy vs. difficult) by mood manipulation condition (positive vs. negative).  The 
experiment was considered low risk and received ethical approval from the University 
of Sussex School of Psychology ethics committee.  All participants read an information 
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sheet and signed a consent form before the experiment began.  At the end of the 
experiment participants were fully debriefed as to the nature of the experimental aims. 
Materials 
All instructions, VAS scales, and questionnaires were presented on-screen with 
the auditory stimuli presented through Dynamode HH-660MV stereo headphones.  The 
controlling program was implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks, 2016) and run on a 
Pavilion DM4 computer (screen size: 36.5cm x 20.5cm).  
The e-crossing task, previously shown to be among the stronger manipulations 
in self-control studies (Hagger et al., 2010), was used as the inhibitory control 
manipulation.  For this, copies of a page of relatively dense text from a statistical article 
(Dinno, 2009, p.2) were used (see Appendix D).  For the difficult condition, the 
lightness and contrast of the copies were manipulated to make them more challenging to 
read, as in Baumeister et al. (1998).  Task instructions also differed for the two tasks, 
see Procedure.  
Mood ratings were captured at three times throughout the experiment (see 
procedure) using a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) for the emotions: happy, sad, anxious, 
aroused and angry, e.g. “At this precise moment how HAPPY do you feel?” with 
ratings provided on a scale from ‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’.  These mood ratings were 
included in order to check that the experimental procedure did not unduly alter any of 
these five emotions between the experimental conditions before the mood manipulation 
and thus did not confound the results.  
An additional VAS was employed as a manipulation check.  This captured how 
mentally exhausting participants found the e-crossing task, with ratings again provided 
on a scale from ‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’.  
89 
INHIBITORY CONTROL & MOOD LABILITY 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS, Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), 
a 14 item, 2 subscale (anxiety and depression) self-report questionnaire was used to 
measure trait anxiety and depression. 
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), a 
30 item self-report questionnaire scored on a 4-point ordinal scale (1 = rarely/never, 2 = 
occasionally, 3 = often, 4 = almost always/ always) was used to measure trait 
impulsivity. The scale is used to measure multiple impulsivity components and is 
comprised of 3 second-order factors (attentional impulsivity, motor impulsivity and 
non-planning) and 6 first-order factors (attention, cognitive instability, motor, 
perseverance, self-control and cognitive complexity).  
The music used for the positive mood manipulation was a two-minute clip of 
Murzurka from Coppelia by Delibes (1870).  The music used for the negative mood 
manipulation was a two-minute clip of Halloween by Ives (1906).  These have 
previously been validated as effective mood manipulations (Mayer, Allen, & 
Beauregard, 1995). 
Design 
The experiment exploited a mixed design with three independent variables: time 
(within subject: before letter crossing task vs. before mood manipulation vs. after mood 
manipulation), inhibitory task condition (between subject: easy vs. difficult), and mood 
manipulation (between subject: positive vs. negative).  The primary dependent variable 
was mood rating measured at each time point.  HADS and BIS-11 measures of state 
anxiety, depression, and trait impulsivity were additionally used as covariates. 
Procedure 
Participants were given the cover story that the experiment was investigating 
sustained attention.  This was done to avoid revealing the experimental hypothesis 
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whilst providing a reasonable explanation for the tasks involved.  Each participant was 
run individually in a quiet room with the experimenter present throughout.  All 
instructions and tasks were presented onscreen with the exception of the inhibitory 
control task which was presented in paper form.  Participants provided demographic 
information (age and gender) and completed a sound check to identify a comfortable 
volume prior to commencing the experiment.  The first set of mood ratings were 
captured using the on-screen VAS.  
Inhibitory control manipulation.  Participants in the easy condition received 
two copies of the text.  Their instructions were to read through the text and cross out 
each instance of the letter ‘e’.  Participants in the difficult condition completed a harder 
version of the same task.  Their instructions were to cross out each instance of the letter 
‘e’ unless it was adjacent to, or one letter away from, another vowel.  The sheet itself 
was also visually degraded (lower contrast and blurred) and five copies were provided 
rather than two.  The logic of this task is that the act of inhibiting oneself from crossing 
out an ‘e’ before checking for the additional constraints is more demanding of inhibitory 
control.  The degraded copy is intended to make the task additionally challenging.  The 
provision of five sheets instead of two is intended to imply that the task will take longer; 
previous research indicates that implying a task will be conducted for longer increases 
the effect of reduced control (Hagger et al., 2010).  Despite the difference in the number 
of sheets provided, all participants were stopped after 10 minutes; no participant was 
able to complete two full sheets during this time. 
Questionnaires.  After the inhibitory control task, participants completed the 
HADS and BIS-11.  The Questionnaires were completed at this stage in the experiment 
as prior research has indicated that completing additional tasks between inhibitory 
control manipulations and subsequent control tasks increases the observed effect 
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(Hagger et al., 2010).  Completion of the questionnaires was followed by a second set of 
mood-ratings identical to the first.  
Mood manipulation.  Participants were then instructed to put on their 
headphones, relax and listen to the music; they heard either the positive (Murzurka) or 
negative (Halloween) clip according to their randomly assigned mood manipulation 
condition. 
After the music stopped, participants completed a third and final set of mood 
ratings identical to the previous sets.  Participants then rated the degree to which they 
had found the earlier letter crossing task mentally exhausting before being fully 
debriefed as to the true nature of the study and thanked for their participation.  
Results 
Inhibitory Control Induced Mental Exhaustion  
An independent t-test showed that participants in the difficult inhibitory task 
condition (M = 60.35, SE = 3.04) rated the e-crossing task as significantly more 
mentally exhausting than those in the easy condition (M = 43.15, SE = 3.30), t(117.21) 
= -3.83, p < .001, dz = 0.70. 
The Effect of Prior Inhibitory Control on Mood  
Whilst 5 emotions were measured as a set, our analyses focused on happiness 
and sadness as these were the most relevant to our intended manipulations.  In order to 
ascertain that the e-crossing task itself had no effect on mood two 2 (time: pre vs. post 
e-crossing task) x 2 (inhibitory control task: easy vs. difficult) mixed ANOVA were 
performed on ratings of happiness and sadness.  
For ratings of happiness there was a significant main effect of time, F(1, 116) = 
4.30, p = .040, ηp2 = .04, whereby ratings of happiness before the e-crossing task (M = 
65.34, SE = 1.38) were significantly higher than ratings of happiness after the e-crossing 
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task (M = 62.79, SE = 1.68), t(117) = 2.10, p = .039, dz = 0.15.  However, importantly 
there was no significant main effect of inhibitory task condition, F < 1, or interaction 
between time and task condition, F (1, 116) = 1.20, p = .280, ηp2 = .01. 
For ratings of sadness there was no significant main effect of time, task 
condition, or interaction between time and task condition, (all F < 1).  Together these 
results indicate that neither happiness nor sadness differed significantly between the two 
inhibitory task conditions prior to the music manipulation, and that the e-crossing task 
used as the inhibitory control manipulation did not itself significantly influence mood.  
Thus, we proceed to examine how any change in mood induced by the music differs 
depending on the inhibitory task condition. 
Main Analysis  
The effect of prior inhibitory control on the modification of rated 
happiness.  Here we sought to examine how changes in rated happiness induced by the 
two different music mood manipulations (positive vs. negative) differed with inhibitory 
task condition.  A 2 (inhibitory control task: easy vs. difficult) x 2 (mood manipulation 
condition: positive vs. negative) between subject ANOVA was conducted on change in 
happiness ratings (ratings after music minus rating before music), see Figure 6.  The 
analysis revealed no significant main effect of inhibitory task condition, F < 1.  
However, there was a significant main effect of mood manipulation, F(1, 112) = 12.41, 
p = .001, ηp2 = .10, and crucially a significant interaction between inhibitory task and 
mood manipulation condition, F(1, 112) = 4.41, p = .038, ηp2 = .04.  
Given the significant interaction we proceed to evaluate the simple effects of 
mood manipulation for each level of the inhibitory task condition.  In the easy condition 
no significant difference was found between the change in happiness for those in the 
positive mood condition (M = 3.67, SE = 1.26) and those in the negative mood 
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condition (M = 0.51, SE = 2.10), t(46.60) = 1.25, p = .20, dz = .32.  However, for those 
in the difficult condition, the change in happiness for those in the positive mood 
condition (M = 8.60, SE = 2.69) was significantly different from those in the negative 
mood condition (M = -3.91, SE = 2.36), t(58) = 3.49, p = .001, dz = .90. 
 
 
The effect of prior inhibitory control on the modification of rated sadness.  
Here we conduct the equivalent analysis examining how changes in rated sadness 
induced by the two different mood manipulations differed with inhibitory task 
condition.  A 2 (inhibitory control task: easy vs. difficult) x 2 (mood manipulation 
condition: positive vs. negative) between subject ANOVA was conducted on change in 
sadness ratings (ratings after music minus rating before music), see Figure 7.  
Consistent with the observed effects on happiness ratings, there was again no significant 
main effect of inhibitory task condition, F < 1, and a significant main effect of mood 
condition, F(1, 116) = 14.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .11.  However, in this instance the 
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interaction between inhibitory task and mood manipulation condition achieved only 
marginal significance, F(1, 116) = 2.83, p = .095, ηp2 = .02. 
Examining the simple effects of mood for each level of the inhibitory task 
condition revealed the same pattern of effects as observed for change in happiness.  In 
the easy condition no significant difference was found between the change of sadness 
ratings for those in the positive music condition (M = -4.15, SE = 1.34) and those in the 
negative music condition (M = 0.13, SE = 1.70), t(58) = -1.98, p = .053, dz = .51. 
However, for those who completed the difficult inhibitory task, change in sadness 
ratings for those in the positive music condition (M = -5.88, SE = 1.76) were again 
significantly different from those in the negative music condition (M = 5.08, SE = 2.82), 
t(58) = -3.30, p = .002, dz = .85.  Taken together, these results are thus consistent with 
the hypothesis that prior exertion of inhibitory control increases susceptibility to mood 
manipulation. 
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Discussion 
 Experiment 1 aimed to establish whether a prior inhibitory challenge increases 
mood lability.  The difficult inhibitory task was rated as significantly more exhausting 
than the easy task demonstrating that it appeared to be successful in creating greater 
inhibitory demand.  In line with predictions, participants who completed the difficult 
versus easy inhibitory task subsequently showed significantly greater differences in 
mood after positive and negative mood manipulations.  These effects were apparent for 
both rated happiness and sadness.  The results indicate that state inhibitory control 
directly influences the degree to which our mood-state is subject to external influence. 
 The present experiment supports and extends the existing literature on inhibitory 
control as the results are consistent with previous findings, namely that prior use of 
inhibitory processes result in a period in which further attempts to inhibit automatic 
responses appear to be unsuccessful (e.g. DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 
2007; Govorun & Payne, 2006; Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 2007; Vohs & Faber, 
2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000).  Our results also support studies documenting a 
correlation between high levels of control and lower emotional intensity and fewer 
fluctuations in mood (Layton & Muraven, 2014; Tangney et al., 2004).  Crucially, the 
observed period of decreased inhibitory control, and increased mood lability is in line 
with the documented neurological profile of decreased frontal connectivity and 
increased amygdala reactivity following a demanding inhibitory task (Wagner & 
Heatherton, 2013).   
 In order to examine the neural underpinnings of the effects observed in 
Experiment 1, Experiment 2 sought to investigate the effect of prior inhibitory control 
on mood lability using the same paradigm alongside an fMRI component.  Here, neural 
activation and connectivity whilst listening to the positive music mood manipulation is 
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compared before versus after the inhibitory control manipulation.  For this reason, 
participants listen to two pieces of the positive mood manipulation accompanied by a 
resting state scanning sequence before and after the e-crossing task.  It was hypothesised 
that increased ECN activity during the difficult inhibitory task would result in a rebound 
effect and increased DMN activity during the subsequent mood manipulation.  
Alternatively, it was hypothesised that, as prior task positive brain states can influence 
subsequent resting state (Rosazza & Minati, 2011), increased ECN activity during the 
difficult inhibitory task would continue during the subsequent mood manipulation, thus 
reducing DMN activity.  Consistent with the results from Experiment 1, it was 
hypothesised that those completing the difficult versus easy inhibitory task would show 
a greater increase in change in happiness after the task whilst change in rated happiness 
before the task should not differ between those in the easy and difficult inhibitory task 
conditions.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight, right-handed participants (32 female, 16 male) aged 18 to 35 years 
(M = 21.98, SD = 4.62) were recruited from the University of Sussex and were paid £15 
for participation.  The project protocol was approved by the Research Governance and 
Ethics Committee at the University of Sussex; all participants gave informed consent, 
were pre-screened for MRI safety with no history of neurological or psychological 
trauma and were fully debriefed at the end of the study.  All participants were naïve to 
the experimental hypothesis and were randomly assigned in equal proportions to one of 
two conditions (inhibitory task condition: easy vs. difficult).   
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Materials 
All instructions, VAS scales, and stimuli were presented on screen with the 
controlling program implemented in MATLAB.  Auditory stimuli were presented 
through scanner safe earphones.  Participants made their responses using a four-button 
button box held throughout in their right hand.  Mood ratings and a measure of 
exhaustion were captured using the same set of VAS used in Experiment 1.  Mood 
ratings were captured at four times during the experimental procedure (see procedure 
section); as in Experiment 1, these were included in order to ascertain that the 
experimental manipulation did not unduly affect these five emotions between 
experimental conditions.  Additional VAS were employed as a measure of engagement 
with the music and distraction during each scanning session.  Questions for these VAS 
included “How engaged were you with the piece of music?”, “During the piece of 
music, how much did your mind wander?”, and “During the piece of music, how 
distracted were you by the scanner noise?” rated from “Not at all” to “Extremely”.  
The music used for the positive mood induction at both pre and post crossing 
task scanning sessions were two different 6-minute loops compiled from the same 2-
minute clip of Murzurka from Coppelia by Delibes (1870) used in Experiment 1.   
The e-crossing task used in Experiment 1, was again employed as the inhibitory 
control manipulation using the same page taken from (Dinno, 2009, p.2), however here 
the pages of text were presented on screen.  The number of pages, and lightness and 
contrast of the text were again manipulated in the difficult condition to make the text 
more challenging to read.  Task instructions also differed for the two tasks, see 
Procedure. 
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Procedure 
Prior to scanning participants provided demographic information (age and 
gender) and were instructed that they would hear two pieces of music separated by a 
reading task.  Participants were asked to stay as still as possible and to keep their eyes 
open throughout.  The experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes and participants 
remained in the scanner for the duration.  Once settled in the scanner, the experiment 
began with a sound check to identify a comfortable volume for audio playback.  This 
was followed by the first set of mood VAS before the mood manipulation began.  
Mood manipulation and pre-crossing task resting state scan.  Participants 
heard the first piece of music accompanied by the first functional scanning sequence, 
both lasting for 6 minutes.  At the end of the music/scanning sequence, participants 
completed a second set of mood VAS and a set of the engagement and distraction VAS 
before being presented with the instructions for the e-crossing task. 
Inhibitory control manipulation and structural scan.  Participants completed 
either the easy or difficult version of the e-crossing task.  Both of which were 
accompanied by a structural scanning sequence lasting for 6 minutes.  Those in the easy 
condition were presented with 2 pages of the text and were asked to read through, 
clicking one button to navigate between pages and a further button every time they 
came across the letter ‘e’.  Those in the difficult condition were presented with 5 pages 
of the text and were asked to read through pressing one button to navigate through the 
pages and a further button every time they came across the letter ‘e’ unless it was next 
to or one letter away from another vowel.  Despite the difference in the number of pages 
provided, the task timed out after 8 minutes and was followed by a 1-minute break 
accompanied by an on-screen countdown timer.  At the end of the 1-minute break 
participants completed a third set of the mood VAS.  
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Mood manipulation and (post crossing task resting state scan).  Participants 
then heard the second piece of music accompanied by the second functional scanning 
sequence again lasting 6 minutes.  Participants completed a final set of the mood and 
engagement/distraction VAS, and the VAS used to measure task related mental 
exhaustion before being removed from the scanner.  Finally, participants were taken to a 
testing room where they completed a paper version the HADs, were fully debriefed, and 
thanked for their time.  See Figure 8 for a diagram of the procedure for the experimental 
stages.  
 
Figure 8.  Procedure for Experiment 2 with stages of MRI acquisition shown in grey.  
Note.  The variable ‘change in happiness pre’ is calculated as happiness levels at mood 
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VAS 2 minus 1 and ‘change in happiness post’ is calculated as happiness at mood VAS 
4 minus 3.  
MRI Acquisition 
Data were acquired using a 1.5T Siemens Avanto MRI scanner at the Brighton 
and Sussex Medical School Clinical Imaging Sciences Centre.  During the presentation 
of the two pieces of music, 144 functional volumes were obtained over a period of 6 
minutes 17 seconds.  These were acquired using a multi-echo Echo-Planar Imaging 
(EPI) sequence with the following parameters: TR = 2570ms, TE = 15, 34, 54ms, flip 
angle = 90°, voxel size = 3.8 x 3.8 x 4.2mm, 31 slices, in interleaved, ascending order.  
T1 weighted MPRAGE structural images were acquired during the inhibitory control e-
crossing task using the following parameters: TR = 1160ms, TE = 3.57ms, flip angle 
15°, voxel size = 0.9 x 0.9 x 0.9mm.  Stimuli presentation was fixed to the acquisition 
of the 6th volume in order to allow for T1 saturation.   
Image Preprocessing 
 Image preprocessing was completed using Multi-Echo Independent Components 
Analysis (ME-ICA; Kundu, Inati, Evans, Luh, & Bandettini, 2012), implemented 
through Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI) software (Kundu et al., 2013).  
ME-ICA was invoked at the AFNI command line for each participant using the data 
from the three echo times (TE = 15, 34, 54ms) and the T1 weighted MPRAGE 
structural image.  The structural image was skull stripped and non-linearly warped to 
MNI space using the AFNI template (3dQWarp), the functional EPI data were also 
warped to MNI space and the voxel dimensions were resampled to 5mm isotropic 
cubes. 
ME-ICA uses FastICA to break down the fMRI data into individual components 
(ICs) based on measurements of Kappa (component scales with TE) and Rho 
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(component does not scale with TE) in order to determine whether or not components 
are BOLD (high Kappa, low Rho) or Non-BOLD (low Kappa, high Rho) on the basis 
that true BOLD signal is linearly dependent on TE whilst noise is not.  Through the 
subsequent removal of these non-BOLD, or ‘noise’ components, ME-ICA is able to 
denoise the data in terms of motion, physiology and scanner drift, leaving only the 
BOLD components for further analysis. 
Image Analysis 
 Independent Component Analysis (ICA) was conducted on the de-noised BOLD 
data using the CONN Functional Connectivity Toolbox (Whitfield-Gabrieli & Nieto-
Castanon, 2012).  CONN employs Calhoun’s group-level ICA (Calhoun, Adali, 
Pearlson, & Pekar, 2001), with group-level dimensionality reduction to the number of 
requested components, fastICA to estimate individual components, and back-
reconstruction group ICA (GICA1) for subject-level estimation of spatial maps (see 
Erhardt et al., 2011, for a comparison of ICA approaches).  20 independent components 
were requested.  The resulting components were visually inspected to identify 
components of interest.  6 Independent Component Networks (ICNs) were identified as 
commonly occurring networks in healthy controls (Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Rosazza & 
Minati, 2011).  Data was collapsed across time and inhibitory task condition in order to 
create masks of the DMN and ECN for use in second level general linear model (GLM) 
analyses of activity within these network areas.  ICA maps were also used for between 
groups exploratory analysis of connectivity differences post inhibitory control 
manipulation.  
First level GLM designs of neural activity were constructed in SPM 8 
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, 2009).  Data were modelled as two separate 
sessions for each participant (pre and post crossing task scanning sessions) and included 
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the 6 motion parameters created during realignment in ME-ICA to remove variance 
associated with participant motion.  First level t-contrasts were created for pre>post, and 
post>pre comparisons.  
A two-factor model was created at second level in SPM 8 with the first level 
contrasts for pre and post sessions added into the 2 (time: pre vs. post crossing task) x 2 
(inhibitory control: easy vs. difficult) design.  Second level t-contrasts were created for 
time: pre>post, post>pre, and inhibitory task: easy>difficult, difficult>easy 
comparisons.  
An initial voxel level uncorrected threshold of p< .001 was applied to all second 
level statistical parametric maps.  Clusters surviving False Discovery Rate cluster 
(FDRc) correction for extent at p< .05 were considered significant.  Given the a priori 
hypotheses that differences might be observed in the DMN and ECN, a small volume 
correction was applied to analyses employing inclusive masks for these networks 
created at the ICA stage of analysis.  Beta-weights were extracted from significant 
clusters using SPM; The beta weight was extracted as the eigenvariate over the entire 
cluster.  We then conducted t-tests on the extracted eigenvariates of beta weights to 
confirm the directionality of interactions.  
Behavioural Results 
Inhibitory Control Induced Mental Exhaustion 
An independent t-test showed no significant difference in reported task related 
mental exhaustion between those in the difficult (M = 66.40, SE = 4.29) and easy (M = 
62, SE = 4.42) inhibitory task conditions, t(46) = -0.71, p = .479, dz = 0.21.  Bayes 
analysis was used to determine the strength of evidence for the null hypothesis that 
there were no differences in rated exhaustion for the easy and difficult task conditions.  
Using the procedure advocated by Dienes (2014), Experiment 1 estimated a change of 
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17.2, thus this was used as the SD with a mean of 0 for the prior in a half-normal 
distribution.  In order to indicate the robustness of the Bayesian conclusion, a robustness 
region is reported and notated as: RR [x1, x2] where x1 is the lowest SD that can be 
used to give the same conclusion and x2 is the highest.  The resulting Bayes, BH(0, 17.20)  
= 0.63, RR[0.01, 36.60], was between 1/3 and 3 indicating an insensitive result. 
The Effect of Prior Inhibitory Control on Mood 
Whilst 5 emotions were measured as a set, our analyses focused on happiness as 
this was the most relevant to our intended manipulation.  In order to ascertain that the e-
crossing task itself had no effect on mood, a 2 (time: pre vs. post e-crossing task) x 2 
(inhibitory control task: easy vs. difficult) mixed ANOVA was conducted on ratings of 
happiness.  
For ratings of happiness there was a significant main effect of time, F(1, 46) = 
17.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, whereby ratings of happiness before the e-crossing task (M = 
61.94, SE = 2.39) were significantly higher than ratings of happiness after the e-crossing 
task (M = 52.83, SE = 2.36), t(47) = 4.02, p < .001, dz = 0.55.  There was no significant 
main effect of inhibitory task condition, F < 1, however there was a significant 
interaction between time and task condition, F(1, 46) = 5.11, p = .029, ηp2 = .10.   
Given the significant interaction, independent t-tests were conducted to examine 
the simple effects of inhibitory task condition at each time point.  Results showed that 
before the inhibitory task there were no significant differences in rated happiness for 
those in the easy (M = 61.17, SE = 3.52) and difficult (M = 62.71, SE = 3.30) 
conditions, t(46) = -0.32, p = .751, dz = 0.06.  Similarly, after the inhibitory 
manipulation there were no significant differences in rated happiness for the those in the 
easy (M = 56.98, SE = 3.80) and difficult (M = 48.69, SE = 2.60) conditions, t(46) = 
1.80, p = 0.78, dz = 0.52.   
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Examining the simple effects of time for each inhibitory task condition showed 
that those in the easy condition showed no significant difference in their ratings of 
happiness before (M = 61.17, SE = 3.52) versus after (M = 56.98, SE = 3.80), the e-
crossing task, t(23) = 1.51, p = .144, dz = 0.23.  However, those in the difficult condition 
rated their happiness as significantly higher before (M = 62.71, SE = 3.30) versus after 
(M = 48.69, SE = 2.60) the e-crossing task, t(23) = 4.18, p < .001, dz = 0.96. 
Main Analysis  
The effect of inhibitory control on the modification of rated happiness.  
Here we sought to examine how changes in rated happiness induced by the music 
differed with inhibitory control manipulation.  A 2 (time: pre-cross-out vs. post-cross-
out) x 2 (inhibitory control task: difficult vs. easy) mixed ANOVA was conducted on 
the change in rated happiness (ratings after music minus rating before music at pre and 
post inhibitory task), see Figure 9. 
Results revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 46) = 5.63, p = .022, ηp2 
= .11, whereby change in happiness was greater post e-crossing task (M = 8.27, SE = 
1.86) in comparison to pre e-crossing task (M = 2.75, SE = 2.46).  However, there was 
no significant main effect of inhibitory task condition, F < 1, and crucially no 
significant interaction between time and inhibitory task condition, F < 1.  The resulting 
Bayes for the interaction, BH(0, 6.54)  = 1.24, RR[0.01, 36.60], was between 1/3 and 3 
indicating an insensitive result. 
 
105 
INHIBITORY CONTROL & MOOD LABILITY 
 
Figure 9.  Change in happiness during mood manipulations pre e-crossing task 
(happiness at mood VAS 2 minus happiness at mood VAS 1) and post e-crossing task 
(happiness at mood VAS 4 minus happiness at mood VAS 3) by inhibitory task 
condition (+/-1 SEM). 
The effect of personality variables on mood lability.  In order to examine any 
potential covariate effects, the above ANOVA analysis was repeated with the inclusion 
of each of the following covariates: mental exhaustion, HADS anxiety, HADS 
depression, music engagement, and scanner distraction.  None of the covariates reached 
significance, all p >.05. 
fMRI Results 
Activation 
BOLD activation during resting states was contrasted in a 2 (time: pre vs. post 
crossing task) x 2 (inhibitory task condition: easy vs. difficult) mixed ANOVA.  Given 
the a priori hypotheses regarding differences in the DMN and ECN and to limit the 
search to regions involved in these networks, the masks created for each of these during 
the ICA stage were applied, using a small volume correction and height thresholding at 
p < .001.  Results revealed no significant clusters for the main effect of inhibitory task 
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condition, time, nor interaction between time and inhibitory task condition when 
masking for the DMN and ECN.   
 The same masks were applied to a planned comparisons t-contrast used to 
highlight regions showing higher BOLD signal post versus pre-crossing task (i.e. 
post>pre, collapsed across inhibitory task condition) employing a small volume and 
FDRc correction with height thresholding at p < .001.  Results showed two significant 
clusters in the right superior frontal gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus pars 
triangularis (PT) when limiting the search to regions involved in the DMN.  Similarly, 
when limiting the search to regions involved in the ECN, results showed two significant 
clusters in the right inferior frontal gyrus PT and right middle frontal gyrus, see Table 3.  
Note that the clusters observed for the DMN and ECN showed considerable overlap.  
As such, it appears that there were two clusters of activation, each of which spanned 
over regions involved in both the DMN and ECN, rather than four separate clusters 
specific to one or the other of the networks, see Figure 10.  Graphical representation of 
the BOLD contrast effect sizes for these clusters can be seen in Appendix E.  
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Table 3.  Significant clusters in regions involved in inclusive DMN and ECN mask, 
surviving small volume and FDRc correction following height thresholding at p<.001 
for the post>pre t-contrast, collapsed across inhibitory task condition. Note ref refers to 
the label of the relevant cluster shown in Figure 10. 
Region Cluster 
pFDR 
K Peak 
pFWE 
Z x y z ref 
DMN          
R superior frontal gyrus  .010 19 .009 4.48 22 31 45 A 
R inferior frontal gyrus (PT) .035 12 .057 4.08 50 31 17 B 
ECN          
R middle frontal gyrus .027 14 .125 3.91 26 31 45 A 
R inferior frontal gyrus (PT) .027 15 .043 4.16 54 27 17 B 
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Figure 10.  Demonstrating overlap of significant clusters (shown in Violet) for the 
post>pre t-contrast, surviving small volume and FDR cluster correction following 
height thresholding at p < .001 (as reported in Table 1), when mapped onto masked 
regions of DMN (blue) and ECN (green).  The cluster shown in ‘A’ encompasses the 
cluster observed in the DMN in the right superior frontal gyrus [22,31,45] (k=19, 
p(FDR cluster)= .010, Z=4.48, p(FWE peak)=.009), and the cluster observed in the 
ECN in the right middle frontal gyrus [26,31,45] (k=14, p(FDR cluster)= .027, 
Z=3.91, p(FWE peak)=.125).  Similarly, the cluster shown in ‘B’ encompasses the 
cluster observed for the DMN in the right inferior frontal gyrus PT at [50,31,17] (k=12, 
p(FDR cluster)= .035, Z=4.08, p(FWE peak)=.057), and that observed for the ECN in 
the right inferior frontal gyrus PT at [54,27,17] (k=15, p(FDR cluster) = .027, Z=4.16, 
p(FWE peak)=.043). 
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Exploratory, whole brain analyses were additionally conducted to identify 
effects outside of the hypothesised RSNs.  No significant main effect of time, task 
condition, nor interaction between the two was observed.  However, a planned 
comparisons t-contrast for post>pre revealed significant clusters surviving FDRc 
correction following height thresholding at p < .001 in the right angular gyrus, left 
inferior occipital gyrus and left middle frontal gyrus (see Table 4 and Figure 11).  
Graphical representation of the BOLD contrast effect sizes for each of these clusters can 
be seen in Appendix F. 
 
Table 4.  FDR corrected clusters following height thresholding at p < .001 for the whole 
brain post>pre t-contrast, collapsed across inhibitory task condition for regions not 
involved in the DMN and ECN masks. 
Region Cluster 
pFDR 
K Peak 
pFWE 
Z x y z 
        
R Angular Gyrus .005 21 .146 4.20 42 -57 49 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus .006 19 .626 3.86 -42 15 41 
L Inferior Occipital Gyrus .041 11 .713 3.79 -42 -69 -3 
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Figure 11.  Significant clusters for the post>pre t-contrast, surviving FDR cluster 
correction following height thresholding at p < .001 for regions outside of the DMN and 
ECN masks in: (A)  right Angular Gyrus [42,-57,49] (k=21, p(FDR cluster)= .005, 
Z=4.20, p(FWE peak)=.146); (B) left Middle Frontal Gyrus [-42,15,41] (k=19, p(FDR 
cluster)= .006, Z=3.86, p(FWE peak)=.626); (C) left Inferior Occipital Gyrus [-42,-69,-
3] (k=11, p(FDR cluster)= .041, Z=3.79, p(FWE peak)=.713).  Colour scale (black – red 
– white) represents t-score range from 0 to 1.5.  
In order to identify regions in which activation observed in the post>pre contrast 
was correlated with the observed behavioural effects, second level one sample t-tests 
were constructed, using the first level post>pre t-contrast for each participant, with each 
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of the following behavioural measures added as covariates: task related mental 
exhaustion, change in happiness at post minus pre, and HADS anxiety and depression 
subscales.  BOLD signal did not correlate with any of the behavioural covariates and the 
inclusion of each of the covariates had no effect on the pattern of results observed in the 
post>pre contrast. 
In the absence of a main effect of inhibitory task condition or interaction 
between time and task condition, a planned t-contrast was used to highlight regions 
exhibiting higher BOLD signal for the difficult versus easy crossing task condition (i.e. 
Difficult>Easy, collapsed across time).  Results revealed no clusters or peaks surviving 
FDR cluster correction following height thresholding at p < .001.  A full table of 
significant clusters for t-contrasts for each level of group and condition (i.e. pre, post, 
easy, difficult) can be found in Appendix G.  Crucially the lack of significant clusters 
for the main effect of inhibitory control task or interaction between time and inhibitory 
task, suggests no effect of prior inhibitory control on subsequent activity within the 
DMN or ECN.  
Connectivity 
The 6 components identified in the ICA stage as commonly occurring networks 
in healthy controls can be seen in Figure 12.  Second level analysis was conducted using 
the RSN maps identified as the DMN and the ECN at each time point.  A 2 (time: pre 
vs. post crossing task) x 2 (inhibitory task condition: easy vs. difficult) ANOVA showed 
no effects of group or condition on connectivity (all clusters p >.05 FDR, all peaks p 
>.05 FWE).  The behavioural exhaustion, engagement, and distraction measures, scores 
on the HADS and change in happiness were added as covariates into the analyses; there 
were no significant clusters (at FDR p >.05) or peaks (at FWE p >.05) relating to any of 
these covariates, indicating that there were no regions within these networks in which 
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connectivity was correlated with the behavioural covariate.  Crucially, the lack of 
significant clusters for the main effect of time and inhibitory control or interaction 
between the two suggests no effect of prior inhibitory control on subsequent 
connectivity within the DMN or ECN.  
 
Figure 12.  Resting state ICNs, collapsed across crossing task condition.  The ICNs 
reported here are consistent with those previously identified in control populations 
(Damoiseaux et al., 2006).  Threshold uncorrected peak p<.001.  
Discussion 
Experiment 2 investigated the neural underpinnings of the period of increased 
mood lability following prior inhibitory control observed in Experiment 1.  In contrast 
to Experiment 1 and previous research (see Dang, 2017) the behavioural results 
revealed no difference in ratings of task exhaustion between those in the easy and 
difficult inhibitory task conditions and Bayesian analysis indicated data insensitivity.  
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Again, in comparison to Experiment 1, here the results revealed a significant main 
effect of time whereby there was a greater change in happiness the second-time 
participants heard the music (immediately after the e-crossing task).  However, there 
was no main effect of inhibitory task condition nor interaction between time (music 
manipulation pre vs. post e-crossing) and inhibitory task condition.  
Using ICA of the BOLD response at rest whilst participants were listening to the 
music both before and after the inhibitory control manipulation, we successfully 
identified six RSNs documented elsewhere (e.g. Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Rosazza & 
Minati, 2011).  We found no evidence of significant main effect of time, inhibitory task 
condition, or interaction between the two on differences in BOLD activation within the 
DMN.  Planned comparisons (post>pre), utilised to highlight regions of higher BOLD 
signal post versus pre inhibitory control manipulation within regions involved in the 
DMN, revealed significant clusters of activation in the right superior and inferior frontal 
gyrus.  Similarly, no significant main effect of time or inhibitory task condition was 
observed for BOLD activation within the ECN.  However, planned comparisons 
(post>pre) revealed significant clusters of activation in the right inferior and middle 
frontal gyrus.   Additional exploratory whole brain analyses revealed significant clusters 
showing greater activation post versus pre (post>pre) inhibitory control manipulation in 
the right angular gyrus, left inferior occipital gyrus and left middle frontal gyrus.  
Furthermore, we found no evidence of a significant effect of time or inhibitory task 
condition on differences in connectivity within the networks of interest (DMN and 
ECN), nor in exploratory analysis of the auditory, medial visual and bilateral fronto-
parietal networks, suggesting no effect of prior inhibitory control on subsequent 
connectivity within RSNs.  Crucially, whilst these results show no significant evidence 
of an effect of prior inhibitory control on subsequent activity or connectivity within the 
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hypothesised networks (DMN and ECN), the results highlight regions of DMN and 
ECN exhibiting heightened activation at post versus pre inhibitory task.   
General Discussion 
Previous research has documented the close relationship between inhibitory 
control and emotion regulation (Layton & Muraven, 2014; Pashke et al., 2016; Tangney 
et al., 2004; Wagner & Heatherton, 2013) but to date none have directly examined the 
effect of prior inhibitory control on changes in resting state network activity or 
connectivity underlying increased emotional lability. Thus, the present study 
investigated the effect of prior inhibitory control on subsequent mood lability 
experienced in response to music-based mood manipulations.  The degree of inhibitory 
control was manipulated throughout using two versions of the e-crossing task designed 
to place differing levels of demand on inhibitory processes.   
Experiment 1 examined the extent of prior inhibitory demand on subsequent 
mood lability.  Experiment 2 then extended this approach by introducing a 
neuroimaging component to investigate differences in resting state network activity and 
connectivity underlying any behavioural changes in mood lability following the prior 
use of inhibitory control.  Consistent with previous research (e.g. Hagger, Wood, Stiff, 
& Chatzisarantis, 2010) the manipulation of inhibitory demand proved to be effective in 
Experiment 1 with the difficult version of the e-crossing task being rated as significantly 
more exhausting than the easy version.  Experiment 2 did not elicit the same between 
condition difference in levels of mental exhaustion, and Bayesian analysis provided 
evidence of data insensitivity.  It is important to note that this indicates that the 
inhibitory control manipulation employed for the purposes of Experiment 2 did not 
prove to be effective, a point which is discussed further below.  
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The results of the main analysis in Experiment 1 revealed greater differences in 
emotional lability to positive and negative mood manipulations for those previously 
experiencing a demanding inhibitory control task.  The results therefore supported 
previous studies which have reported lower levels of emotional lability for individuals 
high in inhibitory control (Layton & Muraven, 2014; Tangney et al., 2004).  The 
findings were also consistent with the existing literature which appears to demonstrate 
that the prior use of inhibitory control results in a period in which further attempts to 
exert control are often met with failure (e.g. DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 
2007; Govorun & Payne, 2006; Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 2007; Vohs & Faber, 
2007; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000).  However, the behavioural results from Experiment 2 
showed no main effect of inhibitory control task on subsequent differences in emotional 
lability, and the resulting Bayes factor indicated data insensitivity.   
The fMRI results showed no evidence of a significant effect of inhibitory task 
condition on subsequent activation within either of the hypothesised networks (DMN 
and ECN).  However, when collapsed across task condition the results revealed clusters 
showing significantly higher BOLD signal after, in comparison to before, the inhibitory 
control manipulation in clusters overlapping regions of both the DMN and ECN.  These 
clusters of activation were in the right superior frontal gyrus, right inferior frontal gyrus 
PT and right middle frontal gyrus.  Two hypotheses regarding the DMN and ECN were 
originally made.  The first hypothesised that due to an increase in task-positive (ECN) 
network activity during the difficult inhibitory task, we would observe a switch to 
increased DMN and decreased ECN activity during the restful conditions of the 
subsequent mood manipulation.  Alternatively, the second hypothesis was based on 
previous research showing that prior task positive brain states can influence subsequent 
resting state (Rosazza & Minati, 2011) and thus predicted that increased ECN activity 
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during the difficult inhibitory task would continue during the subsequent mood 
manipulation, thus decreasing DMN activity.  Interestingly, the results show evidence 
of periods of both increased ECN and increased DMN activity during the second mood 
manipulation, supporting both of these hypotheses to a degree.  However, as these 
clusters show a large amount of overlap it is not possible to meaningfully interpret this 
result in terms of activation of either of the networks.  Furthermore, these effects were 
only observed when task condition was not taken into consideration.  In addition, the 
results revealed no significant effects of time nor inhibitory task condition on changes in 
RSN connectivity.  Thus, we were unable to replicate the decreased frontal connectivity 
following prior inhibitory control previously observed by Wagner and Heatherton 
(2013). 
As previously discussed, the inhibitory control manipulation employed in 
Experiment 2 failed to create a significant between-groups difference in rated mental 
exhaustion.  One limitation of the inhibitory control literature is ensuring that the task 
employed is demanding enough.  Previous research shows that providing a task is 
experienced as exhausting, it is likely to show ‘depleting’ consequences on subsequent 
behaviour and cognition (Dang, 2017).  It is therefore interesting to consider whether 
the on-screen manipulation used for the purposes of Experiment 2 met that requirement.  
Certainly, we believe this is one of the first on-screen applications of the e-crossing task 
using this format.  vanDellen, Shea, Davisson, Koval, and Fitzsimons (2014), 
previously administered an online version of the e-crossing task where participants were 
presented with a page of text and were asked to retype it omitting the letter ‘e’ 
according to specific rules.  The e-crossing task was used in the current study to most 
closely replicate Experiment 1, however it is interesting to consider whether the on-
screen version is inherently exhausting.  The average ratings of task related mental 
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exhaustion for the easy and difficult conditions in Experiment 1 were approximately 43 
and 60 out of 100 respectively.  In contrast, in Experiment 2, both the easy and difficult 
conditions were rated above 60 suggesting that the easy task was experienced as 
comparatively exhausting when conducted in a brain imaging scanner.  For this reason, 
future investigations should consider evaluating different inhibitory tasks with the goal 
of identifying those which most effectively translate into the scanner environment.  
The results from Experiment 1 indicate that prior inhibitory control plays a role 
in the subsequent regulation of emotion.   It appears that a temporary period of reduced 
capacity for control results in increased mood lability where external stimuli more easily 
influence individuals.  However, limitations in the inhibitory control manipulation when 
applied in the fMRI context in Experiment 2 meant that the study is unable to provide 
evidence relating to whether these effects are supported by changes in neural activation 
or resting-state connectivity.
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Abstract 
There is an established relationship between chronic weakness of inhibitory control and 
the likelihood of disordered mood.  In contrast, sustained mindfulness practice has been 
associated with improvements in emotion regulation.  Here we investigate whether a 
short-term inhibitory challenge increases our emotional response to stimuli and whether 
a brief mindfulness exercise has the effect of moderating such affective responses.  
Participants rated positive and negatively valenced pictures after one of two types of 
manipulation.  In Experiment 1, picture ratings were contrasted for participants 
completing either an easy or challenging inhibitory task.  In Experiment 2, ratings of the 
same images were contrasted for participants completing either a mind-wandering or 
mindfulness manipulation.  Manipulation checks confirmed the difficult inhibitory task 
to be significantly more exhausting than the easy task (Experiment 1) and that there was 
no significant difference in engagement between the mind-wandering and mindfulness 
tasks (Experiment 2).  Bayesian analysis provided strong evidence that participants’ 
valence ratings were unaffected by either a prior inhibitory task or mindfulness 
manipulation.  While here we examine valence ratings and not direct measures of mood, 
the results suggest that the short-term depletion of inhibitory resources does not result in 
an increase in emotional response typically observed in chronic conditions.  Similarly, a 
brief mindfulness manipulation does not produce the moderating effects on emotional 
experience found to result from extended practice.   
 
Keywords: Emotion regulation; mindfulness; inhibitory control; self-control; mood 
 
 
 
120 
INHIBITORY CONTROL & AFFECTIVE EVALUATIONS 
Emotion plays a vital role in shaping how individuals interact with the ever-changing 
environments surrounding them.  The ability to adapt and influence one’s own emotions 
in order to ensure that they are helpful rather than harmful is referred to as emotional 
regulation (Gross, 2015), a capacity which is inextricably linked to the ability to exert 
inhibitory control over automatic responses.  One technique thought to contribute to 
successful inhibitory control and the effective regulation of emotion is mindfulness; a 
meditative practice which has undeniably gained considerable attention over the last 
few decades (Teper, Segal, & Inzlicht, 2013).  Evaluating the extent to which emotional 
lability is affected by the prior use of inhibitory control could extend our understanding 
of how emotional trajectories are exacerbated by extraneous factors which drain 
cognitive resources.  In turn, understanding whether mindfulness meditation is 
successful in reducing the variability in emotion lability, offers additional support to the 
established literature which highlights mindfulness as a useful and efficient technique 
employed in balancing emotions (see Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009).  Thus, with 
inhibitory control being paramount to healthy and effective emotion regulation and 
mindfulness training potentially facilitating such processes, it is important to better 
understand how emotion regulation is affected by each of these components in turn.  
The present study therefore examines the effect of a prior inhibitory task, and a 
mindfulness meditation procedure, on subsequent emotion lability captured via the 
perception of emotionally relevant stimuli.   
 Effective emotion regulation is the successful manipulation of the intensity, 
duration, and quality of the emotional response (see Gross, 2015).  Such changes to the 
emotional response can happen automatically or through the conscious application of 
regulatory strategies such as biting one’s tongue or breathing deeply.  Emotions can 
maladaptively bias cognition and behaviour (Eftekhari et al., 2009; Gross & Jazaieri, 
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2014) meaning that effective emotion regulation is an essential component to mental 
health (Gross & Munoz, 1995).  For example, emotion regulation, in terms of 
understanding one’s strategies and their ability to modify their emotions, is held as 
paramount to the understanding of the onset, maintenance, and necessary treatment of 
anxiety related disorders (Cisler & Olatunji, 2012; Cisler, Olatunji, Feldner, & Forsyth, 
2010).  
One capacity responsible for individual differences in emotion regulation is 
inhibitory control (Paschke et al., 2016).  In fact, inhibitory control and self-reported 
emotional stability are highly correlated (Tangney et al., 2004).  Individuals high in 
control, experience fewer fluctuations in mood and lower intensities of emotion (Layton 
& Muraven, 2014).  It is interesting to question whether this is due to an individual’s 
ability to restrict their emotional experiences.  Whilst the necessary regulation of 
responses to affective stimuli happens automatically in the majority of healthy 
individuals (Volokhov & Demaree, 2010), the failure to regulate emotions is inherent to 
many psychopathologies and maladaptive behaviours (Eftekhari et al., 2009).  
Individuals with depression exhibit a combination of decreased prefrontal activation and 
increased activation of limbic regions (Hamilton et al., 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2008).  
This suggests that for those with depression, prefrontal regions are exhibiting poorer 
inhibitory control over limbic areas which are responsible for emotional experience.  In 
accordance with this, many disorders characterised by impulsivity and a lack of 
inhibitory control, also exhibit a high comorbidity with emotion dysregulation, such as 
bulimia nervosa (Anestis et al., 2009), anxiety (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Cisler & 
Olatunji, 2012), depression (Joormann & Stanton, 2016), and Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD; Walcott & Landau, 2004), suggesting that when 
individuals do not possess the capacity to inhibit their responses, they are also more 
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vulnerable to emotional lability.  Understanding the different ways in which inhibitory 
control can impact emotion regulation provides insight into the variations in regulatory 
capacity observed in clinical and non-clinical populations.  
Inhibitory control has predominantly been explored in the context of self-control 
where a dual task paradigm is exploited to examine the effect of prior exertion of 
inhibitory control on subsequent attempts to inhibit or regulate behaviour (contrast 
Dang, 2017; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010, with Carter & McCullough, 
2014).  Exerting control on an initial task leads to a reduction in the amount of control 
applied to subsequent tasks resulting in heightened impulsivity (Vohs & Faber, 2007), 
aggression (DeWall et al., 2007), and overeating (Hofmann et al., 2007; Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2000).  Some attempts to model these effects, such as the resource model of 
self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998) which depicts self-control as akin to a resource 
which once used needs time to replenish, have met with criticism in recent years due to 
an inability to identify the resource in question (Beedie & Lane, 2012; Job et al., 2010; 
Kurzban, 2010; Martijn et al., 2002; Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Tice et al., 2007), and 
from a failure to replicate the reported effect (Hagger et al., 2016).  However, in a recent 
meta-analysis, Dang (2017) advises that the effect of a prior inhibitory control task on 
subsequent processing is apparent so long as the prior task is inherently exhausting.  
This meta-analysis pinpointed the colour naming Stroop task as one of the most 
effective, exhaustive manipulations of self-control.  It is for this reason that the present 
study adopts the Stroop task as the means to manipulate inhibitory control.  It is not yet 
clearly understood whether trait levels of self-control are related to an individual’s 
ability to overcome the effects of prior exertion of inhibitory control (cf Gillebaart & de 
Ridder, 2015; Muraven, Collins, Shiffman, & Paty, 2005, with Imhoff, Schmidt, & 
Gerstenberg, 2014; Stillman, Tice, Fincham, & Lambert, 2009).  For this reason, the 
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Self-Control Scale (SCS, Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004) is included in the 
present study to control for any effect of trait self-control.  
Despite the challenges to the self-control literature it appears that when 
individuals are low in the capacity for inhibitory control, they rely instead on implicit 
response tendencies, impulses, and automatic behaviours (see Bertrams, Baumeister, 
Englert, & Furley, 2015).  It is therefore not surprising that one might be more 
susceptible to fluctuations in mood when they are relying on impulses to guide their 
thoughts, feelings and behaviours.  Wagner and Heatherton (2013), showed that when 
individuals had previously taken part in an inhibitory control task, they exhibited greater 
left-amygdala reactivity to negative stimuli and showed reduced connectivity between 
the left amygdala and prefrontal cortex (PFC).  Due to both the amygdala and PFC 
playing an important role in the processing of emotion (Hariri et al., 2003), these 
findings are inherently indicative of reduced emotion regulation following the prior use 
of inhibitory, prefrontal processes.  Furthermore, Gurney et al. (2018), found that a 
demanding inhibitory control task elicited subsequently heightened mood lability, in 
terms of experienced happiness and sadness, in response to both positive and negative 
mood manipulations.  We therefore propose that exerting inhibitory control on a 
demanding task might similarly increase the subsequent degree of emotion experienced 
in response to the presentation of emotionally salient images.   
One technique thought to contribute to effective emotion regulation is 
mindfulness meditation.  Derived from the reflective traditions of the Buddhist religion, 
mindfulness encourages individuals to focus on the present moment acknowledging 
their thoughts, emotions, and bodily sensations in a non-judgmental acceptance, and 
enhanced awareness of the present reality (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Cardaciotto, Herbert, 
Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008).  In recent years mindfulness has been explained with 
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regards to consciousness and metacognition (Jankowski & Holas, 2014; Norman, 2017), 
in that both mindfulness and metacognition involve an increase in attention and an 
awareness of one’s own cognition (see Norman, 2017).  Specifically, mindfulness is 
thought to increase sensitivity to fringe consciousness, a facet of metacognition which 
involves the fleeting feelings of familiarity or novelty (see Norman, 2017; Rosenstreich 
& Ruderman, 2017).  This awareness of one’s thoughts and feelings in the absence of 
judgment can be referred to as ‘decentering’ and is thought to facilitate effective 
emotion regulation (Bishop et al., 2004; Coffey, Hartman, & Fredrickson, 2010).  
Mindfulness has been shown to be beneficial for a variety of conditions linked to 
emotion dysregulation including hypochondriasis (McManus, Surawy, Muse, Vazquez-
Montes, & Williams, 2012), depression and anxiety (Baer, 2003), maladaptive eating 
behaviours and obesity (Mantzios & Wilson, 2015), ADHD (Zylowska et al., 2008), and 
psychosis (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006; Khoury, Lecomte, Gaudiano, & Paquin, 2013).  
An extensive body of research, has reported a link between mindfulness techniques and 
emotion regulation (see Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009, for a review).  Mindfulness 
Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) for instance, enables successful emotion regulation 
by encouraging individuals to alter their automatic or ingrained responses to distressing 
thoughts and images in order to diminish worry and rumination (Williams, 2008).  
Teper, Segal, and Inzlicht (2013), suggest that mindfulness improves emotion regulation 
by enhancing a sensitivity to minor changes in affective states which signal the need for 
inhibitory processes before the full extent of the original emotional trajectory can 
unfurl.  Despite challenges in conceptualising the mechanism by which mindfulness 
influences emotion regulation, the body of research demonstrating that relationship is 
increasing exponentially reinforcing the value of further investigation. 
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Furthermore, whilst many studies of mindfulness examine lengthy interventions 
often lasting for a period of weeks or months (Farb et al., 2010), research has also 
demonstrated that the beneficial effects of mindfulness on emotion regulation can be 
observed even after very brief interventions lasting for a matter of minutes.  Such 
studies have revealed decreased negativity to repetitive thoughts (Feldman, Greeson, & 
Senville, 2010), reduced dysphoria (Broderick, 2005) and aggression (Heppner et al., 
2008), and less spider avoidance behaviour in phobic participants (Hooper, Davies, 
Davies, & McHugh, 2011) following a short mindfulness induction.  A study by Arch 
and Craske (2006) demonstrated that in comparison to controls, those undergoing a 
short 15-minute mindfulness breathing manipulation experienced lower levels of 
negative affect and emotional volatility and a greater willingness to be exposed to 
negative images.  In light of such findings, the present study proposes that a brief period 
of mindfulness meditation will have the general effect of increasing emotion regulation 
and will thus reduce the degree of positive and negative affect attributed to emotionally 
salient images.  
In the present paper we examine the effect of two manipulations on subsequent 
processing of emotionally salient images.  Experiment 1 investigates the effect of an 
inhibitory control manipulation on affective evaluations.  Specifically, the degree of 
prior inhibitory demand is manipulated via the completion of either an easy or difficult 
version of a colour naming Stroop task.  The effect of this manipulation on participants’ 
emotional evaluation of positive and negative images is then examined.  If challenging 
inhibitory tasks have the general effect of increasing subsequent emotional lability, then 
we should observe more extreme emotional ratings for both positive and negative 
images.  Thus, we predict more extreme ratings of positive and negative images for 
those in the difficult inhibitory task condition.  Experiment 2 seeks to achieve the 
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opposing effect by exploiting a mindfulness manipulation aimed to increase emotion 
regulation.  Specifically Experiment 2 examines the effect of a short mindfulness 
manipulation, in comparison to a mind-wandering procedure, on affective evaluations of 
the same stimuli employed in Experiment 1.  If the brief mindfulness procedure has the 
effect of reducing emotional lability, then we should observe less extreme ratings for 
both positive and negative images; creating a pattern opposite to that of the inhibitory 
control manipulation.  Thus, we predict less variability in ratings of positive and 
negative images for those in the mindfulness condition. 
Experiment 1 
Method  
Participants 
Participants were 120 volunteers (69 female, 51 male) aged 18-34 years (M = 
21, SD = 2.06) recruited from the University of Sussex and participating in exchange for 
entry into a £25 prize draw.  Participants were randomly assigned in equal proportions 
to one of two inhibitory task conditions: difficult versus easy and were naïve to the 
experimental hypothesis.  The experiment was considered low risk and received ethical 
approval from the University of Sussex School of Psychology ethics committee.  All 
participants read an information sheet and signed a consent form before the experiment 
began.  At the end of the experiment participants were fully debriefed as to the nature of 
the experimental aims. 
Materials 
The complete set of materials and the data for both experiments has been made 
available on the Open Science Framework (OSF) and can be retrieved from 
https://osf.io/fbhej.  All elements of the experiment were implemented in Matlab and 
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run on a Pavilion DM4 computer with a 15” 60Hz monitor.  Participants were seated 
with a viewing distance of 600mm. 
Mood ratings for the emotions: happy, sad, anxious, aroused (awake/alert), and 
angry, were captured using a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) ranging from ‘not at all’ to 
‘extremely’.  These mood ratings were captured in order to examine any changes in 
subjective mood which might otherwise confound or explain between group differences 
in the resulting picture ratings.  
For the purposes of a manipulation check an additional VAS captured how 
mentally exhausting participants found the stroop task, i.e. “Thinking back to the earlier 
colour classification task, how mentally exhausting did you find it?” rated from ‘not at 
all’ to ‘extremely’.  
Two versions of the colour-naming Stroop task were employed to manipulate 
inhibitory control; these were those previously found to be among the stronger 
manipulations for these purposes (Dang, 2017; Hagger et al., 2010). 
The Self-Control Scale (SCS, Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), a 36 item, 
self-report questionnaire was used to measure trait self-control.  
The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, Baer, Smith, Hopkins, & 
Toney, 2006), a 39 item, self-report questionnaire was included as a measure of 
mindfulness.  
A collection of 72 positive and 72 negative images matched for degree of 
valence and arousal were selected from the IAPS database.  These were presented 
alongside a VAS capturing ratings from ‘extremely negative’ to ‘extremely positive’.  
Design 
 The experiment exploited a between-subject design with one independent 
variable: inhibitory task condition.  The primary dependent variables of interest were 
128 
INHIBITORY CONTROL & AFFECTIVE EVALUATIONS 
the mean ratings of positive and negative images with scores on both the SCS and 
FFMQ included as covariates. 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room with the experimenter present at 
all times.  Participants first provided demographic information (age and gender) and 
rated their mood using the on-screen VAS for happiness, sadness, anxiety, arousal and 
anger. Instructions were then provided for the inhibitory control manipulation. 
Inhibitory control manipulation.  Participants completed one of two versions 
of the colour naming task (difficult vs. easy).  Those in the difficult condition completed 
a four-colour Stroop requiring high levels of control in order to suppress the automatic 
tendency to read the word in order to correctly report the colour of the text that it is 
written in (either Red, Green, Blue or Yellow). For example, ‘red’ written in blue must 
be classified as blue and not red.  Participants were instructed to be as accurate as 
possible and keep errors to an absolute minimum.  Each trial began with a fixation cross 
for 300ms before the colour word was presented for 1000ms.  Words were displayed in 
‘Arial’ font size 50.  Responses were made using the number keys 1-4 with the 
corresponding colours presented onscreen in monochrome throughout.  If participants 
failed to respond within one second or a wrong classification was made, then an error 
tone (middle C pitch) sounded. There was a total of 240 Trials with every 8 trials 
containing 2 trials of each colour word in a randomized order.  The colour word and the 
text in which it was written in were the same (concordant trials) for 6 out of every 8 
trials and for the remaining 2 trials the colour words were written in one of the other 
three colours chosen at random (discordant trials).  
Those in the easy condition completed a simplified two-colour version of the 
task requiring no inhibition in which the colour of the text and the word presented were 
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always the same (i.e. ‘red’ written in red), however the error tone still sounded if a 
mistake was made.  The duration of the easy condition was fixed to match that of the 
difficult condition, irrespective of the number of trials completed.   
In both conditions, the task was followed by a 1-minute break, whilst a 
countdown timer was presented on screen.  This short break was followed by a second 
set of VAS mood ratings identical to the first, before the instructions for the picture 
evaluation trials were presented on screen.  
Picture evaluation trials. Pictures were presented one at a time and rated on a 
VAS from ‘extremely negative’ to ‘extremely positive’.  Four blocks of 36 trials were 
used.  Images were presented in a randomized order with each block of 36 containing an 
equal number of positive and negative images.  Blocks were separated with a screen 
which instructed participants to “Please take a break. When you are ready to continue 
press any button to move on to the next block”.  
Following the picture evaluation trials, a third and final set of mood ratings were 
captured using the VAS and an additional VAS was used to record a measure of stroop 
exhaustion.  Participants then completed two onscreen questionnaires (SCS, FFMQ) 
before being fully debriefed to the nature of the study and being thanked for their 
participation.  
Results 
Inhibitory Control Induced Mental Exhaustion  
An independent t-test revealed that participants in the difficult inhibitory task 
condition rated the colour naming Stroop as significantly more mentally exhausting (M 
= 67.67, SE = 2.52) than those in the easy condition (M = 43.41, SE = 3.43) t(108.44) = 
-5.70, p < .001, d =1.04.  
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The Effect of Prior Inhibitory Control on Mood  
Whilst 5 emotions were measured as a set, our analyses focus on happiness and 
sadness as these were the most relevant to our intended design.  In order to ascertain 
that the task itself did not differentially effect mood, two 2 (time: before vs. after 
inhibitory task) x 2 (inhibitory task condition: difficult vs. easy) mixed ANOVAs were 
conducted for ratings of happiness and sadness.  
For ratings of happiness, there was a significant main effect of time, F(1,118) = 
34.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .23, no significant main effect of task condition, F < 1, and 
crucially, no significant interaction between time and task condition, F(1,118) = 1.02, p 
= .315, ηp2 = .01.  A paired t-test examining the main effect of time showed that 
participants rated themselves as significantly happier before (M = 58.20, SE = 1.83) 
versus after (M = 47.92, SE = 1.96) the Stroop task, t(119) = 5.89, p < .001, d =0.49.  
For ratings of sadness there was no significant main effect of time, F(1,118) = 
1.09, p = .299, ηp2 = .01, no significant main effect of task condition, F(1,118) = 2.11, p 
= .149, ηp2 = .02, and no significant interaction between time and task condition, F < 1.   
Main Analysis 
The effect of prior inhibitory control on the affective picture evaluations.  A 
2 (picture valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (inhibitory task condition: difficult vs. 
easy) mixed ANOVA on mean picture ratings was conducted with SCS and FFMQ 
scores, and the exhaustion measure added as covariates, see Figure 13.  Neither the 
covariate effect of FFMQ scores nor exhaustion reached significance, F < 1.  However 
there was a significant interaction between picture valence and SCS scores, F(1, 115) = 
9.98, p = .002, ηp2 = .08. Post hoc bivariate correlations were used to examine this effect 
and showed a significant, positive correlation between SCS and positive picture ratings, 
r =.24, p = .008, and a significant, negative correlation between SCS and negative 
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picture ratings, r = -.35, p > .001.  Importantly, after controlling for any effect of the 
covariates, there was no significant main effect of picture valence, inhibitory task 
condition, nor a significant interaction between condition and picture valence, all F < 1.   
Bayesian analysis was employed to assess the strength of evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis, H1, over the null hypothesis, H0 (Wagenmakers, Verhagen, Ly, 
Matzke et al., 2017).  A Bayes factor of 3 or more indicates evidence for H1 over H0, 
below 1/3 indicates evidence for H0 over H1 and a Bayes factor between 1/3 and 3 
represents data insensitivity (see Dienes, 2014).  BH(0, x) denotes a Bayes factor modelled 
as a half-normal distribution with a Mean of zero and a SD of x (see Dienes & 
McLatchie, 2017).  It is hypothesised that the challenging inhibitory task will result in 
more extreme emotional ratings and hence there will be a larger difference between 
mean positive and negative picture ratings in the experimental versus the control 
condition.  The SD for the Bayesian prior was therefore set to be twice the difference 
observed in the control condition (SD = 93.34).  Additionally, to determine the 
robustness of the Bayes, a robustness region is calculated to show the range of scales 
which would support the same conclusion.  The robustness region is notated as RR[x1, 
x2] where x1 is the lowest, and x2 the highest SD which results in the same conclusion. 
Bayesian analysis examining the non-significant interaction between inhibitory 
task condition and task type provided strong evidence for the null hypothesis of no 
interaction between the prior exertion of inhibitory control and the subsequent lability 
of emotional judgements, BH(0, 93.34)  = 0.02 RR[3.35,200]. 
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Figure 13.  Mean picture rating (1 = 'extremely negative', 100 = ‘extremely positive’) 
by picture valence and inhibitory task condition (+/- 1 SEM).  
The effect of prior inhibitory control on reaction times for picture 
evaluations.  A 2 (picture valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (inhibitory task condition: 
difficult vs. easy) mixed ANOVA on mean reaction times was conducted with SCS, 
FFMQ, and the exhaustion measure added as covariates.  None of the covariates 
reached significance, all F<1.  After controlling for the effect of the covariates, there 
was no significant main effect of picture valence, F(1, 115) = 1.70, p = .196, ηp2 = . 02, 
no main effect of inhibitory task condition, F <1, nor a significant interaction between 
inhibitory task condition and picture valence, F < 1.   
Discussion 
Experiment 1 aimed to examine the effect of a prior inhibitory task on the 
subsequent emotional lability as reflected in affective picture evaluations.  The results 
revealed a positive correlation between SCS scores and ratings of positive pictures and a 
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negative correlation between SCS scores and ratings of negative pictures but no effect 
of FFMQ or exhaustion.  Whilst participants’ levels of happiness were significantly 
lower after the Stroop, importantly, there was no effect of inhibitory task condition 
meaning that both groups did not differ significantly immediately prior to rating the 
images.  Crucially, the difficult inhibitory task was found to be more mentally 
exhausting than the easy task, suggesting that the manipulation was successful in 
creating more inhibitory demand, consistent with findings from Dang (2017).  Despite 
this, the results revealed strong evidence for no effect of prior inhibitory challenge on 
subsequent ratings of affective images.  If the prior use of inhibitory control has the 
general effect of increasing subsequent emotional lability, then more extreme ratings of 
positive and negative images should have been observed for those in the difficult 
condition.  As such, the findings do not support the hypothesis and contrast results from 
previous literature which report higher levels of emotional reactivity in response to 
affective stimuli exhibited in increased amygdala reactivity (Wagner & Heatherton, 
2013) following a challenging inhibitory control task. 
Given the use of mindfulness procedures in reducing emotional lability in many 
disorders, Experiment 2 aims to examine whether variations in levels of affect attributed 
to picture stimuli of both positive and negative valence, is stabilised by a short 
mindfulness induction procedure.   
Experiment 2 
Method  
Participants 
Participants were 118 volunteers (86 female, 32 male) aged 18 to 35 years (M = 
22.27, SD = 4.00) recruited from the University of Sussex and participating in exchange 
for entry into a £25 prize draw.  Participants were randomly assigned in equal 
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proportions to one of two conditions: mindfulness versus mind-wandering and were 
naïve to the experimental hypothesis.  The experiment was considered low risk and 
received ethical approval from the University of Sussex School of Psychology ethics 
committee.  All participants read an information sheet and signed a consent form before 
the experiment began.  At the end of the experiment participants were fully debriefed as 
to the nature of the experimental aims. 
Materials 
All materials were identical to Experiment 1 except for the manipulation task 
and manipulation check.  The mindfulness and mind-wandering inductions, used for the 
mindfulness manipulation, were presented to participants via headphones.  The full 
scripts for the both inductions were adapted from Arch and Craske, (2006), and are 
available with all other materials on the OSF at: https://osf.io/fbhej/.  Where the 
manipulation check in Experiment 1 enquired about how mentally exhausting the colour 
classification task was, in Experiment 2 participants used a VAS to report on 
engagement during the listening task.  They were presented with the question, 
“Thinking back to the earlier listening task, how well were you able to engage with the 
instructions?” and provided their rating on a scale from ‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’.  
Design 
 The experiment used a between-subjects design with one independent variable: 
mindfulness manipulation condition (mindfulness vs. mind-wandering).  The primary 
dependent variables of interest were the ratings of positive and negative images with 
scores on both the SCS and FFMQ again included as covariates. 
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Procedure 
Participants were run individually in a quiet room with the experimenter present 
at all times.  The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1 with the exception that 
the inhibitory control manipulation was replaced by the mindfulness manipulation.   
Mindfulness manipulation.  Participants completed either a mindfulness or 
mind-wandering manipulation.  Those in the mindfulness condition listened to a 10-
minute mindfulness induction during which participants were led through a focused 
breathing meditation exercise encouraging a focus on the present moment and the 
physical sensations of breathing.  Those in the mind-wandering condition listened to a 
10-minute mind-wandering induction which repeatedly asked participants to think of 
whatever came to mind. 
Results 
Mindfulness Manipulation Task Engagement  
An independent t-test revealed no significant difference in task engagement 
between those in the mindfulness (M = 69.67, SE = 2.53) and mind-wandering (M = 
71.16, SE = 2.52) conditions, t(116) = 0.42, p = .678, d = 0.11.  
The Effect of the Mindfulness Manipulation Condition on Mood  
In order to ascertain that the task itself did not differentially effect mood, two 2 
(time: before vs. after the manipulation) x 2 (mindfulness manipulation condition: 
mindfulness vs. mind-wandering) mixed ANOVAs were conducted for ratings of 
happiness and sadness.  
For ratings of happiness, there was no significant main effect of time, F < 1, or 
task condition, F(1,116) = 1.34, p = 250, ηp2 = .01, but a significant interaction between 
time and task condition, F(1,116) = 4.62, p = .034, ηp2 = .04.  Given the significant 
interaction, paired t-tests were conducted to examine the simple effects of time for each 
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level of the mindfulness manipulation.  Results showed that those in the mind-
wandering condition rated themselves as significantly happier before (M = 66.90, SE 
=1.83), versus after (M = 62.59, SE = 2.39) the mind-wandering induction, t(59) = 2.12, 
p = .038, d = 0.27.  However, those in the mindfulness condition showed no significant 
difference in their ratings of happiness before (M = 59.98, SE =2.58), versus after (M = 
62.19, SE = 3.04) the mindfulness induction, t(57) = -0.98, p = .332, d = 0.13.  The 
interaction was also examined using independent t-tests to investigate the simple effects 
of mindfulness manipulation at each time point.  Results showed that before the 
manipulation, those in the mind-wandering condition rated themselves as significantly 
happier (M = 66.90, SE = 1.83), than those in the mindfulness condition (M = 59.98, SE 
= 2.58), t(103.41) = 2.19, p = .031, d = 0.41.  However, after the manipulation, there 
was no significant difference in ratings of happiness between mind-wandering (M = 
62.59, SE = 2.39) and mindfulness (M = 62.19, SE = 3.04) conditions, t(116) = 0.10, p = 
.918, d = 0.02.  
For ratings of sadness there was no significant main effect of time, F(1,116) = 
1.93, p = .167, ηp2 = .02, or task condition, F(1,116) = 1.45, p = .231, ηp2 = .01, but 
there was again a significant interaction between time and listening task type, F(1, 116) 
= 3.79, p = .054, ηp2 = .03.  Given the significant interaction, paired t-tests were again 
conducted to examine the simple effects of time for each level of the mindfulness 
manipulation.  Results showed that those in the mind-wandering condition showed no 
significant difference in their ratings of sadness before (M = 18.76, SE =2.09), versus 
after (M = 19.54, SE = 2.41) the mind-wandering induction, t(59) = -0.52, p = .608, d = 
0.07.  Similarly, for the mindfulness condition, the difference between ratings of 
sadness before (M = 25.60, SE =2.73), versus after (M = 20.92, SE = 3.14) the 
manipulation failed to reach significance, t(57) = 1.96, p = .055, d = 0.27.  Independent 
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t-tests were conducted to examine the simple effects of mindfulness manipulation 
condition at each time point.  Results showed that before the manipulation, those in the 
mind-wandering condition rated themselves as significantly less sad (M = 18.76, SE = 
2.09), than those in the mindfulness condition (M = 25.60, SE = 2.73), t(116) = -1.99, p 
= .048, d = 0.37.  However, after the induction, there was no difference in ratings of 
sadness between mind-wandering (M = 19.54, SE = 2.41) and mindfulness (M = 20.92, 
SE = 3.14) conditions, t(116) = -0.35, p = .726, d = 0.06.  
Note, while these analyses reveal an unintended difference in mood between 
conditions at time 1, crucially they reveal no significant differences in mood between 
conditions at time 2 (i.e. immediately prior to rating the emotional pictures). 
Main Analysis 
The effect of mindfulness manipulation on the affective picture evaluations. 
A 2 (picture valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (mindfulness manipulation condition: 
mindfulness vs. mind-wandering) mixed ANOVA on mean picture ratings was 
conducted with SCS, FFMQ, and the engagement measure added as covariates, see 
Figure 14.  None of the covariates reached significance, all p > .05.  Importantly, after 
controlling for the effect of the covariates, there was a significant main effect of picture 
valence, F(1,113) = 22.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, whereby participants mean ratings 
reflected the positive (M = 70.50, SE = 0.70) and negative (M = 19.68, SE = 0.56) 
nature of the stimuli .  There was also a main effect of mindfulness manipulation 
condition, F(1,113) = 6.65, p = .011, ηp2 = .06, whereby those in the mind-wandering 
condition rated the images as more positive on average (M = 45.93, SE = 0.46) in 
comparison to those in the mindfulness condition (M = 44.24, SE = 0.47).  However, 
crucially there was no significant interaction between mindfulness manipulation 
condition and picture valence, F(1,113) = 2.54, p = .114, ηp2 = .02. 
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Bayesian analysis was again utilised to examine the strength of evidence for the 
null hypothesis that there was no interaction between condition type and picture 
valence; the same procedure was adopted as outlined in Experiment 1.  The expectation 
was that ratings in the mindfulness condition would be less extreme than in the mind-
wandering condition.  As such, the prior was modelled as a half-normal distribution 
with a mean of 0 and a SD of half the difference observed in the control (mind-
wandering) condition (SD = 26.18).  The resulting Bayes Factor was less than 1/3 and 
thus provided strong evidence for the null hypothesis that there was no interaction 
between mindfulness condition and the subsequent emotional response to the valenced 
images, BH(0, 26.18) = 0.03, RR[2.62, 250]. 
 
Figure 14.  Mean picture rating (1 = 'extremely negative', 100 = 'extremely positive') by 
picture valence and induction type (+/- 1 SEM). 
The effect of mindfulness on reaction times for picture evaluations.  A 2 
(picture valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (induction condition: mindfulness vs. mind-
wandering) mixed ANOVA on mean reaction times was conducted with SCS, FFMQ, 
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and the engagement measure added as covariates.  Consistent with Experiment 1, none 
of the covariates reached significance, all p > .05.  After controlling for the effect of the 
covariates, there was no significant main effect of picture valence, induction condition, 
nor a significant interaction between induction condition and picture valence, all F < 1.  
Discussion 
Experiment 2 examined the effect of a mindfulness meditation procedure on the 
subsequent emotional lability as reflected in affective picture evaluations.  Results 
showed no covariate effects of SCS, FFMQ nor task engagement.  There was also no 
significant difference in levels of task engagement between those in the mindfulness 
versus mind-wandering condition, suggesting that this was not a confounding variable.  
Whilst the results showed an unintended significant between conditions difference in 
levels of happiness and sadness before the manipulation, importantly there was no 
significant between conditions difference in mood after the manipulation and 
immediately prior to rating the images.  There was a main effect of both picture valence 
and mindfulness condition.  Crucially however, there was no interaction between 
mindfulness manipulation condition and picture valence.  If a brief mindfulness 
procedure has the effect of reducing subsequent emotional lability, then less extreme 
ratings of positive and negative images should have been observed.  As such the result 
provide no evidence for previous research documenting a link between mindfulness and 
effective emotion regulation (e.g. Bishop et al., 2004; Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 
2009; Coffey, Hartman, & Fredrickson, 2010).  
General Discussion 
Previous research has shown that the ability to regulate emotions effectively is 
linked to inhibitory control (Paschke et al., 2016; Tangney et al., 2004) and is facilitated 
by mindfulness techniques (Bishop et al., 2004; Coffey et al., 2010).  While much 
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research has established a relationship between emotion regulation and these two 
factors, few have endeavoured to directly examine differences in the levels of positive 
and negative affect specifically attributed to emotionally valenced imagery following 
inhibitory demand and mindfulness manipulations.  Here, we sought to address this by 
investigating whether an inhibitory control (Experiment 1) and mindfulness 
(Experiment 2) manipulation would alter the level of affect observed in emotion ratings 
of positive and negative valenced images.  Specifically, emotion ratings were compared 
following either an easy versus difficult version of a colour classification Stroop task 
(Experiment 1) and after a mindfulness versus mind-wandering manipulation 
(Experiment 2).  If the prior use of inhibitory control increases subsequent emotional 
lability, it was predicted that this would be reflected in more extreme ratings of positive 
and negative valenced stimuli for those in the difficult versus easy condition.  
Conversely, if a brief mindfulness procedure reduces subsequent emotion lability, it was 
predicted that less extreme ratings of positive and negative affect should have been 
observed for the mindfulness versus mind-wandering condition.   
Consistent with previous research (Dang, 2017; Hagger et al., 2010) the 
manipulation of inhibitory demand in Experiment 1 proved to be effective, with the 
difficult version of the Stroop task being rated as significantly more exhausting than the 
easy version.  Despite this, the results revealed no effect of prior exertion of inhibitory 
control on the subsequent variability in ratings of positive and negative images.  The 
results therefore do not support the hypothesis.  This contrasts with previous findings 
which have shown an increase in mood lability after an inhibitory challenge (e.g. 
Gurney et al., 2018; Wagner & Heatherton, 2013) which is thought to be due to a 
reliance on automatic processes to guide emotion and behaviour in the absence of 
adequate cognitive control (see Bertrams et al., 2015; Wagner & Heatherton, 2013).  
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One potential explanation for why this increase in mood lability was not reflected in 
individuals’ ratings of valenced images, is the fact that here the responses captured 
affective ratings of the images themselves rather than the emotional state that they 
induced; as such the ratings might not reflect the availability of inhibitory resources.  
Although we observed no effect of the temporary reduction in inhibitory control, we 
report a negative correlation between trait self-control (as measured by the SCS) and 
negative image ratings, suggesting that those with low trait self-control perceive these 
images more negatively than those with high self-control.  This relationship supports 
previous research which links a variety of psychopathologies characterised by 
chronically impaired inhibitory control with increased emotional experience (Eftekhari 
et al., 2009) potentially resulting from decreased prefrontal and increased limbic 
activation (e.g. Hamilton et al., 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2008).   
The manipulation check employed in Experiment 2 showed no significant 
difference in levels of engagement between mindfulness and mind-wandering 
conditions.  Whilst mindfulness and mind-wandering conditions showed a significant 
difference in mood prior to the manipulation, crucially this difference was not present 
immediately prior to rating the images.  Despite this, the results provided strong 
evidence for the null hypothesis of no effect of mindfulness meditation on the 
subsequent variability in ratings of positive and negative images.  Therefore the results 
contrast those previously documenting a link between mindfulness and increased 
emotion regulation (Bishop et al., 2004; Coffey et al., 2010).   
It could be argued that longer periods of mindfulness meditation training are 
needed to observe the full extent of the benefits on subsequent emotion regulation.  
However, previous research employing very brief periods of mindfulness meditation 
have compellingly shown beneficial effects on subsequent cognition and behaviour (e.g. 
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Arch & Craske, 2006; Broderick, 2005; Feldman et al., 2010; Heppner et al., 2008; 
Hooper et al., 2011) suggesting that this need not be the case.  One possible explanation 
for our failure to observe an effect in the current study relates to the strength of the 
manipulation.  The design utilised here sought to evaluate the extent to which the 
pictures influenced individuals emotionally, by examining the severity of their picture 
ratings.  This design assumes that such ratings would reflect individuals’ experienced 
emotion.  However, the picture ratings could simply represent individuals’ objective 
ratings of positive and negative affect rather than being reflective of their own 
emotional state.  A future study could directly contrast affective ratings of pictures 
while also capturing ongoing mood ratings. 
Previous research has established a relationship between chronic weakness of 
inhibitory control and emotion dysregulation (Paschke et al., 2016; Tangney et al., 
2004).  In comparison, mindfulness practice has been associated with improved emotion 
regulation (Bishop et al., 2004; Coffey et al., 2010).  Here we examined whether a short 
inhibitory challenge increases emotional responses to affective stimuli and conversely, 
whether a brief mindfulness exercise decreases emotional responses to the same stimuli.  
The results provide strong evidence that contrary to effects observed in chronic 
conditions, a period of reduced inhibitory control does not increase emotional response.  
Similarly, in comparison to results observed following lengthy mindfulness training 
programs, we report strong evidence that a brief mindfulness exercise does not 
moderate emotional experience of affective stimuli.
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General Discussion 
Summary of Aims 
Previous work has shown the effects of prior use of inhibitory control on a 
variety of conscious behavioural outcomes (DeWall et al., 2007; Fischer et al., 2012; 
Hofmann et al., 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003; Vohs & Faber, 2007; Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2000).  However, as previously discussed, an important question remained 
unanswered.  Are we more susceptible to unconscious influences when tired or 
exhausted from prior mental exertion?  Gauging the extent of such variations is 
especially important to understanding how unconscious influences contribute in a 
variety of clinical conditions characterised by chronic mental exhaustion and impaired 
inhibitory control.  This thesis used varied experimental methods to examine whether 
the effects of inhibitory control on conscious behavioural outcomes extend to include 
unconscious influences on cognition and behaviour.  
Empirical Findings and Relationship with Previous Research 
Firstly, Paper 1 sought to investigate the effect of prior inhibitory demand on the 
subsequent susceptibility to unconscious primes of both a neutral (Experiment 1) and 
reward relevant (Experiment 2) nature.  Given previous findings that individuals appear 
to switch to a reliance on automatic implicit processes following a taxing inhibitory task 
(Bertrams et al., 2015; Hagger et al., 2010) we would have expected to observe greater 
levels of unconscious priming for those who had previously completed a demanding 
inhibitory control task.  Furthermore, we would have expected this effect to be 
exacerbated in the presence of reward relevant primes due to previous findings that 
show an increased preference for, or consumption of unhealthy food items following 
prior inhibitory control (Hofmann et al., 2007; Papies & Hamstra, 2010; Papies, 
Stroebe, & Aarts, 2008; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000).  In line with previous research 
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(Dang, 2017; Hagger et al., 2010), the manipulation of inhibitory control proved 
effective with those in the difficult condition rating the task as significantly more 
mentally exhausting than those in the easy condition.  Despite this, the results provided 
substantial evidence for the null hypothesis that the degree of inhibitory control used on 
an initial task had no effect on subsequent susceptibility to unconscious primes.  The 
findings suggest that consciously experienced mental demands do not directly impact on 
the efficacy of unconscious processing mechanisms, leaving the susceptibility to 
unconscious processes unaffected.   
Considering these findings, Paper 2 examined whether prior inhibitory demand 
might influence susceptibility to an alternative source of subjectively non-volitional 
influence, namely hypnosis.  Many theories of hypnosis highlight the role of, or 
alterations in, frontal executive functioning (e.g. Dietrich, 2003; Egner & Raz, 2007); 
that is in frontal processes required for inhibitory control.  Therefore, we aimed to 
investigate evidence for such theories by comparing susceptibility of hypnotic 
suggestion following either an easy or difficult inhibitory task.  Experiment 1 failed to 
find evidence for or against a between conditions difference in levels of mental 
exhaustion, limiting the scope for conclusions from the sample.  Thus Experiment 2 
sought to replicate the procedure used in Experiment 1 using the same analyses and a 
larger sample.  Here a stopping rule was imposed such that participants were run until 
the Bayes factor for the exhaustion manipulation check provided evidence for either H1 
or H0.  The results showed that consistent with Paper 1, we found the inhibitory 
manipulation to be effective in creating a higher level of mental exhaustion in the 
difficult task condition.  Consistent with previous research there was also evidence for a 
relationship between individuals’ mean hypnotic response and their expectancy ratings 
(Kirsch, 1985), and DES scores (Kirsch & Council, 1992; Nadon, Hoyt, Register, & 
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Kihlstrom, 1991).  Crucially however, the results provided substantial evidence that the 
prior exertion of inhibitory control does not affect subsequent susceptibility to hypnotic 
suggestion.  These findings are consistent with cold control theory of hypnosis (Dienes, 
2012; Dienes & Perner, 2007) which maintains that any disruption of frontal function 
would leave hypnotisability unaffected unless that disruption extended to the ability to 
form accurate metacognitive representations.  This is similarly consistent with the 
findings of Paper 1, where prior inhibitory challenge left subjective thresholds of 
awareness unaltered; again, indicating that higher-order thoughts were uninfluenced.  
In light of previous work showing that the capacity for inhibitory control relates 
to the ability to successfully regulate emotions (Layton & Muraven, 2014; Pashke et al., 
2016; Tangney et al., 2004; Wagner & Heatherton, 2013), Paper 3 sought to investigate 
whether a direct manipulation of inhibitory control would affect subsequent mood 
lability observed within a behavioural (Experiment 1) and fMRI (Experiment 2) design.  
It was predicted that the behavioural results from Experiment 1 would reflect a greater 
change in mood following mood induction for those who had performed the difficult 
inhibitory task, due to a reduced capacity for emotion regulation.  Consistent with 
previous research (e.g. Dang, 2017; Hagger et al., 2010), Experiment 1 found the 
manipulation of inhibitory demand to be effective with participants rating the difficult 
task as significantly more exhausting than the easy version.  Crucially the results 
showed that prior inhibitory demand resulted in a period of increased mood lability, 
observed in participants ratings of positive and negative emotion, following either a 
positive or negative mood manipulation.  Given the role of regions of the executive 
control network (ECN) in monitoring cognitive influences on emotion (Stevens et al., 
2011), and the importance of the default mode network (DMN) in self-related emotion 
and introspection in those with depression (Greicius et al., 2007), it was predicted that 
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the fMRI results from Experiment 2 would show significant changes in ECN and DMN 
activation and connectivity following the prior use of inhibitory control.  In contrast to 
Experiment 1, no significant difference in behavioural ratings of mental exhaustion 
were observed; Bayesian analyses indicated that the results were insensitive.  The fMRI 
results revealed a significant increase in activation of regions involved in both of the 
hypothesised networks (ECN and DMN) after the inhibitory manipulation, however this 
was observed for both task conditions suggesting no significant effect of prior inhibitory 
control on cortical activity.  Furthermore, we found no differences in resting state 
network (RSN) connectivity and thus were unable to replicate previous work showing a 
profile of decreased frontal connectivity following prior inhibitory control (Wagner & 
Heatherton, 2013).  Importantly, examining the mean exhaustion levels for both 
conditions revealed that each showed levels of exhaustion equivalent to the difficult 
condition in Experiment 1 (mental exhaustion rated as > 60%).  If being in the context 
of an fMRI scanner resulted in both tasks eliciting high levels of mental exhaustion, 
then the results from both conditions may reflect prior inhibitory demand on subsequent 
neural activation.  However, viewing the results in this manner effectively removes any 
control group, preventing strong conclusions from being drawn.  
Paper 4 sought to examine whether the period of increased mood lability 
following prior inhibitory control (as observed in Paper 3, Experiment 1) would be 
similarly reflected in valence ratings of images, and whether a brief mindfulness 
manipulation would have the opposing effect of reducing the degree of valence 
attributed to the same images.  In Experiment 1, participants were asked to rate images 
in terms of positive and negative valence after either an easy or difficult inhibitory task.  
Crucially, the difficult inhibitory task was experienced as significantly more exhausting 
than the easy version.  Despite this, we found substantial evidence that prior inhibitory 
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control had no effect on the subsequent emotion ratings of positively and negatively 
valenced images.  Due to previous findings that mindfulness facilitates successful 
emotion regulation (Bishop et al., 2004; Coffey, Hartman, & Fredrickson, 2010), 
Experiment 2 examined whether a brief mindfulness manipulation would reduce the 
extremes of emotion attributed to the same set of emotionally valenced stimuli.  
However, as in Experiment 1, there was strong evidence that the manipulation had no 
influence on the emotion ratings of the positive and negative images.  These findings 
suggest that the perception of the emotional stimuli is not influenced by the degree to 
which inhibitory capacity is compromised, or by a brief mindfulness manipulation.   
Throughout the course of this thesis, we examined the effect of mental 
exhaustion arising from prior use of inhibitory control on susceptibility to unconscious 
influences.  We report an effect of prior inhibitory control on subsequent mood lability 
in response to a consciously presented piece of music.  However, taken together, the 
results presented herein provide the novel contribution that mental exhaustion arising 
from prior inhibitory control, does not appear to affect unconscious cognitive processes 
such as subliminal priming and hypnosis.  These unconscious influences are discussed 
further in the next section with regards to the degree to which they can be considered 
‘unconscious’ and the potential reasons why mental exhaustion does not appear to affect 
susceptibility to these processes.  
Unconscious Influences  
In the introduction to this thesis, we defined the unconscious as an absence of 
meta-awareness; for example, where there is a dissociation between subjective reports 
and influence on behavioural measures.  Here, we will discuss each paper in turn in 
order to examine the effect of inhibitory control on the different degrees of 
(un)conscious awareness explored.  Paper 1 most directly examines unconscious 
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processing due to the implementation of the stem completion task in examining 
susceptibility to subliminal priming.  In line with previous research employing the stem 
completion paradigm (e.g. Perrig & Eckstein, 2005; Tiggemann, Hargreaves, Polivy, & 
McFarlane, 2004), here the stimuli are believed to be unconscious when participants 
report being unable to consciously discern the words presented (i.e. they are below their 
subjective threshold of awareness) but it influences their subsequent choice of word 
completion.  Despite a significant priming effect, we observed no effect of a challenging 
inhibitory control task on subsequent susceptibility to unconscious priming suggesting 
no effect of mental exhaustion on unconscious influences.  One reason for the absence 
of any effect of prior inhibitory control could be due to the unconscious nature of the 
stimuli; that is, it is likely that priming elicits automatic responses which do not 
necessitate conscious awareness or effortful control.  
Similarly, in Paper 2 we examined the effect of prior inhibitory control on 
subsequent susceptibility to hypnosis.  Whilst hypnosis is presented consciously and 
thus cannot be considered as a purely unconscious process, it is experienced as 
subjectively non-volitional; that is, individuals lack a conscious awareness that they 
themselves are carrying out the suggested action.  Here we observed no effect of mental 
exhaustion arising from prior inhibitory control on hypnotic response.  In a similar 
manner to subliminal priming, this suggests that hypnosis elicits responses which 
appear to function outside of subjective conscious awareness and perhaps do not 
necessitate effortful control.  
In Paper 3 we examined a different type of unconscious process; namely we 
examined emotion regulation which is often thought to happen unconsciously in 
response to consciously perceived stimuli (Koole & Rothermund, 2011).  Here, whilst 
the music was presented consciously, participants were given no indication of the 
150 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
experimental aim or the need for emotion regulation and thus were thought to be 
responding automatically to the music with no conscious awareness of their need for 
emotional control.  Interestingly, we observed an increase in mood lability following the 
prior use of inhibitory control suggesting that mental exhaustion arising from inhibitory 
control affects subsequent capability for emotion regulation.  Consequently, it appears 
that there is a depleting effect of mental exhaustion on some unconscious processes but 
arguably only when such cognitions require a degree of regulation or self-control.  
Paper 4 examined a similar concept, namely we studied whether any heightened 
mood lability following prior inhibitory control might alter the perception of 
consciously perceived emotionally valenced stimuli.  However, we found no effect of 
inhibitory control on valence ratings of both positive and negative stimuli.  We 
conclude that this is likely due to the nature of the ratings involved such that they were 
concerned with the emotional valence of the stimuli themselves rather than a rating of 
participants’ mood and thus likely did not reflect the need for any conscious effort or 
control.  
 Thus, whilst mental exhaustion affects some aspects of cognition which require 
a degree of unconscious processing (i.e. emotion regulation) it does not appear to affect 
other unconscious influences such as subliminal priming below the subject threshold 
and hypnotic response.  One explanation for this could involve differing demands for 
self-control.  Whilst emotion regulation requires some form of control (either conscious 
or unconscious), responses to hypnosis and subliminal priming potentially happen 
without the need for self-control and thus likely would not be affected by an impaired 
ability for executive control or response inhibition.  Thus, whilst self-control itself 
happens both consciously and unconsciously (Fishbach & Shen, 2014; Muraven, 2012), 
our findings suggest that the temporary depletion of inhibitory control affects only those 
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processes which require a degree of effortful regulation or inhibition of responses to 
consciously presented stimuli.  These findings are discussed further below in relation to 
the different theories of self-control.  
Implications for Models of Self-control 
Whilst evaluating the different theories of self-control was not the primary 
objective of the present research, it is interesting to consider how the different models of 
self-control might attempt to account for the various findings presented in this thesis.  In 
terms of Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice's (1998) resource model, prior 
inhibitory control is thought to deplete the resources necessary for subsequent attempts 
at inhibitory control.  When considering the absence of an effect of the prior inhibitory 
task on unconscious priming in Experiment 1, the resource model might simply posit 
that there are no inhibitory processes operating in unconscious priming; hence depleting 
inhibitory or executive control resources could not be expected to have an effect.  This 
would be consistent with early research which characterised unconscious priming as an 
automatic process which requires no intention to be initiated (Posner & Snyder, 1975).  
Similarly, the absence of an effect of impaired inhibitory control on hypnotic response 
might be viewed as support for theories which do not consider inhibition or alterations 
in frontal executive functions as a necessary component of hypnosis (such as the 
expectancy theory, Kirsch, 1985).  In Paper 3, we observed increased mood lability 
following prior inhibitory control.  This result fits well with the resource model of self-
control and can be interpreted as resulting from a reduced capacity to regulate emotion 
due to the necessary resources being depleted by the initial exertion of self-control.  
Whilst this increase in mood lability was not reflected in individuals’ ratings of 
valenced images (Paper 4), this could be due to the fact that the responses captured 
affective ratings of the images themselves rather than the emotional state that they 
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induced; in which case the ratings would not be expected to reflect the availability of 
inhibitory resources. 
According to the process model of self-control (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012), 
failures to inhibit responses following prior inhibitory control are understood to stem 
from a change in motivation which shifts attention away from the need for control and 
toward rewards.  From this perspective, it could be argued that neither unconscious 
priming nor hypnosis are inherently rewarding and as such individuals are not any more 
motivated to attend to these tasks following prior inhibitory control.  The process model 
is able to account for the increased mood lability observed in Paper 3 by suggesting that 
the initial exertion of inhibitory control leads individuals to be more motivated to seek 
reward through absorption in the music.  Whilst the rewards associated with positive 
music are perhaps more immediately recognisable, it has been demonstrated that 
individuals similarly take enjoyment from negative emotions evoked by music (Garrido 
& Schubert, 2011).  In the case of positively and negatively valenced images, perhaps 
these did not elicit the same reward seeking observed for music.  This could simply be 
due to the pictures not being inherently rewarding or enjoyable, or that the ratings were 
reflective of the images rather than any effect they had on mood, as outlined above.   
Kurzban et al.'s (2013) opportunity cost model states that mental exhaustion 
arising from inhibitory control acts as a signal to cue the reallocation of executive 
processes to a lower cost/more beneficial task.  Applied to Paper 3, this theory might 
argue that the inhibitory task causes the reallocation of processes towards mind-
wandering and absorption rather than the more demanding emotion regulation, resulting 
in the increased mood lability.  Considering the absence of effects in unconscious 
priming, hypnosis, and affective ratings, an advocate of the opportunity cost model 
might hold that none of these activities are inherently rewarding or demanding and as 
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such there would be no motivation to allocate or withdraw executive processes in these 
contexts. 
Finally, Heatherton and Wagner's (2011) balance model states that self-control 
fails when frontal executive processes are disrupted.  This model can readily account for 
the increased mood lability observed in Paper 3, as it would hold that the prior 
inhibitory task impairs the frontal inhibitory capacity which would otherwise be 
employed to achieve mood regulation.  However, given the inhibitory manipulation 
failed to result in a significant difference in mental exhaustion when employed in the 
fMRI experiment we are unable to provide further empirical evidence of differences in 
frontal activation.  The balance model can also account for the finding that hypnotic 
response is not altered by the prior use of inhibitory control provided one endorses a 
model of hypnosis that is not based on frontal disinhibition, e.g. expectancy theory 
(Kirsch, 1985) or Cold Control Theory (Dienes, 2012; Dienes & Perner, 2007). 
Implications for Mental Health and Emotion Regulation 
 As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, impaired self-control is associated 
with a higher incidence of psychopathological symptoms (see de Ridder, Lensvelt-
Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & Baumeister, 2011, for a review), health risk behaviours 
(Wills et al., 2007), poorer inhibition of negative emotions (Kieras et al., 2005), lower 
academic success (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005) and is thought to contribute to many 
challenges faced by society such as debt, obesity, criminality, racial discrimination, and 
substance abuse (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012).  Thus, understanding the extent to 
which our capacity for inhibitory control affects how we respond to unconscious 
influence is especially pertinent to furthering our understanding of how unconscious 
influences affect those with clinical conditions which are characterised by chronically 
impaired inhibitory control.    
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 The results from Papers 1, 2 and 4 (Experiment 1) provide evidence that a 
reduced capacity for inhibitory control should not alter individuals’ responses to 
influences such as unconscious priming, hypnosis, or alter their perception of 
emotionally valenced stimuli.  Among other applications, hypnosis has been shown to 
be effective for the cessation of smoking (Elkins, Marcus, Bates, Rajab, & Cook, 2017), 
easing insomnia (Galovski et al., 2016), and lessening the symptoms of anxiety and 
depression (Heap, 2012).  Whilst it has yet to be shown whether a distinctively hypnotic 
component is responsible for all these effects, it is arguably reassuring that those 
suffering with impaired inhibitory control should be no less receptive to these beneficial 
effects.  On the contrary, we report a negative correlation between hypnotic responding 
and trait self-control which suggests that those with chronically impaired self-control 
could be more receptive to these potential benefits.  
The results from Paper 3 highlight the important contribution of effective 
inhibitory control in maintaining mood stability.  Whilst many strategies are already 
aimed at or involved in increasing self-control, the extent to which improved self-
control is the source of primary benefit taken from these therapies is, as yet, unknown.  
Consistent with this approach, mindfulness based therapies are thought to promote 
mental health by increasing self-control and thereby decreasing negative rumination and 
impulsive maladaptive behaviours, and increasing the capacity for effective emotional 
regulation (see Baer, 2003, for a meta-analysis).  A study focusing on employing 
mindfulness to combat the effects of inhibitory control ‘depletion’ reported that those 
who partook in meditation following an inhibitory control task subsequently performed 
as well as those who had not previously exerted control (Friese et al., 2012).  Such 
findings suggest that employing mindfulness strategies following self-control could 
decrease individuals’ tendency toward increased mood lability in a state of ego-
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depletion.  Similarly, neuroimaging studies indicate that cognitive therapy for 
depression and anxiety function by simultaneously reducing hyper-activation of 
subcortical regions responsible for emotion generation and increasing activation of 
higher-order cortical regions associated with mental control (Clark & Beck, 2010).   
The findings from Paper 3 also fit well with the mood-as-input hypothesis (see 
Meeten & Davey, 2011; Startup & Davey, 2001) which has been used to successfully 
explain a range of perseverative behaviours in psychopathologies (see MacDonald & 
Davey, 2005; Hawksley & Davey, 2010; Meeten & Davey, 2011; Startup & Davey, 
2001, 2003; Watkins & Mason, 2002).  Previous work has demonstrated that individuals 
are more likely to attend to their mood and use it as a source of information under 
increased cognitive load (Schwarz et al., 1987; Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998), especially 
during a state of negativity when they have a desire to repair their mood (see Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983).   The findings presented here indicate that mental exhaustion and the 
reduced capacity for control arising from prior inhibition may have a similar effect of 
increasing reliance on mood as a source of information and a vulnerability to mood 
manipulations.   
Finally, whilst impulsivity and emotional lability appear to co-exist in 
pathological states (see Eftekhari, Zoellner, & Vigil, 2009) here, trait measures of 
anxiety, depression and impulsivity were unrelated to emotional lability (Paper 3).  This 
may be due to the nature of the sample employed with results differing for clinical 
populations.  Alternatively, relationships between these personality measures and mood 
lability may be unrelated to transient changes in mood of the sort achieved in our study. 
General Limitations and Future Directions 
Dang (2017), highlights the importance of the effectiveness of the inhibitory 
task as paramount to being able to subsequently examine the effects of mental 
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exhaustion arising from inhibitory control.  In Papers 1, 2, and 4 the Stoop was used as 
the inhibitory control task and (with the exception of Experiment 1 in Paper 2) was 
shown to be successful in creating a higher level of mental exhaustion for those 
undertaking the difficult task, consistent with previous research (Bray et al., 2008; 
Govorun & Payne, 2006; Webb & Sheeran, 2003).  Bearing this in mind, it should have 
been possible to observe effects of mental exhaustion on subsequent behaviours should 
they exist.  Paper 3 utilised the e-crossing task which, at the time of employing the task, 
had been identified as one of the strongest inhibitory control manipulations (Hagger et 
al. 2010).  In Experiment 1 this showed to be effective in producing a significant 
difference in levels of task related mental exhaustion.  However, as mentioned above, 
the same difference was not observed in the fMRI context of Experiment 2.  Instead we 
observed that both conditions gave an average rating of mental exhaustion which were 
similar to that observed in the difficult inhibitory condition in Experiment 1.  This 
suggested that both of the e-crossing tasks were experienced as similarly exhausting.  In 
order to allow for conclusions regarding neural activation and connectivity underlying 
the effect of prior inhibitory control, it is therefore imperative that future research test 
the effectiveness of the inhibitory control tasks (e.g. Stroop, e-crossing, emotion video) 
in order to find a task that transfers most appropriately into the scanner environment.  
This is especially important considering recent replication failures in the self-control 
literature (Hagger et al., 2016). 
The present research sought to assess the effect of prior inhibitory demand on 
subsequent susceptibility to unconscious influences.  Arguably the most direct test of 
this is observed in Paper 1 which utilised a stem completion task to assess levels of 
unconscious priming following an inhibitory control manipulation.  While not explicitly 
an unconscious process, Paper 2 examined hypnosis which is experienced as 
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subjectively non-volitional.  Similarly, whilst the music-based mood manipulations 
employed in Paper 3 were presented consciously, we investigate their influence on 
emotion regulation which can be elicited in the absence of subjective awareness (see 
Koole & Rothermund, 2011).  This same approach was employed for Paper 4 in which 
the stimuli used were conscious, and we sought to examine any influence of mental 
exhaustion on the perception of emotional valence.   
There are alternative experimental paradigms that it was not possible to employ 
within the scope of this thesis, but which may prove to be more sensitive to unconscious 
influences and, as such, might reasonably be explored in future research.  One such 
example would be to assess the effects of a prior inhibitory challenge on unconscious 
attentional shifts.  This could be achieved using an unconscious dot-probe task 
exploiting back-masking or continuous flash suppression to suppress neutral and 
rewarding stimuli.  It remains to be established whether states of mental exhaustion 
arising from prior inhibitory control alter such pre-conscious attentional biases. 
Reproducibility 
Over the last decade a crisis of confidence in the field of psychological science 
has resulted from failures to replicate, questionable research practices, publication bias, 
and a lack of willingness to share data (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012).  Consequently, 
in recent years, replicability has been identified as of chief importance within the 
empirical sciences (Schmidt, 2009).  The Reproducibility Project by the Open Science 
Collaboration (Aarts et al., 2015) closely replicated 100 studies selected from leading 
journals and found that less than 40 were successfully replicated, further impressing the 
need for independent replications (Asendorpf & Conner, 2012).  Publication bias, which 
refers to the higher likelihood for papers to be published if they report significant results 
(Bishop & Thompson, 2016) can contribute to the reproducibility crisis by encouraging 
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a tendency to chase statistically significant (Stahel, 2016) and discard non-significant 
results (see Amrhein, Korner-Nievergelt, & Roth, 2017).  With orthodox statistics, a 
non-significant result is uninformative and can result in being misinterpreted as 
evidence against a theory, or wrongly discarded when it could offer evidence for the 
null hypothesis (see Dienes, 2014).  Bayesian statistics overcome this issue by 
distinguishing between a statistically non-significant result which is a product of data 
insensitivity and a non-significant result which provides evidence for the null 
hypothesis (Dienes, 2014).  Furthermore, Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) provide a 
protocol for using Bayes to determine whether an attempt at replication has been 
successful or not by modelling the alternative hypothesis of the replication study on the 
posterior distribution of the effect observed in the original experiment.  Crucially, this 
process is able to detect effects of the same size as obtained in the original study and 
can be applied to multiple replications (see Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014).   
This thesis embraces current practices to promote data transparency and 
replicability.  We employ Bayesian statistics to determine whether statistically non-
significant results provide evidence for and against the null hypothesis.  Further we 
employ the replication procedure outlined in Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) in 
Paper 2.  We also provide links to the data and experimental materials stored on the 
Open Science Framework, the core purpose of which is to promote “openness, integrity, 
and reproducibility of scientific research” (Center for Open Science, 2013, p.1). 
Conclusion 
Converging methods are utilised in the current thesis to provide the novel 
contribution that mental exhaustion arising from the prior use of inhibitory control 
processes, has no effect on subsequent susceptibility to unconscious influences arising 
from unconscious priming and hypnosis, and no effect on the degree of emotion 
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attributed to positively and negatively valenced images.  Despite no significant 
differences in neural activation or connectivity being observed between inhibitory task 
conditions, mental exhaustion arising from inhibitory control does appear to result in a 
period of increased mood lability suggesting that individuals either find it more 
challenging to regulate their emotions, or do not attempt to use inhibitory processes for 
emotion regulation following prior inhibitory demand.  The results suggest that those 
with conditions characterised by chronically impaired inhibitory capacity may be more 
susceptible to unconscious influence on their mood state but should be no more 
susceptible to unconscious priming and no less receptive to the potential therapeutic 
effects of hypnosis.  
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Appendix A: Word stimuli employed in Paper 1  
Visual Threshold Stem Completion Experiment 1 Stem Completion Experiment 2 
     Reward Neutral 
       
red shape debit bacardi earlobe 
green stupid offend baguette sanctify 
blue asset muscle banana endure 
yellow talent bound barbeque  transpire 
orange morgue armour batter raving 
black appear goose berry goose 
grey deter wages biscuit quarrel 
purple hollow elect bread refer 
pink verify marry burger expire 
brown which cheese candy freak 
one birch racer caramel beehive 
two yeast cough cheese relate 
three vacant grass chips dried 
four glean orgasm chocolate narrative 
five scurry street cocoa wedge 
six ballet victim coffee object 
seven friend horse cream blame 
eight tender awake crisps untidy 
nine salary behave croissant calloused 
ten visit crash curry elect 
eleven native speed dessert rapport 
twelve affair common dinner danger 
thirteen squid secure feast slave 
fourteen triple clear flake debit 
fifteen notice thump galaxy famine 
sixteen relate emblem honey vague 
seventeen patch change lager litre 
eighteen famine click lemon width 
nineteen mutate metro lunch limit 
twenty bride germs mango feral 
  panda endure martini pollute 
  adorn sound melon hinge 
  define locate meringue dismount 
  afresh insert nougat wangle 
  annoy threat orange native 
  single diary picnic triple 
  oracle refer pudding vicious 
  dried raisin raisin mutate 
  trust estate roast venus 
196 
 
  aerial known salmon vessel 
  galaxy alley sambuca offense 
  expire alive sausage fatigue 
  risen guilty scone waive 
  scope rustle sherbet hydrant 
  cable trough sorbet velour 
  global astute sweets vacant 
  garlic latte tortilla abdicate 
  motive gentle truffle verbose 
  pasta admit vanilla abiding 
  raving drone waffle wallow 
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Appendix B: Word stimuli with frequency data for Paper 1 Experiment 2 
Stem Reward Frequency Stem Neutral Frequency 
Number 
of Letters  
bac bacardi 23 ear earlobe 12 7 
bag baguette 19 san sanctify 13 8 
ban banana 511 end endure 511 6 
bar barbeque  11 tra transpire 22 9 
bat batter 148 rav raving 166 6 
ber berry 461 goo goose 479 5 
bis biscuit 552 qua quarrel 552 7 
bre bread 3621 ref refer 3720 5 
bur burger 210 exp expire 218 6 
can candy 360 fre freak 337 5 
car caramel 71 bee beehive 74 7 
che cheese 2504 rel relate 2555 6 
chi chips 1789 dri dried 1730 5 
cho chocolate 1931 nar narrative 1672 9 
coc cocoa 479 wed wedge 400 5 
cof coffee 6213 obj object 6135 6 
cre cream 3099 bla blame 2973 5 
cri crisps 353 unt untidy 376 6 
cro croissant 28 cal calloused 27 9 
cur curry 526 ele elect 526 5 
des dessert 300 rap rapport 293 7 
din dinner 5858 dan danger 5755 6 
fea feast 849 sla slave 858 5 
fla flake 262 deb debit 259 5 
gal galaxy 605 fam famine 633 6 
hon honey 1413 vag vague 1432 5 
lag lager 497 lit litre 502 5 
lem lemon 1190 wid width 1128 5 
lun lunch 4850 lim limit 4848 5 
man mango 110 fer feral 119 5 
mar martini 114 pol pollute 109 7 
mel melon 198 hin hinge 203 5 
mer meringue 57 dis dismount 67 8 
nou nougat 10 wan wangle 18 6 
ora orange 2585 nat native 2568 6 
pic picnic 632 tri triple 670 6 
pud pudding 837 vic vicious 840 7 
rai raisin 29 mut mutate 27 6 
roa roast 510 ven venus 510 5 
sal salmon 1403 ves vessel 1382 6 
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sam sambuca 1 off offense 8 7 
sau sausage 497 fat fatigue 480 7 
sco scone 145 wai waive 138 5 
she sherbet 24 hyd hydrant 14 7 
sor sorbet 34 vel velour 24 6 
swe sweets 726 vac vacant 785 6 
tor tortilla 33 abd abdicate 45 8 
tru truffle 25 ver verbose 31 7 
van vanilla 176 abi abiding 196 7 
waf waffle 87 wal wallow 60 6 
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Appendix C: Word stimuli with alternative completions Paper 1 Experiment 2 
Reward Stimuli Neutral Stimuli 
Stem 
Target 
Word 
Alternative 
Completions Stem 
Target 
Word 
Alternative 
Completions 
bac bacardi backing backfire ear earlobe early earnest 
bag baguette baggage bagpipe san sanctify sanction sanctuary 
ban banana band bangle end endure endorse endless 
bar barbeque  barber barge tra transpire transit transient 
bat batter baton batch rav raving ravage ravel 
ber berry beret bereaved goo goose good goon 
bis biscuit bishop bison qua quarrel quantity quandary 
bre bread break breath ref refer refine refrigerate 
bur burger burden burglar exp expire express export 
can candy canal canary fre freak free freedom 
car caramel career carbon bee beehive beetle beech 
che cheese cheek cheerful rel relate release relationship 
chi chips chief chilly dri dried drive drily 
cho chocolate choice choke nar narrative narrow narrate 
coc cocoa cocaine cocoon wed wedge wedding Wednesday 
cof coffee coffin coffer obj object objective objector 
cre cream crease creep bla blame black blade 
cri crisps criminal cricket unt untidy until untold 
cro croissant crocus crochet cal calloused calendar calico 
cur curry current curtsey ele elect electricity electrode 
des dessert despite desperate rap rapport rapid rapt 
din dinner dingy dinghy dan danger danger dance 
fea feast feature fearful sla slave slang slap 
fla flake flag flair deb debit debris debate 
gal galaxy gallant gallery fam famine fame familiar 
hon honey honour honest vag vague vagrant vagabond 
lag lager lagging lagoon lit litre literal literacy 
lem lemon lemming lemur wid width wide widen 
lun lunch lunge lung lim limit limpet limp 
man mango manicure manager fer feral ferocious ferment 
mar martini market margin pol pollute polio polite 
mel melon mellow melancholy hin hinge hinder hindsight 
mer meringue merge mercury dis dismount disciple disco 
nou nougat nourish noun wan wangle wand wander 
ora orange oracle orator nat native nature nation 
pic picnic pictorial piccolo tri triple tripod trivial 
pud pudding puddle pudgy vic vicious vicar vicinity 
rai raisin rain  raise mut mutate mutilate mutation 
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roa roast roam road ven venus veneer venal 
sal salmon salary saliva ves vessel vestige vestry 
sam sambuca sample samaritan off offense offend offensive 
sau sausage sauna saunter fat fatigue fate fatality 
sco scone scold score wai waive wail waif 
she sherbet shed sheath hyd hydrant hydraulic hydrangea 
sor sorbet sorrow sort vel velour velvet velocity 
swe sweets swede sweep vac vacant vacate vacuum 
tor tortilla torture torso abd abdicate abduct abdomen 
tru truffle trudge trumpet ver verbose verbatim verb 
van vanilla vandal vanity abi abiding ability abide 
waf waffles wafer waft wal wallow wallet wallaby 
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Appendix D: Text employed for e-crossing task in Paper 3  
Dinno
 
Page 2 
 
Horn’s Parallel Analysis 
The question of the number of components or factors to retain is critical both for reducing the analytic 
dimensionality of data, and for producing insight as to structure of latent variables (cf. Velicer & 
Jackson, 1990). Guttman (1954) formally argued that because in PCA total variance equals the number 
of variables P, in an infinite population a theoretical lower bound to the number of true components is 
given by the number of components with eigenvalues greater than one. This insight was later 
articulated by Kaiser as a retention rule for PCA as the ‘eigenvalue greater than one’ rule (Kaiser, 
1960) which has also been called the ‘Kaiser rule’ (cf. Lance et al., 2006), the ‘Kaiser-Guttman’ rule 
(cf. Jackson, 1993), and the ‘K1’ rule (cf. Hayton et al., 2004). Assessing Kaiser’s prescription, Horn 
observed that in a finite sample of N observations in P measured variables of uncorrelated data, the 
eigenvalues from a PCA or FA would be greater than and less than one, due to “sample- error and least 
squares bias.” Therefore, Horn argued, when making a component-retention decision with respect to 
observed, presumably correlated data of size N observations by P variables, researchers would want to 
adjust the eigenvalues of each factor by subtracting the mean sample error from a “reasonably large” 
number K of uncorrelated N × P data sets, and retaining those components or factors with adjusted 
eigenvalues greater than one (Horn, 
1965). Horn also expressed the PA decision criterion in a mathematically equivalent way, by saying that 
a researcher would retain those components or factors whose eigenvalues were larger than the mean 
eigenvalues of the K uncorrelated data sets. Both these formulations are illustrated in Figure 1 which 
represents PA of a PCA applied to a simulated data set of 50 observations, across 20 variables, with two 
uncorrelated factors, and %50 total variance. 
 
Ironically, PA has enjoyed both a substantial affirmation in the methods literature for its performance 
relative to other retention criteria, while at the same time being one of the least often used methods in 
actual empirical research (cf. Hayton et al., 2004; Patil et al., 2008; Thompson & Daniel, 1996; Velicer 
et al., 2000). Methods papers making comparisons between retention decisions in PCA and FA have 
tended to ratify the idea that PA outperforms all other commonly published component retention 
methods, particularly the commonly reported Kaiser rule and scree test (Cattell, 1966) methods. Indeed, 
the panning of the eigenvalue greater than one rule has provoked harsh criticism: “The most disparate 
results were obtained… with the [K1] criterion…” (Silverstein, 1977, page 398) “Given the apparent 
functional relation of the number of components retained by Kl to the number of original variables and 
the repeated reports of the method’s inaccuracy, we cannot recommend the Kl rule for PCA.” (Zwick & 
Velicer, 1986, page 439) “…the eigenvalues- greater-than-one rule proposed by Kaiser… is the result 
of a misapplication of the formula for internal consistency reliability.” (Cliff, 1988, page 276) “On 
average the [K1] rule overestimated the correct number of factors by 66%. This poor performance led to 
a recommendation against continued use of the [K1] rule.” (Glorfeld, 1995, page 379) “The [K1] rule 
was extremely inaccurate and was the most variable of all the methods. Continued use of this method is 
not recommended” (Velicer et al., 2000, page 26). In an article titled “Efficient theory development and 
factor retention criteria: Abandon the ‘eigenvalue greater than one’ criterion” Patil et al. (2008) wrote 
on pages 169–170 “With respect to the factor retention criteria, perhaps marketing journals, like some 
journals in psychology, should 
recommend strongly the use of PA or minimum average partial and not allow the eigenvalue greater 
than one rule as the sole criterion. This is essential to avoid proliferation of superfluous constructs and 
weak theories.” More recent methods include the root mean square error adjustment which evaluates 
successive maximum likelihood FA models in a progression from zero to some positive number of 
factors for model fit (Browne & Cudeck, 
1992; Steiger & Lind, 1980), and bootstrap methods that account for sampling variability in the estimates 
of the eigenvalues of the observed data (Lambert, Wildt & Durand, 1990), but have yet to be rigorously 
evaluated against one another and other retention methods. Recent 
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Appendix E: BOLD contrast effect sizes for significant clusters in masked post>pre 
analyses of Paper 3 
 
Figure E.1.  BOLD contrast effect sizes (SPM beta weights) for significant clusters 
detected in the post>pre t-contrast when masking for the DMN and ECN, separated by 
inhibitory task condition.  Error bars show ± 1 SEM.  Note. * p < .001. 
 
 
 
203 
 
Appendix F: BOLD contrast effect sizes for significant clusters in whole brain 
post>pre analysis 
 
Figure F.1.  BOLD contrast effect sizes (SPM beta weights) for significant clusters 
detected in the whole brain post>pre t-contrast (see corresponding A-C in Figure 6) 
separated by inhibitory task condition.  Error bars show ± 1 SEM.  Note. * p< .001. 
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Appendix G: Significant clusters for all t-contrasts 
Region Cluster 
pFDR 
K Peak 
pFWE 
Z x y z 
Pre        
R Sub Gyral .022 16 .044 4.46 30 35 5 
R Superior Temporal Gyrus .009 22 .079 4.34 46 -17 1 
R Rolandic Operculum .044 10 .103 4.28 42 -9 21 
L Medial Frontal Gyrus .035 12 .261 4.07 -18 39 21 
R Sub Gyral  .044 10 .524 3.90 38 -49 33 
Post         
R Sub Gyral  .010 19 .054 4.42 38 -49 21 
R Superior Frontal Gyrus <.001 69 .055 4.41 18 43 21 
R Postcentral Gyrus .042 12 .067 4.37 30 -29 45 
R Superior Temporal Gyrus .011 18 .089 4.31 58 7 -7 
L Angular Gyrus .002 28 .108 4.27 -38 -65 33 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus .015 16 .222 4.10 -42 19 41 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus .010 20 .280 4.05 34 15 41 
Post>Pre        
R Superior Frontal Gyrus .002 29 .040 4.48 22 31 45 
R Angular Gyrus .005 21 .146 4.20 42 -57 49 
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus  
(pars triangularis) 
.005 23 .176 4.16 54 27 17 
R Middle Frontal Gyrus .027 13 .529 3.90 42 7 37 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus .006 19 .626 3.86 -42 15 41 
L Inferior Occipital Gyrus .041 11 .713 3.79 -42 -9 -3 
Difficult        
Table G.1. Significant FDR corrected clusters following height thresholding at p<.001 
for all t-contrasts. 
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L Superior Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
.036 13 .072 4.36 -6 35 53 
L Supramarginal Gyrus <.001 50 .080 4.33 -54 -45 29 
R Supramarginal Gyrus .036 14 .111 4.26 42 -49 33 
L Dorsolateral Superior 
Frontal Gyrus 
.008 21 .516 3.90 -18 51 9 
 
